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Executive Summary
Stabilizing greenhouse gas (GHG) concentrations will require large-
scale transformations in human societies, from the way that we pro-
duce and consume energy to how we use the land surface. A natural 
question in this context is what will be the ‘transformation pathway’ 
towards stabilization; that is, how do we get from here to there? The 
topic of this chapter is transformation pathways. The chapter is pri-
marily motivated by three questions. First, what are the near-term and 
future choices that define transformation pathways, including the goal 
itself, the emissions pathway to the goal, technologies used for and 
sectors contributing to mitigation, the nature of international coordi-
nation, and mitigation policies? Second, what are the key characteris-
tics of different transformation pathways, including the rates of emis-
sions reductions and deployment of low-carbon energy, the magnitude 
and timing of aggregate economic costs, and the implications for other 
policy objectives such as those generally associated with sustainable 
development? Third, how will actions taken today influence the options 
that might be available in the future? As part of the assessment in this 
chapter, data from over 1000 new scenarios published since the IPCC 
Fourth Assessment Report (AR4) were collected from integrated mod-
elling research groups, many from large-scale model intercomparison 
studies. In comparison to AR4, new scenarios, both in this AR5 dataset 
and more broadly in the literature assessed in this chapter, consider 
more ambitious concentration goals, a wider range of assumptions 
about technology, and more possibilities for delays in additional global 
mitigation beyond that of today and fragmented international action. 
Atmospheric concentrations in baseline scenarios collected for 
this assessment (scenarios without additional efforts to con-
strain emissions beyond those of today) all exceed 450 parts 
per million (ppm) carbon dioxide-equivalent (CO2eq) by 2030 
and lie above the RCP  6�0 representative concentration path-
way in 2100 (770 ppm CO2eq in 2100); the majority lie below 
the RCP  8�5 concentration pathway in 2100 (1330 ppm CO2eq 
in 2100) (high confidence). The scenario literature does not system-
atically explore the full range of uncertainty surrounding development 
pathways and the possible evolution of key drivers such as popula-
tion, technology, and resources. However, the baseline scenarios do 
nonetheless strongly suggest that absent explicit efforts at mitigation, 
cumulative CO2 emissions since 2010 will exceed 700 GtCO2 by 2030, 
exceed 1500 GtCO2 by 2050, and potentially be well over 4000 GtCO2 
by 2100. [Section 6.3.1]
Scenarios can be distinguished by the long-term concentration 
level they reach by 2100; however, the degree to which concen-
trations exceed (overshoot) this level before 2100 is also impor-
tant (high confidence). The large majority of scenarios produced in the 
literature that reach about 450 ppm CO2eq by 2100 are characterized 
by concentration overshoot facilitated by the deployment of carbon 
dioxide removal (CDR) technologies. Many scenarios have been con-
structed to reach about 550 ppm CO2eq by 2100 without overshoot. 
Scenarios with more overshoot exhibit less mitigation today, but they 
often rest on the assumption that future decision makers deploy CDR 
technologies at large scale. An assessment in this chapter of geophysi-
cal climate uncertainties consistent with the dynamics of Earth System 
Models assessed in Working Group I (WG I) provides estimates of the 
temperature implications of different emissions pathways. This assess-
ment found that the likelihood of exceeding temperature goals this 
century increases with peak concentration levels, which are higher in 
overshoot scenarios. [6.3.2]
All major-emitting regions make substantial reductions from 
their baseline CO2eq emissions over the century in scenarios 
that bring atmospheric concentrations to about 550 ppm CO2eq 
or below by 2100 (high confidence). In most scenarios collected for 
this assessment that reach concentrations of about 550 ppm CO2eq by 
2100, global CO2eq emissions are reduced by more than 50 %, and in 
some cases by more than 100 %, by the end of the century relative to 
2010 levels. The CO2eq emissions are brought to near or below zero 
by 2100 in the majority of the scenarios reaching concentrations of 
about 450 ppm CO2eq by 2100. In large part because baseline emis-
sions from the countries not part of the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) in 1990 are projected to outstrip 
those from the OECD-1990 countries, the total CO2eq reductions from 
baseline occurring in the non-OECD-1990 countries are larger than in 
the OECD-1990 countries, particularly in scenarios that cost-effectively 
allocate emissions reductions across countries. Emissions peak earlier 
in the OECD-1990 countries than in the non-OECD-1990 countries in 
these cost-effective scenarios. [6.3.2]
Bringing concentrations to about 550 ppm CO2eq or below by 
2100 will require large-scale changes to global and national 
energy systems, and potentially to the use of land; these 
changes are inconsistent with both long- and short-term trends 
(high confidence). Accelerated electrification of energy end use, cou-
pled with decarbonization of the majority of electricity generation by 
2050 and an associated phaseout of freely emitting coal generation, 
is a common feature of scenarios reaching about 550 ppm CO2eq or 
less by 2100. Scenarios suggest that sectors currently using liquid fuel 
are more costly to decarbonize than electricity and may be among the 
last sectors to be decarbonized for deep CO2 emissions reductions. 
Scenarios articulate very different changes in the land surface, reflect-
ing different assumptions about the potential for bioenergy produc-
tion, afforestation, and reduced deforestation. Studies indicate a large 
potential for energy use reductions, but also demonstrate that these 
reductions will not be sufficient by themselves to constrain GHG emis-
sions. [6.3.4, 6.3.5, 6.8]
Estimates of the aggregate economic costs of mitigation vary 
widely, but increase with stringency of mitigation (high confi-
dence). Most scenario studies collected for this assessment that are 
based on the idealized assumptions that all countries of the world begin 
mitigation immediately, there is a single global carbon price applied to 
well-functioning markets, and key technologies are available, estimate 
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that reaching about 450 ppm CO2eq by 2100 would entail global con-
sumption losses of 1 – 4 % in 2030 (median of 1.7 %), 2 – 6 % in 2050 
(median of 3.4 %), and 3 – 11 % in 2100 (median of 4.8 %) relative to 
what would happen without mitigation. These consumption losses cor-
respond to an annual average reduction of consumption growth of 0.06 
to 0.20 percentage points from 2010 to 2030 (median of 0.09), 0.06 
to 0.17 percentage points through 2050 (median of 0.09), and 0.04 to 
0.14 percentage points over the century (median of 0.06). To put these 
losses in context, studies assume annual average consumption growth 
rates without mitigation between 1.9 % and 3.8 % per year until 2050 
and between 1.6 % and 3.0 % per year over the century. These growth 
rates correspond to increases in total consumption from roughly four-
fold to over ten-fold over the century. Costs for maintaining concen-
trations at around 550 ppm  CO2eq are estimated to be roughly one-
third to two-thirds lower. Substantially higher and lower cost estimates 
have been obtained based on assumptions about less idealized policy 
implementations, interactions with pre-existing distortions, non-climate 
market failures, or complementary policies. (Limits on technology and 
delayed mitigation are discussed below.) [6.3.6]
Effort-sharing frameworks could help address distributional 
issues and decouple regional mitigation investments from 
financial burdens, but could be associated with significant inter-
national financial flows (medium confidence). In the absence of 
effort-sharing frameworks, cost-effectively allocating emissions across 
countries would yield an uneven distribution of mitigation costs. Sce-
narios indicate that this would lead to higher relative costs in develop-
ing economies as well as for many fossil fuel exporters. Studies explor-
ing effort-sharing frameworks in the context of a global carbon market 
estimate that the financial flows to ameliorate this asymmetry could 
be on the order of hundreds of billions of USD per year before mid-cen-
tury to bring concentrations to about 450 ppm CO2eq in 2100. [6.3.6]
Emissions through 2030 will have strong implications for the 
challenges of, and options for, bringing concentrations to about 
450 to about 500 ppm CO2eq by the end of the twenty-first cen-
tury (high confidence). The vast majority of cost-effective scenarios 
leading to 2100 concentrations of about 450 to about 500 ppm CO2eq 
are characterized by 2030 emissions roughly between 30  GtCO2eq 
and 50 GtCO2eq. Scenarios with emissions above 55 GtCO2eq in 2030 
are predominantly driven by delays in additional mitigation relative 
to what would be most cost-effective. These scenarios are character-
ized by substantially higher rates of emissions reductions from 2030 
to 2050, a larger reliance on CDR technologies in the long term, and 
higher transitional and long-term economic impacts. Due to these 
challenges, many models with 2030 emissions in this range could not 
produce scenarios reaching about 450 ppm CO2eq in 2100. Studies 
confirm that delaying additional mitigation through 2030 has substan-
tially larger influence on the subsequent challenges of mitigation than 
delaying only through 2020. [6.3.2, 6.4]
The availability of key technologies and improvements in the 
cost and performance of these technologies will have important 
implications for the challenge of achieving concentration goals 
(high confidence). Many models in recent multi-model comparisons 
could not produce scenarios reaching approximately 450 ppm CO2eq 
by 2100 with broadly pessimistic assumptions about key mitigation 
technologies. Large-scale deployment of CDR technologies in particular 
is relied upon in many of these scenarios in the second-half of the cen-
tury. For those models that could produce such scenarios, pessimistic 
assumptions about important technologies for decarbonizing non-elec-
tric energy supply significantly increased the discounted global mitiga-
tion costs of reaching about 450 ppm and about 550 ppm CO2eq by 
the end of the century, with the effect being larger for more stringent 
goals. These studies also showed that reducing energy demand can 
potentially decrease mitigation costs significantly. [6.3.2, 6.3.4, 6.3.6, 
6.4]
Mitigation efforts will influence the costs of meeting other 
policy objectives� Recent studies indicate that climate policies 
significantly reduce the costs of reaching energy security and 
air quality objectives (medium evidence, high agreement). The asso-
ciated economic implications for these objectives are not taken into 
account in most scenario studies. Sectoral studies suggest that the 
potential for co-benefits of energy end-use mitigation measures out-
weighs the potential for adverse side-effects, whereas the evidence 
suggests this may not be the case for all supply-side and AFOLU mea-
sures. The overall welfare implications associated with these additional 
objectives have not been assessed thoroughly in the literature. [6.6]
There is uncertainty about the potential of geoengineering by 
CDR or solar radiation management (SRM) to counteract climate 
change, and all techniques carry risks and uncertainties (high 
confidence). A range of different SRM and CDR techniques has been 
proposed, but no currently existing technique could fully replace miti-
gation or adaptation efforts. Nevertheless, many low-GHG concentra-
tion scenarios rely on two CDR techniques, afforestation and biomass 
energy with carbon dioxide capture and storage (BECCS), which some 
studies consider to be comparable with conventional mitigation meth-
ods. Solar radiation management could reduce global mean tempera-
tures, but with uneven regional effects, for example on temperature and 
precipitation, and it would not address all of the impacts of increased 
CO2 concentrations, such as ocean acidification. Techniques requiring 
large-scale interventions in the earth system, such as ocean fertilization 
or stratospheric aerosol injections, carry significant risks. Although pro-
posed geoengineering techniques differ substantially from each other, 
all raise complex questions about costs, risks, governance, and ethical 
implications of research and potential implementation. [6.9]
Despite the advances in our understanding of transformation path-
ways since AR4, many avenues of inquiry remain unanswered. Impor-
tant future research directions include the following: development of 
a broader set of socioeconomic and technological storylines to sup-
port development of scenarios; scenarios explicitly pursuing a wider 
set of climate goals, including those related to temperature change; 
more mitigation scenarios that include impacts from, and adaptations 
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to, a changing climate, including energy and land use systems critical 
for mitigation; expanded treatment of the benefits and risks of CDR 
and SRM options; expanded treatment of co-benefits and adverse 
side-effects of mitigation pathways; improvements in the treatment 
and understanding of mitigation options and responses in end-use sec-
tors in transformation pathways; and more sophisticated treatments 
of land use and land use-based mitigation options in mitigation sce-
narios. [6.10]
6.1 Introduction
6�1�1 Framing and evaluating transformation 
pathways 
Stabilizing greenhouse gas (GHG) concentrations at any level will 
require deep reductions in GHG emissions. Net global CO2 emissions, 
in particular, must eventually be brought to or below zero. Emissions 
reductions of this magnitude will require large-scale transformations in 
human societies, from the way that we produce and consume energy 
to how we use the land surface. The more ambitious the stabilization 
goal, the more rapid this transformation must occur. A natural question 
in this context is what will be the transformation pathway toward sta-
bilization; that is, how do we get from here to there?
The topic of this chapter is transformation pathways. The chapter is 
motivated primarily by three questions. First, what are the near-term 
and future choices that define transformation pathways including, for 
example, the goal itself, the emissions pathway to the goal, the tech-
nologies used for and sectors contributing to mitigation, the nature 
of international coordination, and mitigation policies? Second, what 
are the key decision making outcomes of different transformation 
pathways, including the magnitude and international distribution of 
economic costs and the implications for other policy objectives such 
as those associated with sustainable development? Third, how will 
actions taken today influence the options that might be available in 
the future?
Two concepts are particularly important for framing any answers to 
these questions. The first is that there is no single pathway to stabiliza-
tion of GHG concentrations at any level. Instead, the literature eluci-
dates a wide range of transformation pathways. Choices will govern 
which pathway is followed. These choices include, among other things, 
the long-term stabilization goal, the emissions pathway to meet that 
goal, the degree to which concentrations might temporarily overshoot 
the goal, the technologies that will be deployed to reduce emissions, 
the degree to which mitigation is coordinated across countries, the 
policy approaches used to achieve these goals within and across coun-
tries, the treatment of land use, and the manner in which mitigation is 
meshed with other policy objectives such as sustainable development. 
The second concept is that transformation pathways can be distin-
guished from one another in important ways. Weighing the character-
istics of different pathways is the way in which deliberative decisions 
about transformation pathways would be made. Although measures of 
aggregate economic implications have often been put forward as key 
deliberative decision making factors, these are far from the only char-
acteristics that matter for making good decisions. Transformation path-
ways inherently involve a range of tradeoffs that link to other national 
and policy objectives such as energy and food security, the distribu-
tion of economic costs, local air pollution, other environmental factors 
associated with different technology solutions (e. g., nuclear power, 
coal-fired carbon dioxide capture and storage (CCS)), and economic 
competitiveness. Many of these fall under the umbrella of sustainable 
development.
A question that is often raised about particular stabilization goals 
and transformation pathways to those goals is whether the goals or 
pathways are ‘feasible’. In many circumstances, there are clear physi-
cal constraints that can render particular long-term goals physically 
impossible. For example, if additinional mitigation beyond that of 
today is delayed to a large enough degree and carbon dioxide removal 
(CDR) options are not available (see Section 6.9), a goal of reaching 
450 ppm CO2eq by the end of the 21st century can be physically impos-
sible. However, in many cases, statements about feasibility are bound 
up in subjective assessments of the degree to which other character-
istics of particular transformation pathways might influence the ability 
or desire of human societies to follow them. Important characteristics 
include economic implications, social acceptance of new technolo-
gies that underpin particular transformation pathways, the rapidity 
at which social and technological systems would need to change to 
follow particular pathways, political feasibility, and linkages to other 
national objectives. A primary goal of this chapter is to illuminate these 
characteristics of transformation pathways.
6�1�2 New mitigation scenarios since 
AR4
Since the IPCC Fourth Assessment Report (AR4), the integrated mod-
elling community has produced a range of new transformation path-
way scenarios. Major advances include an increase in the number of 
scenarios exploring the following: low-concentration goals such as 
450 ppm CO2eq; overshoot emissions trajectories with and without 
CDR technologies; a variety of international mitigation policy configu-
rations, including fragmented action and delays in additional mitiga-
tion beyond that of today; and the implications of variations in tech-
nology cost, performance, and availability. The literature also includes 
a small but growing set of scenarios and research exploring the link-
age between mitigation and other policy objectives, an increasingly 
sophisticated treatment of the role of land use in mitigation, and sce-
narios exploring non-market approaches to mitigation. Two particularly 
important categories for the discussion in this chapter are non-ideal-
ized international implementation scenarios and scenarios with limits 
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on technology cost, performance, or availability. These categories of 
scenarios are discussed in more detail below.
6�1�2�1 Non-idealized international implementation 
scenarios
At the time of AR4, the majority of mitigation scenarios were based on 
the idealized assumption that mitigation is undertaken where and 
when it is least expensive. Such ‘idealized implementation’ scenarios 
assume the imposition of a global price on carbon that reaches across 
countries, permeates all economic sectors within countries, and rises 
over time in a way that will minimize discounted economic costs over 
a long period of time, typically through 2100. These are often referred 
to as ‘cost-effective’ scenarios, because they lead to the lowest aggre-
gate global mitigation costs under idealized assumptions about the 
functioning of markets and economies (see Section  6.3.6). However, 
the reality of international strategies for mitigation is one of different 
countries taking on mitigation at different times and using different 
and independent implementation approaches. Responding to this real-
ity, the research community has produced a large set of ‘non-idealized’ 
international implementation scenarios for reaching long-term concen-
tration goals. Often, but not always, non-idealized implementation is 
focused on the coming decades, with a transition toward idealized 
implementation in the long run. In addition to individual papers (for 
example, Richels et  al., 2007; Edmonds et  al., 2008; Luderer et  al., 
2014b; Rogelj et al., 2013a), there have been a number of multi-model 
projects exploring non-idealized implementation scenarios (Table 6.1). 
This chapter relies heavily on those multi-model studies. 
There are a number of ways that scenarios may deviate from the ideal-
ized implementation, but two are most prominent in the new litera-
ture. One set of scenarios includes those in which near-term mitigation 
is inconsistent with — typically less than — what would be called for to 
minimize the discounted, century-long costs of meeting a long-term 
goal such as 450 ppm CO2eq by 2100. These scenarios are intended to 
capture the implications of ‘delayed action’ or ‘delayed mitigation’ or 
‘constrained near-term ambition’. Mitigation is not undertaken ‘when’ 
it would be least expensive. The other set of scenarios includes those 
in which the price on carbon is not consistent across countries. Some 
countries reduce emissions more aggressively than others, particularly 
in the near-term, so that mitigation is not undertaken ‘where’ it is least 
expensive. These scenarios are intended to capture the implications 
of ‘fragmented action’ or ‘delayed participation’. Non-idealized inter-
national implementation scenarios may include one or both of these 
deviations.
6�1�2�2 Limited technology scenarios
Scenario research prior to AR4 emphasized the importance of tech-
nology in constraining the costs of mitigation. A range of individual 
papers had made initial explorations of this space for more than a 
decade before AR4. Since AR4, however, a range of new studies have 
emerged including large model intercomparison studies, that have 
focused on the implications of limitations on technology cost, per-
formance, availability on the cost and other characteristics of meet-
ing concentration goals such as 450 ppm CO2eq by 2100. The large 
model intercomparison studies include Energy Modeling Forum (EMF) 
27 (Krey et al., 2014; Kriegler et al., 2014a), ADAM (Adaptation and 
Mitigation Strategies: Supporting European Climate Policy) (Edenhofer 
et al., 2010), RECIPE (Report on Energy and Climate Policy in Europe) 
(Luderer et al., 2012a; Tavoni et al., 2012), and AMPERE (Assessment 
of Climate Change Mitigation Pathways and Evaluation of the Robust-
ness of Mitigation Cost Estimates) (Riahi et  al., 2014). In addition 
to the large model intercomparison studies, a number of individual 
Table 6�1 | Multi-model studies exploring non-idealized international implementation
Multi-Model Study Description
EMF 22 (Clarke et al., 2009) Delayed participation (fragmented action) scenarios in which Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
countries begin mitigation immediately; Brazil, Russia, India, and China begin after 2030; remaining countries begin after 
2050. Scenarios meet various 2100 concentration goals, with and without overshooting the concentration goal. 
EMF 27 (Blanford et al., 2014; 
Kriegler et al., 2014a) 
Delayed and limited participation scenario with Annex I adopting 80 % emissions reductions until 2050, non-Annex I adopting a global 
50 % emissions reduction by 2050 after 2020, and resource exporting countries not undertaking emissions reductions. 
AMPERE (Kriegler et al., 
2014c; Riahi et al., 2014) 
Two studies: AMPERE WP2 focused on delayed mitigation scenarios with the world following moderate 
mitgation until 2030, and adopting long-term concentration goals thereafter. 
AMPERE WP3 focused on delayed participation scenarios with EU27 or EU27 and China acting immediately and the remaining countries 
transitioning from moderate policies to a global carbon pricing regime (without mitigation goal) between 2030 and 2050.
LIMITS (Kriegler et al., 2013b; 
Tavoni et al., 2013)
Delayed mitgation scenarios with the world following two levels of moderate fragmented action through 2020 or 2030, and 
adopting two long-term concentration goals thereafter. Three different effort-sharing schemes are considered. 
RoSE (Luderer et al., 2014a) Delayed mitgation scenarios with the world following moderate fragmented action in the near 
term and adopting a long-term concentration goal after 2020 or 2030.
Note: The Energy Modeling Forum (EMF) 27, AMPERE (Assessment of Climate Change Mitigation Pathways and Evaluation of the Robustness of Mitigation Cost Estimates), LIMITS 
(Low Climate Impact Scenarios and the Implications of Reguired Tight Emission Control Strategies), and RoSE (Roadmaps Towards Sustainable Energy Futures) studies also included 
scenarios of moderate fragmented action throughout the 21st century without the goal of meeting any specific long-term concentration.
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research papers and reports have explored this space since AR4, typi-
cally constrained to a single model (Richels et al., 2007; Calvin et al., 
2009a; Krey and Riahi, 2009; van Vliet et al., 2009; Riahi et al., 2012; 
Luderer et al., 2013; Rogelj et al., 2013b). In many cases, these stud-
ies have simply assumed that particular technologies, such as CCS 
or nuclear power, may not be available. In others, studies have put 
constraints on resource supplies, for example, the supply of bioenergy. 
In others, they have called for variations in cost and performance of 
different technologies. Many have also explored the implications of 
energy end-use improvements.
6.2 Tools of analysis
6�2�1 Overview of integrated modelling tools
The long-term scenarios assessed in this chapter were generated 
primarily by large-scale, integrated models that can project key char-
acteristics of transformation pathways to mid-century and beyond. 
These models represent many of the most relevant interactions among 
important human systems (e. g., energy, agriculture, the economic 
system), and often represent important physical processes associated 
with climate change (e. g., the carbon cycle). Other approaches to 
explore transformation pathways include qualitative scenario methods 
and highly aggregated modelling tools, such as those used for cost-
benefit analysis (see Box 6.1 on cost-benefit analysis, p. 394). These 
other approaches provide a different level of quantitative information 
about transformation pathways than scenarios from large-scale inte-
grated models. 
All integrated models share some common traits. Most fundamentally, 
integrated models are simplified, stylized, numerical approaches to 
represent enormously complex physical and social systems. They take 
in a set of input assumptions and produce outputs such as energy 
system transitions, land-use transitions, economic effects of mitiga-
tion, and emissions trajectories. Important input assumptions include 
population growth, baseline economic growth, resources, technologi-
cal change, and the mitigation policy environment. The models do not 
structurally represent many social and political forces that can influ-
ence the way the world evolves (e. g., shocks such as the oil crisis of 
the 1970s). Instead, the implications of these forces enter the model 
through assumptions about, for example, economic growth and 
resource supplies. The models use economics as the basis for decision 
making. This may be implemented in a variety of ways, but it funda-
mentally implies that the models tend toward the goal of minimizing 
the aggregate economic costs of achieving mitigation outcomes, unless 
they are specifically constrained to behave otherwise. In this sense, the 
scenarios tend towards normative, economics-focused descriptions of 
the future. The models typically assume fully functioning markets and 
competitive market behavior, meaning that factors such as non-market 
transactions, information asymmetries, and market power influencing 
decisions are not effectively represented. Maintaining a long-term, 
integrated, and often global perspective involves tradeoffs in terms 
of the detail at which key processes can be represented in integrated 
models. Hence, the models do not generally represent the behaviour 
of certain important system dynamics, such as economic cycles or the 
operation of electric power systems important for the integration of 
solar and wind power, at the level of detail that would be afforded by 
analyses that the focus exclusively on those dynamics. 
Beyond these and other similarities, integrated modelling approaches 
can be very different, and these differences can have important impli-
cations for the variation among scenarios that emerge from different 
models. The following paragraphs highlight a number of key differ-
ences in model structure. To provide insight into the implications of 
these tradeoffs, potential implications for aggregate economic costs 
are provided as examples, when appropriate.
Economic coverage and interactions� Models differ in terms of the 
degree of detail with which they represent the economic system and 
the degree of interaction they represent across economic sectors. Full-
economy models (e. g., general equilibrium models) represent inter-
actions across all sectors of the economy, allowing them to explore 
and understand ripple effects from, for example, the imposition of 
a mitigation policy, including impacts on overall economic growth. 
Partial-economy models, on the other hand, take economic activ-
ity as an input that is unresponsive to policies or other changes such 
as those associated with improvements in technology. These models 
tend to focus more on detailed representations of key systems such 
as the energy system. All else equal, aggregate economic costs would 
tend to be higher in full-economy models than in partial-economy 
models because full-economy models include feedbacks to the entire 
economy. On the other hand, full-economy models may include more 
possibilities for substitution in sectors outside of those represented in 
partial-economy models, and this would tend to reduce aggregate eco-
nomic costs.
Foresight� Perfect-foresight models (e. g., intertemporal optimization 
models) optimize over time, so that all future decisions are taken into 
account in today’s decisions. In contrast, recursive-dynamic models 
make decisions at each point in time based only on the information in 
that time period. In general, perfect-foresight models would be likely to 
allocate emissions reductions more efficiently over time than recursive-
dynamic models, which should lead to lower aggregate costs.
Representation of trade� Models differ in terms of how easy it is 
for goods to flow across regions. On one end of the spectrum are 
models assuming goods are homogeneous and traded easily at one 
world price (Heckscher-Ohlin) or that there is one global producer 
(quasi-trade). On the other end of the spectrum are models assuming 
a preference for domestic goods over imported goods (Armington) or 
models without explicit trade across regions (e. g., models with import 
supply functions). In general, greater flexibility to trade will result in 
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lower-aggregate mitigation costs because the global economy is more 
flexible to undertake mitigation where it is least expensive. More gen-
erally, many partial-equilibrium models include trade only in carbon 
permits and basic energy commodities. These models are not capable 
of exploring the full nature of carbon leakage that might emerge from 
mitigation policies, and particularly those associated with fragmented 
international action.
Model flexibility� The flexibility of models describes the degree 
to which they can change course. Model flexibility is not a single, 
explicit choice for model structure. Instead, it is the result of a range 
of choices that influence, for example, how easily capital can be reallo-
cated across sectors including the allowance for premature retirement 
of capital stock, how easily the economy is able to substitute across 
energy technologies, whether fossil fuel and renewable resource con-
straints exist, and how easily the economy can extract resources. The 
complexity of the different factors influencing model flexibility makes 
clear delineations of which models are more or less flexible difficult. 
Evaluation and characterization of model flexibility is an area of cur-
rent research (see Kriegler et al., 2014b). Greater flexibility will tend to 
lower mitigation costs.
Sectoral, regional, technology, and GHG detail� Models differ dra-
matically in terms of the detail at which they represent key sectors and 
systems. These differences influence not only the way that the models 
operate, but also the information they can provide about transforma-
tion pathways. Key choices include the number of regions, the degree 
of technological detail in each sector, which GHGs are represented and 
how, whether land use is explicitly represented, and the sophistica-
tion of the model of earth system process such as the carbon cycle. 
Some models include only CO2 emissions, many do not treat land-use 
change (LUC) and associated emissions, and many do not have sub-
models of the carbon cycle necessary to calculate CO2 concentrations. 
In addition, although the scenarios in this chapter were generated 
from global models that allow for the implications of mitigation for 
international markets to be measured, regional models can provide 
finer detail on the implications for a specific region’s economy and dis-
tributional effects. The effects of detail on aggregate mitigation costs 
are ambiguous 
Representation of technological change� Models can be catego-
rized into two groups with respect to technological change. On one 
end of the spectrum, models with exogenous technological change 
take technology as an input that evolves independently of policy mea-
sures or investment decisions. These models provide no insight on 
how policies may induce advancements in technology. On the other 
end of the spectrum, models with endogenous technological change 
(also known as induced technological change) allow for some por-
tion of technological change to be influenced by deployment rates 
or investments in research and development (R&D). Models featuring 
endogenous technological change are valuable for understanding how 
the pace of technological change might be influenced by mitigation 
policies.
6�2�2 Overview of the scenario ensemble for 
this assessment
The synthesis in this chapter is based on a large set of new scenarios 
produced since AR4. The number of models has increased and model 
functionality has significantly improved since AR4, allowing for a 
broader set of scenarios in the AR5 ensemble. The majority of these 
scenarios were produced as part of multi-model comparisons. Most 
model intercomparison studies produce publicly available databases 
that include many of the key outputs from the studies. Although crucial 
for our understanding of transformation pathways, these intercompari-
son exercises are not the only source of information on transformation 
pathways. A range of individual studies has been produced since AR4, 
largely assessing transformation pathways in ways not addressed in 
the model intercomparison exercises. For the purposes of this assess-
ment, an open call was put forward for modellers to submit scenarios 
not included in the large model intercomparison databases. These 
scenarios, along with those from many of the model intercomparison 
studies, have been collected in a database that is used extensively in 
this chapter. A summary of the models and model intercomparison 
exercises that generated the scenarios referenced in this chapter can 
be found in Annex II.10.
6�2�3 Uncertainty and the interpretation of 
large scenario ensembles 
The interpretation of large ensembles of scenarios from different mod-
els, different studies, and different versions of individual models is a 
core component of the assessment of transformation pathways in this 
chapter. Indeed, many of the tables and figures represent ranges of 
results across all these dimensions. 
There is an unavoidable ambiguity in interpreting ensemble results in 
the context of uncertainty. On the one hand, the scenarios assessed in 
this chapter do not represent a random sample that can be used for 
formal uncertainty analysis. Each scenario was developed for a specific 
purpose. Hence, the collection of scenarios included in this chapter does 
not necessarily comprise a set of ‘best guesses.’ In addition, many of 
these scenarios represent sensitivities, particularly along the dimensions 
of future technology availability and the timing of international action 
on climate change, and are therefore highly correlated. Indeed, most of 
the scenarios assessed in this chapter were generated as part of model 
intercomparison exercises that impose specific assumptions, often 
regarding long-term policy approaches to mitigation, but also in some 
cases regarding fundamental drivers like technology, population growth, 
and economic growth. In addition, some modelling groups have gener-
ated substantially more scenarios than others, introducing a weighting 
of scenarios that can be difficult to interpret. At the same time, however, 
with the exception of pure sensitivity studies, the scenarios were gen-
erated by experts making informed judgements about how key forces 
might evolve in the future and how important systems interact. Hence, 
although they are not explicitly representative of uncertainty, they do 
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provide real and often clear insights about our lack of knowledge about 
key forces that might shape the future (Fischedick et al., 2011; Krey and 
Clarke, 2011). The synthesis in this chapter does not attempt to resolve 
the ambiguity associated with ranges of scenarios, and instead focuses 
simply on articulating the most robust and valuable insights that can 
be extracted given this ambiguity. However, wherever possible, scenario 
samples are chosen in such a way as to reduce bias, and these choices 
are made clear in the discussion and figure legends.
6�2�4 Interpretation of model inability to 
 produce particular scenarios 
A question that is often raised about particular stabilization goals and 
transformation pathways is whether the goals or pathways are ‘fea-
sible’ (see Section 6.1). Integrated models can be helpful in informing 
this question by providing information about key elements of transfor-
mation pathways that might go into assessments of feasibility, such 
as rates of deployment of energy technologies, rates of reductions 
in global and regional emissions, aggregate economic costs, finan-
cial flows among regions, and links to other policy objectives such as 
energy security or energy prices. However, beyond cases where physi-
cal laws might be violated to achieve a particular scenario (for exam-
ple, a 2100 carbon budget is exceeded prior to 2100 with no option for 
negative emissions), these integrated models cannot determine feasi-
bility in an absolute sense. 
This is an important consideration when encountering situations in 
which models are incapable of producing scenarios. Many models 
have been unable to achieve particularly aggressive concentration 
goals such as reaching 450 ppm CO2eq by 2100, particularly under 
challenging technological or policy constraints. In some cases, this 
may be due to the violation of real physical laws, the most common of 
which is when the cumulative carbon budget associated with meeting 
a long-term goal is exceeded without options to remove carbon from 
the atmosphere. Frequently, however, instances of model infeasibility 
arise from pushing models beyond the boundaries of what they were 
built to explore, for example, rates of change in the energy system that 
exceed what the model can represent, or carbon prices sufficiently 
high that they conflict with the underlying computational structure. 
Indeed, in many cases, one model may be able to produce scenarios 
while another will not, and model improvements over time may result 
in feasible scenarios that previously were infeasible. Hence, although 
these model infeasibilities cannot generally be taken as an indicator of 
feasibility in an absolute sense, they are nonetheless valuable indica-
tors of the challenge associated with achieving particular scenarios. 
For this reason, whenever possible, this chapter highlights those situa-
tions where models were unable to produce scenarios.
Unfortunately, this type of result can be difficult to fully represent in 
an assessment because, outside of model intercomparison studies 
intended explicitly to identify these circumstances, only scenarios that 
could actually be produced (as opposed that could not be produced) 
are generally published. Whether certain circumstances are under-
represented because they have been under-examined or because they 
have been examined and the scenarios failed is a crucial distinction, 
yet one that it is currently not possible to fully report. Model infeasibili-
ties can bias results in important ways, for example, the costs of miti-
gation, because only those models producing scenarios can provide 
estimated costs (Tavoni and Tol, 2010). 
6.3 Climate stabilization: 
Concepts, costs and 
 implications for the macro 
economy, sectors and 
technology  port folios, 
taking into account 
 differences across regions
6�3�1 Baseline scenarios
6�3�1�1 Introduction to baseline scenarios
Baseline scenarios are projections of GHG emissions and their key driv-
ers as they might evolve in a future in which no explicit actions are 
taken to reduce GHG emissions. Baseline scenarios play the important 
role of establishing the projected scale and composition of the future 
energy, economic, and land-use systems as a reference point for mea-
suring the extent and nature of required mitigation for a given climate 
goal. Accordingly, the resulting estimates of mitigation effort and costs 
in a particular mitigation scenario are always conditional upon the 
associated baseline. 
Although the range of emissions pathways across baseline scenarios in 
the literature is broad, it may not represent the full potential range of 
possibilities. There has been comparatively little research formally con-
structing or eliciting subjective probabilities for comprehensive ranges 
of the key drivers of baseline emissions in a country-specific context, 
and this remains an important research need for scenario develop-
ment. As discussed in Section 6.2, although the range of assumptions 
used in the literature conveys some information regarding modellers’ 
expectations about how key drivers might evolve and the associated 
implications, several important factors limit its interpretation as a true 
uncertainty range. An important distinction between scenarios in this 
regard is between those that are based on modellers’ ‘default’ assump-
tions and those that are harmonized across models within specific 
studies. The former can be considered a better, although still imperfect, 
representation of modellers’ expectations about the future, while, as is 
discussed below, the latter consider specific alternative views that in 
some cases span a larger range of possible outcomes.
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6�3�1�2 The drivers of baseline energy-related emissions
As discussed in Chapter 5, the drivers of the future evolution of energy-
related emissions in the baseline can be summarized by the terms of 
the Kaya identity: population, per capita income, energy intensity of 
economic output, and carbon intensity of energy. At the global level, 
baseline projections from integrated models are typically characterized 
by modest population growth stabilizing by the end of the century, fast 
but decelerating growth in income, decline in energy intensity, and 
modest changes in carbon intensity with ambiguous sign (Figure 6.1).
There is comparatively little variation across model scenarios in pro-
jected population growth, with virtually all modelling studies relying 
on central estimates (UN, 2012). One exception is the RoSE project 
(Bauer et al., 2014b; Calvin et al., 2014b; De Cian et al., 2014), which 
explicitly considers high population scenarios, as well as the storyline 
beneath the representative concentration pathways (RCP) 8.5 scenario. 
Among the majority of default population projections, there are some 
minor differences across models, for example, the extent to which 
declining rates for certain regions in coming decades are incorporated. 
On the other hand, there is substantially more variation in model pro-
jections of per capita income, with a few scenarios harmonized at both 
the low and high ends of the range, and energy intensity, for which 
two studies (AMPERE and EMF27) specified alternative ‘fast’ decline 
baselines. Still, the interquartile range of default assumptions for both 
indicators is narrow, suggesting that many scenarios are based on a 
Figure 6�1 | Global baseline projection ranges for Kaya factors. Scenarios harmonized with respect to a particular factor are depicted with individual lines. Other scenarios are 
depicted as a range with median emboldened; shading reflects interquartile range (darkest), 5th — 95th percentile range (lighter), and full range (lightest), excluding one indi-
cated outlier in panel a) Scenarios are filtered by model and study for each indicator to include only unique projections. Model projections and historic data are normalized to 
1 in 2010. Gross domestic product (GDP) is aggregated using base-year market exchange rates. Energy and carbon intensity are measured with respect to total primary energy. 
Sources: UN (2012), WG III AR5 Scenario Database (Annex II.10). Historic data: JRC / PBL (2013), IEA (2012a), see Annex II.9; Heston et al. (2012), World Bank (2013), BP (2013).
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similar underlying narrative. Models project a faster global average 
growth rate in the future as dynamic emerging economies constitute 
an increasing share of global output. Energy intensity declines more 
rapidly than in the past, with an especially marked departure from the 
historical trend for ‘fast’ energy intensity decline scenarios. Carbon 
intensity, typically viewed as a model outcome driven by resource and 
technology cost assumptions, is projected in most baseline scenarios to 
change relatively little over time, but there are exceptions in both 
directions. Declining carbon intensity could result from rapid improve-
ments in renewable technologies combined with rising fossil fuel 
prices. Conversely, the fossil share in energy could rise with favourable 
resource discoveries, or the fossil mix could become more carbon 
intensive, for example, due to replacement of conventional petroleum 
with heavier oil sands or coal-to-liquids.
While all models assume increasing per capita income and declin-
ing energy intensity, broad ranges are projected and high uncer-
tainty remains as to what rates might prevail. Most models describe 
income growth as the result of exogenous improvement over time in 
labour productivity. The processes of technological advance by which 
such improvement occurs are only partially understood. Changes 
in aggregate energy intensity over time are the net result of several 
trends, including both improvements in the efficiency of energy end-
use technology and structural changes in the composition of energy 
demand. Structural changes can work in both directions: there may be 
increased demand for energy-intensive services such as air-condition-
ing as incomes rise, while on the production side of the economy, there 
may be shifts to less energy-intensive industries as countries become 
wealthier. Although increasing energy intensity has been observed for 
some countries during the industrialization stage, the net effect is usu-
ally negative, and in general energy intensity has declined consistently 
over time. Both efficiency improvements and structural change can be 
driven by changes in energy prices, but to a significant extent both are 
driven by other factors such as technological progress and changing 
preferences with rising incomes. Most integrated models are able to 
project structural and technological change only at an aggregate level, 
although some include explicit assumptions for certain sectors (Sugi-
yama et al., 2014). 
Because of limited variation in population and carbon-intensity projec-
tions, the relative strength of the opposing effects of income growth 
and energy intensity decline (summarized by changes in per capita 
energy), plays the most important role in determining the growth of 
emissions in the baseline scenario literature (see Blanford et al., 2012). 
Assumptions about the evolution of these factors vary strongly across 
regions. In general, rates of change in population, income, energy 
intensity, and per capita energy are all expected to be greater in devel-
oping countries than in currently developed countries in coming 
decades, although this pattern has not necessarily prevailed in the 
past 40 years, as non-OECD-1990 countries had slower energy inten-
sity decline than OECD-1990 countries (Figure 6.2). Among default 
energy-intensity scenarios, assumed rates of change appear to be pos-
itively correlated between income and energy intensity, so that equiv-
alent per capita energy outcomes are realized through varying combi-
nations of these two indicators. The harmonized shift in the energy 
intensity decline rate leads to very low per capita energy rates, with 
global per capita energy use declining in a few cases (Figure 6.2). Pro-
jected emissions are essentially the product of per capita energy and 
carbon intensity projections, with most variation in future emissions 
scenarios explained by variation in per capita energy; the highest 
emissions projections arise from instances with high levels in both 
indicators (Figure 6.3).
6�3�1�3 Baseline emissions projections from fossil fuels 
and industry
Based on the combination of growing population, growing per capita 
energy demand, and a lack of significant reductions in carbon intensity 
of energy summarized in the previous section, global baseline emis-
sions of CO2 from fossil fuel and industrial (FF&I) sources are projected 
to continue to increase throughout the 21st century (Figure 6.4, left 
panel). Although most baseline scenarios project a deceleration in 
emissions growth, especially compared to the rapid rate observed 
in the past decade, none is consistent in the long run with the path-
ways in the two most stringent RCP scenarios (Sections 2.6 and 4.5), 
with the majority falling between the 6.0 and 8.5 pathways (see IPCC 
(2013), Chapter 12 for a discussion of the RCP study). The RCP 8.5 
pathway has higher emissions than all but a few published baseline 
scenarios. Projections for baseline FF&I CO2 emissions in 2050 range 
from only slightly higher than current levels (in scenarios with explicit 
assumptions about fast energy intensity decline) to nearly triple cur-
rent levels.
Figure 6�2 | Average rates of change between 2010 and 2050 in baseline scenarios 
for GDP per capita and energy intensity of GDP in OECD-1990 and Non-OECD-1990. 
There are 62 of 77 unique default intensity scenarios and 22 of 24 unique fast inten-
sity scenarios plotted. Omitted are scenarios without OECD-1990 break-out. Sources: 
UN (2012), WG III AR5 Scenario Database (Annex II.10). Historic data: JRC / PBL 
(2013), IEA (2012a), see Annex II.9; Heston et  al. (2012), World Bank (2013), BP 
(2013).
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Figure 6�4 | Global FF&I CO2 emissions in baseline scenarios with default growth assumptions (grey range) and fast energy intensity decline (gold range) (left panel), and for OECD-
1990 vs. non-OECD-1990 (right panel) from 1970 to 2100. RCP scenarios are shown for comparison with the global baseline ranges. Scenarios are depicted as ranges with median 
emboldened; shading reflects interquartile range (darkest), 5th – 95th percentile range (lighter), and full extremes (lightest). Absolute projections are subject to variation in reported 
base-year emissions arising from different data sources and calibration approaches (Chaturvedi et al., 2012). Some of the range of variation in reported 2010 emissions reflects dif-
ferences in regional definitions. Sources: WG III AR5 Scenario Database (Annex II.10), van Vuuren et al. (2011a). Historic data: JRC / PBL (2013), IEA (2012a), see Annex II.9.
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Figure 6�3 | Indexed change through 2050 in carbon intensity of energy and per capita energy use in baseline scenarios. Color reflects indexed 2050 global fossil fuel and indus-
trial (FF&I) CO2 emissions according to key in right panel showing histogram of plotted scenarios. For default population projections, emissions are correlated with chart position; 
exceptions with high population are noted. Source: UN (2012), WG III AR5 Scenario Database (Annex II.10). Historic data: JRC / PBL (2013), IEA (2012a), see Annex II.9; BP (2013).
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A common characteristic of all baseline scenarios is that the major-
ity of emissions over the next century occur among non-OECD-1990 
countries (Figure 6.4, right panel). Because of its large and growing 
population and projected rates of economic growth relatively faster 
than the industrialized OECD-1990 countries, this region is projected to 
have the dominant share of world energy demand over the course of 
the next century. While the range of emissions projected in the OECD-
1990 region remains roughly constant (a few models have higher 
growth projections), nearly all growth in future baseline emissions is 
projected to occur in the non-OECD-1990 countries. It is important to 
note that while a baseline by construction excludes explicit climate 
policies, management of non-climate challenges, particularly in the 
context of sustainable development, will likely impact baseline GHG 
pathways. Many of these policy objectives (but likely not all) are taken 
into account in baseline scenarios, such as reductions in local air pol-
lution and traditional biomass use and fuel switching more generally 
away from solids towards refined liquids and electricity. Section 6.6 
provides more details on this issue.
6�3�1�4 Baseline CO2 emissions from land use and 
emissions of non-CO2 gases
Baseline projections for global land-use related carbon emissions and 
sequestration (also referred to as net Agriculture, Forestry and Other 
Land Use (AFOLU) CO2 emissions) are made by a smaller subset of 
models. Net AFOLU CO2 emissions have greater historical uncertainty 
than FF&I emissions as discussed in Section 11.2 (Pan et  al., 2011; 
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Houghton et al., 2012). Baseline projections for land-use related CO2 
emissions reflect base-year uncertainty and suggest declining annual 
net CO2 emissions in the long run (Figure 6.5, left panel). In part, 
projections are driven by technological change, as well as projected 
declining rates of agriculture area expansion, a byproduct of decelerat-
ing population growth. Though uncertain, the estimated contribution 
of land-use related carbon over the coming century is small relative 
to emissions from fossil fuels and industry, with some models project-
ing a net sink late in the century. For non-CO2 GHGs, the contribu-
tion in CO2eq terms is larger than land-use CO2 with projected emis-
sions increasing over time (Figure 6.5, left panel). Along with fugitive 
methane and a few industrial sources, land-use related activities are 
projected to be a major driver of non-CO2 emissions, accounting for 
roughly 50 % of total methane (CH4) emissions and 90 % of nitrous 
oxide (N2O) emissions. Total CO2eq emissions are projected as the 
sum of FF&I CO2, land-use related CO2, and non-CO2 (Figure 6.5, right 
panel), with FF&I CO2 constituting around 80 %.
6�3�1�5 Baseline radiative forcing and cumulative carbon 
emissions
The emissions pathways for all of the emissions from the scenarios col-
lected for this assessment were run through a common version of the 
MAGICC model to obtain estimates of CO2eq concentrations (Section 
6.3.2). As a result of projected increasing emissions in the scenarios, 
radiative forcing from all sources continues to grow throughout the 
century in all baseline scenarios, exceeding 550 CO2eq (3.7 W / m2) 
between 2040 and 2050, while 450 CO2eq (2.6 W / m2) is surpassed 
between 2020 and 2030 (Figure 6.6, left panel). Again, the majority of 
baseline forcing scenarios fall below the RCP 8.5 path but above RCP 
6.0. Total forcing projections include the highly uncertain contribution 
of aerosols and other non-gas agents, which are based on the MAGICC 
model’s median estimates of forcing as a function of aerosol emissions 
(for scenarios that do not project emissions of these substances, emis-
sions were prescribed from other sources; see Annex II.10). Due to 
variation in driver assumptions, which may not reflect true uncertainty, 
baseline scenarios could lead to a range of long-term climate out-
comes, with cumulative carbon emissions from 1751 to 2100 reaching 
between 1.5 and 3 TtC (Figure 6.6, right panel). Noting that all of the 
baseline scenarios reviewed here include improvements to technology 
throughout the economy, there is strong evidence that, conditional on 
rates of growth assumed in the literature, technological change in the 
absence of explicit mitigation policies is not sufficient to bring about 
stabilization of GHG concentrations.
6�3�2 Emissions trajectories, concentrations, 
and temperature in transformation 
pathways
6�3�2�1 Linking between different types of scenarios
There are important differences among long-term scenarios that compli-
cate comparison between them. One difference is the nature of the goal 
itself. The majority of long-term scenarios focus on reaching long-term 
radiative forcing or GHG concentration goals. However, scenarios based 
on other long-term goals have also been explored in the literature. This 
includes scenarios focused on specific policy formulations (e. g., goal of 
50 % emission reduction in 2050 (G8, 2009) or the pledges made in the 
context of United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC) (UNFCCC, 2011a; b)), those based on cumulative emissions 
goals over a given period, those based on prescribed carbon prices, and 
those resulting from cost-benefit analysis (see Box 6.1 for a discussion 
of cost-benefit analysis scenarios). A second important difference is that 
some scenarios include all relevant forcing agents, while others only 
cover a subset of gases or focus only on CO2. Finally, some scenarios 
Box 6�1 | Cost benefit analysis scenarios 
Cost-benefit studies (e. g. Tol, 1997; Nordhaus and Boyer, 2000; 
Hope, 2008) monetize the impacts of climate change and then 
balance the economic implications of mitigation and climate 
damages to identify the optimal trajectory of emissions reductions 
that will maximize total welfare. There are other frameworks of 
analysis for considering impacts as well (Bradford, 1999; Barrett, 
2008; Keller et al., 2008b). For example, risk assessment is also 
often used to determine overall goals. A theoretical discussion of 
cost-benefit analysis, including models that have conducted these 
analyses, can be found in both Chapters 2 and 3. One important 
characteristic of cost-benefit analyses is that the bulk of research 
in this domain has been conducted using highly-aggregate models 
that do not have the structural detail necessary to explore the 
nature of energy system or agricultural and land-use transitions 
that are the focus of this chapter. For this reason, they are not 
assessed in this chapter. In contrast, the scenarios explored here 
rely on more detailed integrated models and have been imple-
mented in a cost-effectiveness framework, meaning that they are 
designed to find a least-cost approach to meeting a particular 
goal, such as a concentration goal in 2100. Additionally, the 
scenarios and models described in this chapter typically examine 
mitigation independent from potential feedbacks from climate 
impacts and adaptation responses. A discussion of studies that 
do incorporate impacts into their assessment of transformation 
pathways, and a characterization of how these feedbacks might 
affect mitigation strategies, is provided in Section 6.3.3.
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Figure 6�5 | Global CO2-equivalent emissions in baseline scenarios by component (left panel) and total (right panel) for baseline scenarios. Net AFOLU CO2 and total non-CO2 (CH4, 
N2O, and F-gases) projections are shown for individual models from EMF27. The FF&I CO2 projections are depicted in detail above (see Fig.6.4); the range is truncated here. FF&I 
CO2 includes CO2 from AFOLU fossil fuel use. Total CO2eq emissions* are shown for all baseline scenarios with full coverage, depicted as a range with median emboldened; shad-
ing reflects interquartile range (darkest), 5th – 95th percentile range (lighter), and full range (lightest). Sources: WG III AR5 Scenario Database (Annex II.10); historic data: JRC / PBL 
(2013), IEA (2012a), see Annex II.9.
Note: In this chapter, CO2eq emissions are constructed using Global Warming Potentials (GWPs) over a 100-year time horizon derived from the IPCC Second Assessment Report 
(see Annex II.9.1 for the GWP values of the different GHGs). A discussion about different GHG metrics can be found in Sections 1.2.5 and 3.9.6.
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Figure 6�6 | Total radiative forcing (left panel) and cumulative carbon emissions since 1751 (right panel) in baseline scenario literature compared to RCP scenarios. Forcing was 
estimated ex-post from models with full coverage the median output from the MAGICC results. Secondary axis in the left panel expresses forcing in CO2eq concentrations. Scenarios 
are depicted as ranges with median emboldened; shading reflects interquartile range (darkest), 5th – 95th percentile range (lighter), and full range (lightest). Sources: WG III AR5 
Scenario Database (Annex II.10); Boden et al. (2013); Houghton (2008); van Vuuren et al. (2011a).
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allow concentrations to temporarily exceed long-term goals (overshoot 
scenarios), while others are formulated so that concentrations never 
exceed the long-term goal (‘not-to-exceed scenarios’).
Despite these differences, it is necessary for the purposes of assess-
ment to establish comparability across scenarios. To this end, scenarios 
assessed here have been grouped according to several key param-
eters (Table 6.2) (for more detail on this process, see Annex II.10). The 
main criterion for grouping is the full radiative forcing level in 2100, 
expressed in CO2eq concentrations. (Full radiative forcing here includes 
GHGs, halogenated gases, tropospheric ozone, aerosols, and land-use 
related albedo change). Radiative-forcing levels are often used as goal 
in scenarios, and the RCPs have been formulated in terms of this indica-
tor (Moss et al., 2010; van Vuuren et al., 2011a). The scenario catego-
ries were chosen to relate explicitly to the four RCPs. A similar table in 
AR4 (Table 3.5) presented equilibrium values rather than 2100 values. 
Equilibrium values (as presented in AR4) and 2100 concentration and 
temperature values (as presented in this report) cannot easily be com-
pared given the wide range of possible post-2100 trajectories and the 
lags in the physical processes that govern both. In particular, equilib-
rium values assume that concentrations stay constant after 2100, while 
many scenarios in the literature since AR5 show increasing or decreas-
ing concentrations in 2100. Thus, it is more appropriate to focus on 21st 
century values to avoid relying on additional assumptions about post-
2100 dynamics. 
Another issue that complicates comparison across scenarios reported 
in the literature is that the Earth-System components (e. g., the carbon 
cycle and climate system) of integrated models can vary substantially 
(van Vuuren et  al., 2009b). Hence, similar emissions pathways may 
arrive at different 2100 CO2eq concentration levels and climate out-
comes in different models. To provide consistency in this regard across 
the scenarios assessed in the scenario database for AR5 (Annex II.10), 
and to facilitate the comparison with the assessment in Working Group 
I (WG I), the variation originating from the use of different models was 
removed by running all the scenarios in the database with at least 
information on Kyoto gas emissions through a standard reduced-form 
climate model called MAGICC (see Meinshausen et  al., 2011a; b; c; 
Rogelj et al., 2012). For each scenario, MAGICC was run multiple times 
using a distribution of Earth-System parameters, creating an ensemble 
of MAGICC runs. The resulting median concentration from this distribu-
tion was used to classify each scenario (see Section 6.3.2.6 for more on 
this process and a discussion of temperature outcomes). This means 
that the median concentration information reported here does not 
reflect uncertainty by Earth-System components, unless mentioned 
otherwise, and it also means that the concentrations may differ from 
those that were originally reported in the literature for the individual 
models and scenarios.
The consistency of the MAGICC model version used here and the more 
comprehensive general circulation models used in the WGI report 
(IPCC, 2013) is discussed in Section 6.3.2.6, where MAGICC is also 
used to produce probabilistic temperature estimates. The CO2eq con-
centration in 2010 based on the parameters used in this version of 
MAGICC is roughly consistent with the 2011 radiative forcing estimate 
from WGI.
Table 6�2 | Definition of CO2eq concentration categories used in this assessment, the mapping used to allocate scenarios based on different metrics to those categories, and the 
number of scenarios that extend through 2100 in each category. [Note: This table shows the mapping of scenarios to the categories; Table 6.3. shows the resulting characteristics 
of the categories using this mapping. The table only covers the scenarios with information for the full 21st century. The mapping of scenarios based on 2011 – 2050 cumulative total 
CO2eq emissions is described in the Methods and Metrics Annex.
CO2-equivalent concentration in 2100 (ppm 
CO2eq) (based on full radiative forcin g) 1 
Secondary categorization criter ia 2 
Corresponding RC P 3 
No of scenarios extending through 2100 
CO2eq concentration 
(ppm)
Radiative forcing 
(W / m 2 )
Kyoto gas only 
CO2eq concentration 
in 2100 (ppm)
Cumulative total 
CO2 emissions
2011 – 2100 (GtCO2)
Tota l 4 
With Overshoot 
Greater than  
0�4 W / m 2 
430 – 480 2.3 – 2.9 450 – 500 < 950 RCP 2.6 114 (114) 72 (72)
480 – 530 2.9 – 3.45 500 – 550   950 – 1500 251 (257) 77 (77)
530 – 580 3.45 – 3.9 550 – 600 1500 – 1950 198 (222) 22 (22)
580 – 650 3.9 – 4.5 600 – 670 1950 – 2600
RCP 4.5
102 (109) 8 (8)
650 – 720 4.5 – 5.1 670 – 750 2600 – 3250 27 (27) 0 (0)
720 – 1000 5.1 – 6.8 750 – 1030 3250 – 5250 RCP .6 111 (120) 0 (0)
> 1000   > 6.8 > 1030 > 5250 RCP 8.5 160 (166) 0 (0)
1 Scenarios with information for the full 21st century were categorized in different categories based on their 2100 full radiative forcing / CO2eq concentration level (including 
GHGs and other radiatively active substances). 
2 If insufficient information was available to calculate full forcing, scenarios were categorized, in order of preference, by 2100 Kyoto gas forcing or cumulative CO2 emissions 
in the 2011 – 2100 period. Scenarios extending only through 2050 were categorized based on cumulative CO2 emissions in the 2011 – 2050 period. Those scenarios are not 
included in this table. (See the Methods and Metrics Annex for more information.)
3 The column indicates the corresponding RCP falling within the scenario category based on 2100 CO2 equivalent concentration.
4 Number of scenarios in the respective category, which report at least total CO2 emissions (and potentially other GHGs and other radiatively active substances) to 2100. Numbers 
in parentheses denote all scenarios in the respective category, including those scenarios that report only CO2 emissions from fossil fuels and industry (but not land-use CO2).
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To compare scenarios with different coverage of relevant substances or 
goals, a set of relationships was developed to map scenarios with only 
sufficient information to assess Kyoto gas forcing or with information 
only on cumulative CO2 budgets to the full-forcing CO2eq concentra-
tion categories (Table 6.2 and Method and Metrics Annex). Scenarios 
without full forcing information and that extend to the end of the cen-
tury were mapped, in order of preference, by Kyoto gas forcing in 2100 
or by cumulative CO2 budgets from 2011 to 2100. In addition, scenar-
ios that only extend to mid-century were mapped according to cumu-
lative CO2 budgets from 2011 to 2050. These mappings allow for a 
practical, though still imperfect, means to compare between scenarios 
with different constructions. 
The categories leading to CO2eq concentration above 720 ppm con-
tain mostly baseline scenarios and some scenarios with very modest 
mitigation policies (Figure 6.7). The categories from 580 – 720 ppm 
CO2eq contain a small number of baseline scenarios at the upper end 
of the range, some scenarios based on meeting long-term concentra-
tion goals such as 650 ppm CO2eq by 2100, and a number of scenarios 
without long-term concentration goals but based instead on emissions 
goals. There has been a substantial increase in the number of scenarios 
in the two lowest categories since AR4 (Fisher et al., 2007). The RCP 2.6 
falls in the 430 – 480 ppm CO2eq category based on its forcing level by 
2100. A limited number of studies (Rogelj et al 2013a,b; Luderer et 
al, 2013) have explored emissions scenarios leading to concentrations 
below 430 ppm CO2eq by 2100. These scenarios were not submitted to 
the AR5 database. 
This mapping between different types of scenarios allows for roughly 
comparable assessments of characteristics of scenarios, grouped by 
2100 full-forcing CO2eq concentration, across the full database of sce-
narios collected for AR5 (Table 6.3.). The cumulative CO2 budgets from 
2011 to 2100 in each category in Table 6.3 span a considerable range. 
This variation in CO2 budgets results from the range of concentration 
levels assigned to each category, the timing of emission reductions, and 
variation in non-CO2 emissions, including aerosols. Although this leads 
Figure 6�7 | Emissions pathways for total CO2 and Kyoto gases for the various categories defined in Table 6.2. The bands indicate the 10th to 90th percentile of the scenarios 
included in the database. The grey bars to the right of the top panels indicate the 10th to 90th percentile for baseline scenarios (see Section 6.3.1). The bottom panels show for 
the combined categories 430 – 530 ppm and 530 – 650 ppm CO2eq the scenarios with and without net negative emissions larger than 20 GtCO2eq / yr. Source: WG III AR5 Scenario 
Database (Annex II.10).
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to a wider range of CO2 budgets than for the scenarios used in WG I 
(SPM Figure 10), the central estimates for the period 2011 – 2100 are 
very consistent. (Temperature results are discussed in Section 6.3.2.6).
An important distinction between scenarios is the degree to which con-
centrations exceed the 2100 goal before decreasing to reach it. Table 
6.3 includes subcategories for scenarios in which concentrations exceed 
their 2100 level by more than 0.4 W / m2 and scenarios that sometime 
during the century overshoot the upper-bound concentration level of 
the category. Both subcategories result in different emission profiles 
and temperature outcomes compared to those that do not meet these 
criteria (see Section 6.3.2.6 regarding temperature outcomes).
6�3�2�2 The timing of emissions reductions: The 
influence of technology, policy, and overshoot
There are many different emissions pathways associated with meet-
ing 2100 CO2eq concentrations (Figure 6.7). For all categories below 
a 2100 CO2eq concentration of 720 ppm CO2eq, emissions are reduced 
in the long-run relative to current levels. The decision on timing of 
emission reductions is a complex one. Model scenarios are typically 
designed to find the least-cost pathway to meet a long-term goal, in 
some cases under specific constraints, such as the availability of cer-
tain technologies or the timing and extent of international participa-
tion. Because models differ in, among other things, technology rep-
resentations and baseline assumptions, there are clear differences 
among scenarios with regards to the timing of emissions reductions 
and the allocation of reductions across gases. 
Three interrelated factors are particularly important determinants of 
emissions profiles in the modelling literature: (1) the degree of over-
shoot, (2) technology options and associated deployment decisions, 
and (3) policy assumptions. Overshoot scenarios scenarios entail less 
mitigation today in exchange for greater reductions later (Wigley, 
2005; Meinshausen et al., 2006; den Elzen and van Vuuren, 2007; Nus-
baumer and Matsumoto, 2008). Overshooting a long-term concentra-
tion goal, however, may lead to higher transient temperature change 
than if the goal is never exceeded (Section 6.3.2.6). Overshoot is par-
ticularly important for concentration goals that are close to today’s 
levels. The majority of scenarios reaching 480 ppm CO2eq or below 
by 2100, for instance, rely on overshoot pathways. Those that do not 
include overshoot, need faster emissions reductions (and associated 
energy system changes) during the next 1 – 2 decades (Calvin et  al., 
2009b).
The second consideration is technology. The most critical set of tech-
nologies in the context of the timing of emission reductions is CDR 
technologies, which can be used to generate negative emissions (van 
Vuuren et  al., 2007; Edenhofer et  al., 2010; Azar et  al., 2010, 2013; 
van Vuuren and Riahi, 2011; Tavoni and Socolow, 2013). In most model 
studies in the literature, negative emissions are generated via the use 
of biomass energy with carbon dioxide capture and storage (BECCS), 
and to a lesser extent, afforestation, though in principle other options 
could potentially result in negative emissions as well (see Section 
6.9). CDR technologies have not been applied yet at large scale. The 
potential of afforestation is limited, and the use of BECCS is ultimately 
constrained by the potential for CCS and biomass supply (van Vuuren 
et al., 2013). CDR technologies have two key implications for transfor-
mation pathways. One is that by removing emissions from the atmo-
sphere, CDR technologies can compensate for residual emissions from 
technologies and sectors with more expensive abatement. The second 
is that CDR technologies can create net negative emissions flows, 
which allow faster declines in concentrations in the second half of 
the century and thus facilitate higher near-term emissions, effectively 
expanding the potential scope for overshoot. In model comparison 
studies, many of the models that could not produce scenarios lead-
ing to concentrations of about 450 ppm CO2eq by 2100, particularly 
in combination with delayed or fragmented policy approaches, did 
not include CDR techniques (Clarke et  al., 2009). The vast majority 
of scenarios with overshoot of greater than 0.4 W / m2 (greater than 
20 ppm CO2eq) deploy CDR technologies to an extent that net global 
CO2 emissions become negative. Evidence is still mixed whether CDR 
technologies are essential for achieving very low GHG concentration 
goals (Rose et al., 2013). A limited number of studies have explored 
scenarios with net negative emissions as large as 20 GtCO2 per year or 
more (lower panels Figure 6.7), which allow for very substantial delays 
in emission reductions. However, the majority of studies have explored 
futures with smaller, but often still quite substantial, contributions of 
CDR technologies. Technology portfolio assumptions other than CDR 
technologies (e. g., regarding renewables, CCS, efficiency, and nuclear 
power) can also have implications for emissions trajectories, although 
these are often less pronounced and may in fact shift mitigation earlier 
or later (Rogelj et al., 2012; Eom et al., 2014; Krey et al., 2014; Kriegler 
et al., 2014a; Riahi et al., 2014).
The third consideration is policy structure. Since AR4, scenario studies 
have increasingly focused on the outcomes of fragmented international 
action and global delays in emission reduction (Clarke et al., 2009; van 
Vliet et al., 2012; Kriegler et al., 2013b; Tavoni et al., 2013; Rogelj et al., 
2013a; see Riahi et al., 2014). Considering both idealized implementa-
tion and non-idealized implementation scenarios, a considerable range 
of 2020 and 2030 emissions can be consistent with specific long-term 
goals. Although studies show that low long-term concentration goals 
could still be met with near-term emissions above those in idealized 
scenarios, initial periods of delay are typically followed by periods 
rapid reductions in subsequent decades (Kriegler et  al., 2014c; Riahi 
et al., 2014). This has important implications for costs and technology 
transitions, among other things (see Section 6.3.5). In general, delays 
in mitigation decrease the options for meeting long-term goals and 
increase the risk of foreclosing on certain long-term goals (Riahi et al., 
2014). 
The intersection of these three factors — overshoot, CDR technologies, 
and delayed mitigation — can be viewed in the context of emissions 
pathways over the next several decades, for example, the emissions 
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level in 2030 (Figure 6.8). For a given range of forcing at the end of the 
century, pathways with the lowest levels in 2030 have higher emis-
sions in the long run and slower rates of decline in the middle of the 
century. On the other hand, high emissions in 2030 leads to more rapid 
declines in the medium term and lower or eventually net negative 
emissions in the long-run, with the pattern exaggerated in a few 
extreme scenarios exploring deployment of CDR of 20 GtCO2 / yr or 
more. (See Section 6.4 for a more thorough discussion of the relation-
ship between near-term actions and long-term goals.) Deeper long-
term goals also interact with these factors. For example, scenarios 
leading to concentrations below 430 ppm CO2eq by 2100 (Rogelj et al., 
2013a,b; Luderer et al., 2013) feature large-scale application of CDR 
technologies in the long-term, and most of them have deep emission 
reductions in the near term.
A final observation is that the characteristics of emissions profiles dis-
cussed here are, in many cases, driven by the cost-effectiveness fram-
ing of the scenarios. A more comprehensive consideration of timing 
would also include, among other things, considerations of the tradeoff 
between the risks related to both transient and long-term climate 
change, the risks associated with deployment of specific technologies 
and expectation of the future developments of these technologies, 
short-term costs and transitional challenges, flexibility in achieving 
climate goals, and the linkages between emissions reductions and a 
wide range of other policy objectives (van Vuuren and Riahi, 2011; Krey 
et al., 2014; Riahi et al., 2014).
6�3�2�3 Regional roles in emissions reductions
The contribution of different regions to mitigation is directly related to 
the formulation of international climate policies. In idealized imple-
mentation scenarios, which assume a uniform global carbon price, the 
extent of mitigation in each region depends most heavily on relative 
baseline emissions, regional mitigation potentials, and terms of trade 
effects. All of these can vary significantly across regions (van Vuuren 
et al., 2009a; Clarke et al., 2012; Tavoni et al., 2013; Chen et al., 2014; 
van Sluisveld et  al., 2013). In this idealized implementation environ-
ment, the carbon budgets associated with bringing concentrations to 
between 430 and 530 ppm CO2eq in 2100 are generally highest in Asia, 
smaller in the OECD-1990, and lowest for other regions (Figure 6.9, left 
panel). However, the ranges for each of these vary substantially across 
scenarios. Mitigation in terms of relative reductions from baseline 
emissions is distributed more similarly between OECD-1990, ASIA, and 
Economies in Transition (EIT) across scenarios (Figure 6.9, right panel). 
The Middle East and Africa (MAF) region and especially Latin America 
(LAM) have the largest mitigation potential. In absolute terms, the 
remaining emissions in the mitigation scenarios are largest in Asia 
(Figure 6.9, left panel) as are the absolute emissions reductions (Figure 
6.9, right panel), due to the size of this region. It is important to note 
that the mitigation costs borne by different regions and countries do 
not need to translate directly from the degree of emissions reductions, 
because the use of effort-sharing schemes can reallocate economic 
costs (see Section 6.3.6.6).
Figure 6�8 | Emissions pathways from three model comparison exercises with explicit 2030 emissions goals. Mitigation scenarios are shown for scenarios reaching 430 – 530 ppm 
CO2eq in 2100 (left panel) and 530 – 650 ppm CO2eq in 2100 (right panel). Scenarios are distinguished by their 2030 emissions: < 50 GtCO2eq, 50 – 55 GtCO2eq, and > 55 GtCO2eq. 
Individual emissions pathways with net negative emissions of > 20 GtCO2 / yr in the second-half of the century are shown as solid black lines. The full range of the scenarios in the 
AR5 database is given as dashed black lines. (Source: Scenarios from intermodelling comparisons with explicit interim goals (AMPERE: Riahi et al. (2014); LIMITS: Kriegler et al. 
(2013b), ROSE: Luderer et al. (2014a), and WG III AR5 Scenario Database (Annex II.10)).
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Figure 6�9 | Regional carbon budget (left panel) and relative mitigation effort (right panel) for mitigation scenarios reaching 430 – 530 ppm CO2eq in 2100, based on cumulative 
CO2 emissions from 2010 to 2100. Carbon budgets below 0 and relative mitigation above 100 % can be achieved via negative emissions. The number of scenarios is reported 
below the regional acronyms. The number of scenarios outside the figure range is noted at the top. Source: WG III AR5 Scenario Database (Annex II.10), idealized implementation 
and default technology cases.
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6�3�2�3 Regional roles in emissions reductions
The contribution of different regions to mitigation is directly related to 
the formulation of international climate policies. In idealized imple-
mentation scenarios, which assume a uniform global carbon price, the 
extent of mitigation in each region depends most heavily on relative 
baseline emissions, regional mitigation potentials, and terms of trade 
effects. All of these can vary significantly across regions (van Vuuren 
et al., 2009a; Clarke et al., 2012; Tavoni et al., 2013; Chen et al., 2014; 
van Sluisveld et  al., 2013). In this idealized implementation environ-
ment, the carbon budgets associated with bringing concentrations to 
between 430 and 530 ppm CO2eq in 2100 are generally highest in Asia, 
smaller in the OECD-1990, and lowest for other regions (Figure 6.9, left 
panel). However, the ranges for each of these vary substantially across 
scenarios. Mitigation in terms of relative reductions from baseline 
emissions is distributed more similarly between OECD-1990, ASIA, and 
Economies in Transition (EIT) across scenarios (Figure 6.9, right panel). 
The Middle East and Africa (MAF) region and especially Latin America 
(LAM) have the largest mitigation potential. In absolute terms, the 
remaining emissions in the mitigation scenarios are largest in Asia 
(Figure 6.9, left panel) as are the absolute emissions reductions (Figure 
6.9, right panel), due to the size of this region. It is important to note 
that the mitigation costs borne by different regions and countries do 
not need to translate directly from the degree of emissions reductions, 
because the use of effort-sharing schemes can reallocate economic 
costs (see Section 6.3.6.6).
Figure 6�9 | Regional carbon budget (left panel) and relative mitigation effort (right panel) for mitigation scenarios reaching 430 – 530 ppm CO2eq in 2100, based on cumulative 
CO2 emissions from 2010 to 2100. Carbon budgets below 0 and relative mitigation above 100 % can be achieved via negative emissions. The number of scenarios is reported 
below the regional acronyms. The number of scenarios outside the figure range is noted at the top. Source: WG III AR5 Scenario Database (Annex II.10), idealized implementation 
and default technology cases.
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The transient emission reductions implications also vary across regions 
in idealized implementation scenarios (Table 6.4). In general, emissions 
peak in the OECD-1990 sooner than in other countries with higher 
baseline growth. Similarly, emissions are reduced in the OECD-1990 
countries by 2030 relative to today, but they may increase in other 
regions, particularly the fast-growing Asian and MAF regions.
Deviations from the idealized implementation, either through global 
delays in mitigation or delays by particular countries or regions, will 
lead to different regional contributions to emissions reductions. When 
mitigation is undertaken by a subset of regions, it will have implications 
on other non-participating countries through energy markets, terms of 
trade, technology spillovers, and other leakage channels. Multi model 
ensembles have shown leakage rates of energy-related emissions to 
be relatively contained, often below 20 % (Arroyo-Curras et al., 2014; 
Babiker, 2005; Bauer et  al., 2014a; Blanford et  al., 2014; Böhringer 
et al., 2012; Bosetti and De Cian, 2013; Kriegler et al., 2014c). Policy 
instruments such as border carbon adjustment can effectively reduce 
these effects further (Böhringer et al., 2012). Leakage in land use, on 
the other hand, could be substantial, though fewer studies have quan-
tified it (Calvin et al., 2009).
6�3�2�4 Projected CO2 emissions from land use 
Net AFOLU CO2 emissions (see Figure 6.5) result from an interplay 
between the use of land to produce food and other non-energy prod-
ucts, to produce bioenergy, and to store carbon in land. Land-manage-
ment practices can also influence CO2 emissions (see Section 6.3.5). 
Currently about 10 – 20 % of global CO2 emissions originate from land 
use and LUC. In general, most scenarios show declining CO2 emissions 
from land use as a result of declining deforestation rates, both with 
and without mitigation (see also Section 6.3.1.4). In fact, many scenar-
ios project a net uptake of CO2 as a result of reforestation after 2050 
(Figure 6.10). 
Scenarios provide a wide range of outcomes for the contribution of CO2 
emissions from land use (see Section 11.9 for a sample from a model 
intercomparison study). However, one difficulty in interpreting this 
range is that many scenarios were developed from models that do not 
explicitly look at strategies to reduce net AFOLU CO2 emissions. None-
theless, the spread in net AFOLU emissions still reflects the implications 
of land-use related mitigation activities — bioenergy, avoided defores-
tation, and afforestation — in both models that explicitly represent land 
use and those that do not (see Section 6.3.5 for a detailed discussion). 
Some studies emphasize a potential increase in net AFOLU emissions 
due to bioenergy production displacing forests (van Vuuren et al., 2007; 
Searchinger et al., 2008; Wise et al., 2009; Melillo et al., 2009; Reilly 
et  al., 2012). Others show a decrease in net AFOLU emissions as a 
result of decreased deforestation, forest protection, and / or net affor-
estation enacted as a mitigation measure (e. g. Wise et al., 2009; Popp 
et al., 2011b; Riahi et al., 2011; Reilly et al., 2012). Wise et al. (2009) 
show a range of results from a single model, first focusing mitigation 
policy on the energy sector, thereby emphasizing the bioenergy produc-
tion effect, and then focusing policy more broadly to also encourage 
afforestation and slow deforestation. Reilly et al. (2012) conduct a simi-
lar analysis, but with more policy design alternatives. However, policies 
to induce large-scale land-related mitigation will be challenging and 
actual implementation will affect costs and net benefits (Lubowski and 
Rose, 2013) (see Section 6.3.5, Section 6.8 and Chapter 11).
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6�3�2�5 Projected emissions of other radiatively 
important substances
Beyond CO2, the scenario literature has focused most heavily on the 
mitigation opportunities for the gases covered by the Kyoto protocol, 
including the two most important non-CO2 gases, CH4 and N2O. Atten-
tion is also increasingly being paid to the climate consequences of 
other emissions such as aerosols and ozone precursors (e. g. Shindell 
et  al., 2012; Rose et  al., 2014b). Although several models have pro-
duced projections of aerosol forcing and have incorporated these emis-
sions into the constraint on total forcing, most of them do not have 
specific mitigation measures for these emissions. 
For non-CO2 Kyoto gases, the relative depth and timing of emissions 
reductions are influenced by two primary factors: (1) the abatement 
potential and costs for reducing emissions of different greenhouse forc-
ers, and (2) the strategies for making tradeoffs between them. With 
respect to abatement potential and costs, studies indicate that in the 
short run, there are many low-cost options to reduce non-CO2 gases 
relative to opportunities to reduce CO2 emissions. Partially as a result, 
studies indicate that short-term reduction strategies may rely more 
heavily in the near term on non-CO2 gases than in the long run (Wey-
ant et al., 2006; Lucas et al., 2007). In the longer run, emission reduc-
tions, particularly for CH4 and N2O, are expected to be constrained by 
several hard-to-mitigate sources such as livestock and the application 
of fertilizers. This ultimately results in lower reduction rates than for 
CO2 for the lower concentration categories despite slower growth in 
baseline projections (see Figure 6.11, and also discussed by Lucas et al., 
2007). For scenarios resulting in 430 – 480 CO2eq concentration in 
2100, CH4 reductions in 2100 are about 50 % compared to 2005. For 
Figure 6�10 | Net AFOLU CO2 emissions in mitigation scenarios. The left panel shows cumulative net CO2 emission (2011 – 2100) from energy / industry (horizontal axis) and AFOLU 
(land use) (vertical axis). The right panel shows net CO2 emission from land use as function of time. FF&I CO2 includes CO2 from AFOLU fossil fuel use. Source: WG III AR5 Scenario 
Database (Annex II.10).
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Figure 6�11 | Emissions reductions for different GHGs in 2030, 2050, and 2100. The left panel shows 2010 historic emissions and the bars in the right panel indicate changes 
compared to 2010 (AR5 Scenario Database). FF&I CO2 includes CO2 from AFOLU fossil fuel use. Source: WG III AR5 Scenario Database (Annex II.10). Historic data: JRC / PBL (2013), 
IEA (2012a), see Annex II.9.
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OECD-1990 ASIA LAM MAF EIT
Peak year of emissions 430 – 530 ppm CO2eq 2010 
(2010 / 2010)
2020  
(2015 / 2030)
2015 
(2010 / 2020)
2020 
(2010 / 2030)
2014 
(2010 / 2015)
Peak year of emissions 530 – 650 ppm CO2eq 2014 
(2010 / 2015)
2030 
(2030 / 2030)
2020 
(2010 / 2030)
2034 
(2020 / 2040)
2016 
(2010 / 2020)
2030 Emission 
reductions w. r. t. 2010
430 – 530 ppm CO2eq 32 % 
(23 / 40 %)
– 1 % 
(– 15 / 14 %)
35 % 
(16 – 59 %)
8 % 
(– 7 / 18 %)
32 % 
(18 / 40 %)
2030 Emission 
reductions w.r.t. 2010
530 – 650 ppm CO2eq 14 % 
(6 / 21 %)
– 34 % 
(– 43 / – 26 %)
9 % 
(– 17 / 41 %)
– 22 % 
(– 41 / – 12 %)
8 % 
(– 5 / 16 %)
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potential and costs for reducing emissions of different greenhouse forc-
ers, and (2) the strategies for making tradeoffs between them. With 
respect to abatement potential and costs, studies indicate that in the 
short run, there are many low-cost options to reduce non-CO2 gases 
relative to opportunities to reduce CO2 emissions. Partially as a result, 
studies indicate that short-term reduction strategies may rely more 
heavily in the near term on non-CO2 gases than in the long run (Wey-
ant et al., 2006; Lucas et al., 2007). In the longer run, emission reduc-
tions, particularly for CH4 and N2O, are expected to be constrained by 
several hard-to-mitigate sources such as livestock and the application 
of fertilizers. This ultimately results in lower reduction rates than for 
CO2 for the lower concentration categories despite slower growth in 
baseline projections (see Figure 6.11, and also discussed by Lucas et al., 
2007). For scenarios resulting in 430 – 480 CO2eq concentration in 
2100, CH4 reductions in 2100 are about 50 % compared to 2005. For 
 
Figure 6�11 | Emissions reductions for different GHGs in 2030, 2050, and 2100. The left panel shows 2010 historic emissions and the bars in the right panel indicate changes 
compared to 2010 (AR5 Scenario Database). FF&I CO2 includes CO2 from AFOLU fossil fuel use. Source: WG III AR5 Scenario Database (Annex II.10). Historic data: JRC / PBL (2013), 
IEA (2012a), see Annex II.9.
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N2O, the most stringent scenarios result in emission levels just below 
today’s level. For halogenated gases, emission growth is significantly 
reduced for the lower concentration categories, but variation among 
models is large, ranging from a 90 % reduction to a 100 % increase 
compared to 2005. 
Strategies for making tradeoffs across greenhouse forcers must account 
for differences in both radiative effectiveness and atmospheric lifetime 
and the associated impacts on near-term and long-term climate change. 
They must also consider relationships between gases in terms of com-
mon sources and non-climate impacts such as air pollution control. 
Models handle these tradeoffs differently, but there are essentially two 
classes of approaches. Most models rely on exogenous metrics such as 
Global Warming Potentials (GWPs) (discussed further below) and trade 
off abatement among gases based on metric-weighted prices. Other 
models make the tradeoff on the basis of economic optimization over 
time and the physical characterization of the gases within the model 
with respect to a specified goal such as total forcing (e. g. Manne and 
Richels, 2001). Differences both within these classes of approaches 
and among them lead to very different results, especially with respect 
to the timing of mitigation for short-lived substances. Several stud-
ies have looked into the role of these substances in mitigation (Shine 
et al., 2007; Berntsen et al., 2010; UNEP and WMO, 2011; Myhre et al., 
2011; McCollum et al., 2013a; Rose et al., 2014a). Studies can be found 
that provide argument for early emission reduction as well as a more 
delayed response of short-lived forcers. Arguments for early reductions 
emphasize the near-term benefits for climate and air pollution asso-
ciated with ozone and particulate matter. An argument for a delayed 
response is that, in the context of long-term climate goals, reducing 
short-lived forcers now has only a very limited long-term effect (Smith 
and Mizrahi, 2013). 
Model analysis has also looked into the impact of using different sub-
stitution metrics (see Section  3.9.6 for a theoretical discussion the 
implication of various substitution metrics and Section 8.7 of the WGI 
report for the physical aspects of substitution metrics). In most cur-
rent climate policies, emission reductions are allocated on the basis 
of GWPs for a time of horizon of 100 years. Several papers have 
explored the use of metrics other than 100-year GWPs, including 
updated GWP values and Global Temperature Change Potential (GTP) 
values (Smith et al., 2012; Reisinger et al., 2012; Azar and Johansson, 
2014). Quantitative studies show that the choice of metrics is critical 
for the timing of CH4 emission reductions among the Kyoto gases, but 
that it rarely has a strong impact on overall global costs. The use of 
dynamic GTP values (as alternative to GWPs) has been shown to 
postpone emissions reductions of short-lived gases. Using different 
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estimates for 100-year GWP from the various previous IPCC Assess-
ment Reports has no major impact on transition pathways. 
6�3�2�6 The link between concentrations, radiative 
forcing, and temperature
The assessment in this chapter focuses on scenarios that result in 
alternative CO2eq concentrations by the end of the century. However, 
temperature goals are also an important consideration in policy dis-
cussions. This raises the question of how the scenarios assessed in 
this chapter relate to possible temperature outcomes. One complica-
tion for assessing this relationship is that scenarios can follow differ-
ent concentration pathways to the same end-of-century goal (see 
Section 6.3.2.2), and this will lead to different temperature 
responses. A second complication is that several uncertainties con-
found the relationship between emissions and temperature 
responses, including uncertainties about the carbon cycle, climate 
sensitivity, and the transient climate response (see WG I, Box 12.2). 
This means that the temperature outcomes of different concentra-
tion pathways assessed here (see Section 6.3.2.1) are best expressed 
in terms of a range of probable temperature outcomes (see Chapter 
Figure 6�12 | Comparison of CMIP5 results (as presented in Working Group I) and MAGICC output for global temperature increase. Note that temperature increase is presented 
relative to the 1986 – 2005 average in this figure (see also Figure 6.13). Panel a) shows concentration-driven runs for the RCP scenarios from MAGICC (lines) and one-standard 
deviation ranges from CMIP5 models. Panel b) compares 2081 – 2100 period projections from MAGICC with CMIP5 for scenarios driven by prescribed RCP concentrations (four left-
hand bars of both model categories) and the RCP 8.5 run with prescribed emissions (fifth bar; indicated by a star). Panel c) shows temperature increases for the concentration-driven 
runs of a subset of CMIP5 models against cumulative CO2 emissions back-calculated by these models from the prescribed CO2 concentration pathways (full lines) and temperature 
increase projected by the MAGICC model against cumulative CO2 emissions (dotted lines) (based on WG I Figure SPM.10). Cumulative emissions are calculated from 2000 onwards. 
Source: WG I AR5 (Section 12.5.4.2, Figure 12.46, TFE.8 Figure 1) and MAGICC calculations (RCP data (van Vuuren et al., 2011a), method as in Meinshausen et al., 2011c).
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2 and Section 6.2.3 for a discussion of evaluating scenarios under 
uncertainty). The definition of the temperature goals themselves 
forms a third complication. Temperature goals might be defined in 
terms of the long-term equilibrium associated with a given concen-
tration, in terms of the temperature in a specific year (e. g., 2100), or 
based on never exceeding a particular level. Finally, the reference 
year, often referred to as ‘pre-industrial’, is ambiguous given both 
the lack of real measurements and the use of different reference 
periods. Given all of these complications, a range of emissions path-
ways can be seen as consistent with a particular temperature goal 
(see also Figure 6.12, 6.13, and 6.14).
Because of the uncertain character of temperature outcomes, probabilis-
tic temperature information has been created for the scenarios in the AR5 
database that have reported information on at least CO2, CH4, N2O and 
sulphur aerosol emissions. Several papers have introduced methods for 
probabilistic statements on temperature increase for emission scenarios 
(Meinshausen, 2006; Knutti et al., 2008; Schaeffer et al., 2008; Zickfeld 
et al., 2009; Allen et al., 2009; Meinshausen et al., 2009; Ramanathan and 
Xu, 2010; Rogelj et al., 2011). For this assessment, the method described 
by Rogelj et al. (2012) and Schaeffer et al. (2014) is used, which employs 
the MAGICC model based on the probability distribution of input param-
eters from Meinshausen (2009) (see also Meinshausen et  al., 2011c). 
Figure 6�13 | Changes in global temperature for the scenario categories above 1850 – 1900 reference level as calculated by MAGICC. (Observed temperatures in the 1985 – 2006 
period were about 0.61 deg C above the reference level — see e. g. WG1 Table SPM.2). Panel a) shows temperature increase relative reference as calculated by MAGICC (10th 
to 90th percentile for median MAGICC outcomes). Panel b) shows 2081 – 2100 temperature levels for the scenario categories and RCPs for the MAGICC outcomes. The bars for 
the scenarios used in this assessment include both the 10th to 90th percentile range for median MAGICC outcomes (colored portion of the bars) and the 16th to 84th percentile 
range of the full distribution of MAGICC outcomes from these scenarios, which also captures the Earth-System uncertainty. The bars for the RCPs are based on the 16th to 84th 
of MAGICC outcomes based on the RCP emissions scenarios, capturing only the Earth-System uncertainty. Panel c) shows relationship between cumulative CO2 emissions in the 
2011 – 2100 period and median 2081 – 2100 temperature levels calculated by MAGICC. Panel d indicates the median temperature development of overshoot (> 0.4 W / m2) and non-
overshoot scenarios for the first two scenario categories (25th to 75th percentile of scenario outcomes). Source: WG III AR5 Scenario Database (Annex II.10).
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MAGICC was run 600 times for each scenario. Probabilistic temperature 
statements are based on the resulting distributions (see also the Meth-
ods and Metrics Annex; and the underlying papers cited). Because the 
temperature distribution of these runs is based on a single probability 
distribution in a single modelling framework, resulting probabilistic tem-
perature statements should be regarded as indicative.
An important consideration in the evaluation of this method is the con-
sistency between the distributions of key parameters used here and the 
outcome of the WG I research regarding these same parameters. Carbon-
cycle parameters in the MAGICC model used in this chapter are based on 
Earth-System Coupled Model Intercomparison Project (CMIP) 4 model 
results from AR4, and a probability density function (PDF) for climate 
sensitivity is assumed that corresponds to the assessment of IPCC AR4 
(Meehl et al., 2007; Rogelj et al., 2012, Box 10.2). The MAGICC output 
based on this approach has been shown to be consistent with the output 
of the CMIP5 Earth-System models (see also WG I Sections 12.4.1.2 and 
12.4.8). The MAGICC model captures the temperature outcomes of the 
CMIP5 models reasonably well, with median estimates close to the mid-
dle of the CMIP5 uncertainty ranges (see panels a and b in Figure 6.12). 
Figure 6�14 | The probability of staying below temperature levels for the different scenario categories as assessed by the MAGICC model (representing the statistics of 600 dif-
ferent climate realizations for each emission scenario). Panel a) probability in 2100 of being below 2 °C versus probability of staying below 2 °C throughout the 21st century. 
Open dots indicate overshoot scenarios (> 0.4 W / m2). Panel b) probability of staying below 1.5, 2.0, and 2.5 °C (10th to 90th percentile) during 21st century. Panel c) relationship 
between peak concentration and the probability of exceeding 2 °C during the 21st century. Panel d) relationship between 2100 concentration and the probability of exceeding 2 °C 
in 2100. Source: WG III AR5 Scenario Database (Annex II.10).
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For lower-emission scenarios, the MAGICC uncertainty range is more 
narrow, mainly due to the larger range methodologies representing 
non-CO2 forcings in the CMIP5 models, as well as the fact that MAGICC 
does not reflect all of the structural uncertainty represented by the range 
of CMIP5 models (see panels a and b in Figure 6.12, and WG I Figure 
12.8 and Section 12.4.1.2). Uncertainty ranges are largest for emissions-
driven runs (only available for RCP 8.5 from CMIP5 models), since uncer-
tainties in carbon-cycle feedbacks play a larger role (see also WG I Sec-
tion 12.4.8.1). The relationship between the cumulative CO2 emissions 
and the transient temperature increase from MAGICC is well aligned 
with the CMIP5 model results for the RCP pathways (Figure 6.12 panel 
c, and WG I Section 12.5.4.2, Figure 12.46, TFE.8 Figure 1). WG I has esti-
mated that a cumulative CO2 emissions budget of around 1000 GtCO2 
from 2011 onward is associated with a likely (> 66 %) chance of main-
taining temperature change to less than 2 °C. For the database of sce-
narios assessed here, the majority of scenarios with a greater than 66 % 
chance of limiting temperature change to less than 2 °C, based on the 
MAGICC analysis, are those that reach between 430 and 480 ppm CO2eq, 
and these are associated with cumulative emissions over the century of 
630 – 1180 GtCO2 (Table 6.3). The two budgets are not fully comparable, 
however, since the WG I budget relates to the cumulative emissions at 
the time of peak warming which are higher than the cumulative emis-
sions until 2100 in overshoot scenarios with net negative emissions by 
the end of the century. In addition, the WGI AR5 estimate is based on a 
single scenario for non-CO2 substances, whereas the database assessed 
here considers a much wider range of non-CO2 emissions.
Based on the results of the MAGICC analysis, temperature outcomes 
are similar across all scenarios in the next few decades, in part due 
to physical inertia in the climate system (Figure 6.13, panel a). In the 
second half of the century, however, temperatures diverge. Scenarios 
leading to 2100 concentrations over 1000 ppm CO2eq lead to a tem-
perature increase of about 3 to 6 °C (66th percentile of the distribution 
of temperature outcomes), while scenarios with 2100 concentrations 
between 430 – 480 ppm CO2eq lead to a temperature increase of about 
1.3 to 2.2 °C (66th percentile of the distribution of temperature out-
comes) (Figure 6.13, panels a and b). Cumulative CO2 emissions for all 
scenarios in the database correlate well to the temperature level — see 
also WG I Section 12.5.4 (Figure 6.13, panel c). However, there is some 
variation due to differences in emissions of other forcing agents, in par-
ticular CH4 and sulphur, along with the timing of emissions reduction 
and the associated extent of overshoot. In general, both the 2100 tem-
peratures and the relationship between the cumulative emissions and 
2100 temperature change are roughly consistent with the correlation 
for the RCPs in WG I (Figure 6.13, panel c). Scenarios that overshoot 
the 2100 concentration goal by more than 0.4 W / m2 result in higher 
levels of temperature increase mid-century and prolonged periods of 
relatively rapid rates of change in comparison to those without over-
shoot or with less overshoot (Figure 6.13, panel d). By 2100, however, 
the different scenarios converge. 
Defining temperature goals in terms of the chance of exceeding a par-
ticular temperature this century accounts for both the 2100 concentra-
tion and the pathway to get to this concentration (Figure 6.14). Over-
shoot scenarios of greater than 0.4 W / m2 have a higher probability of 
exceeding 2 °C prior to 2100 than in 2100 (Figure 6.14, panel a). In 
general, the results suggest that the peak concentration during the 21st 
century is a fundamental determinant of the probability of remaining 
below a particular temperature goal (Figure 6.14, panel c). The CO2eq 
concentration in 2100, on the other hand, is a proxy for the probability 
of exceeding end-of-the-century temperature goals (panel d). Based on 
the MAGICC results, only scenarios leading to 2100 concentrations of 
430 – 480 ppm and a small number of scenarios leading to 2100 con-
centrations of 480 – 530 ppm have a probability of greater than 66 % 
probability of maintaining temperature change below 2 °C throughout 
the century. Scenarios that reach 2100 concentrations between 530 
and 580 ppm CO2eq while exceeding this range (that is, exceeding 
580 ppm CO2eq) during the course of the century have less than a 33 % 
probability of limiting transient temperature change to below 2 °C over 
the course of the century, based on the MAGICC results.
Other temperature levels in addition to 2 °C are relevant for mitigation 
strategy. Based on the MAGICC results, scenarios leading to concentra-
tions between 430 and 480 ppm CO2eq have less than a 50 % prob-
ability of maintaining temperature change below 1.5 °C throughout the 
21st century, and many have less than a 33 % probability of achieving 
this goal. As noted in Section 6.3.2.1, there are scenarios in the litera-
ture that reach levels below 430 ppm CO2eq by 2100, but these were 
not submitted to the database used for this assessment. Using the same 
methods for assessing temperature implications of scenarios as used in 
this assessment, the associated studies found that these scenarios have 
a probability (also based on MAGICC) of more than 66 % of remaining 
below 1.5 °C, after peaking earlier in the century (e. g., Luderer et al., 
2013, Rogelj et al., 2013a,b).1 In contrast, the scenarios submitted to 
this assessment that lead to CO2eq concentration below 580 ppm to 
CO2eq by 2100 have more than a 50 % probability of limiting tem-
perature change to below 2.5 °C during the 21st century, based on the 
MAGICC results, and many have more than a 66 % probability. (Section 
6.9 discusses how the use of geoengineering techniques can change 
the relationships between GHG emissions and radiative forcing.)
6�3�3 Treatment of impacts and adaptation in 
transformation pathways
The importance of considering impacts and adaptation responses when 
assessing the optimal level of mitigation in a cost-benefit framework 
has been well studied in highly-aggregated models (see Box  6.1. on 
cost-benefit analysis). However the role impacts and adaptation in sce-
narios from large-scale integrated models has seen far less treatment. 
Mitigation, impacts, and adaptation are interlinked in several important 
1 In these scenarios, the cumulative CO2 emissions range between 680 – 800 GtCO2 
from 2011 to 2050 and between 90 – 310 GtCO2 from 2011 to 2100. Global 
CO2eq emissions in 2050 are between 70 % and 95 % below 2010 emissions, and 
they are between 110 % and 120 % below 2010 emissions in 2100.
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ways and should, ideally, be considered jointly in the context of achiev-
ing concentration goals such as those explored in this chapter. A few 
studies from large-scale integrated models consider mitigation, 
impacts, and adaptation simultaneously in their construction of scenar-
ios (see Reilly et al., 2007; Isaac and van Vuuren, 2009; Chum et al., 
2011; Nelson et al., 2014; Calvin et al., 2013; Zhou et al., 2013; Dowl-
ing, 2013). In the vast majority of cases, however, the scenarios dis-
cussed in this chapter do not consider these linkages, and this is consid-
ered a major gap in the transformation pathways literature. (For a 
summary of integrated models that capture impacts and adaptation, 
see, e. g., Füssel (2010) and Fisher-Vanden et al. (2013). For a compre-
hensive discussion of climate impacts, adaptation, and vulnerability, 
see IPCC WG II AR5). Major efforts are now underway to incorporate 
impacts and adaptation into large-scale integrated models, but these 
efforts must overcome a range of challenges, including incorporating 
the sectoral and regional character of impact and adaptation into inte-
grated models, which have higher spatial aggregation, and a lack of 
data and empirical evidence on impacts and adaptation required for 
model inputs. 
Omitting climate impacts and adaptation responses from scenarios is 
likely to lead to biased results for three main reasons. First, climate 
impacts could influence the effectiveness of mitigation options. For 
instance, electricity production could be affected by changes in cooling 
water availability (Schaeffer et al., 2012) or air temperature, changes 
in precipitation will alter hydroelectric power, and climate change 
could impact biofuel crop productivities (Chum et  al., 2011). Unfor-
tunately, the set of modelling studies that explore these issues is lim-
ited (Fisher-Vanden et al., 2011), so there is insufficient evidence today 
to draw broad conclusions about how the omission of impacts and 
adaptation responses would alter mitigation options and the resulting 
scenarios reviewed in this chapter. Second, adaptation responses to 
climate change could themselves alter emissions from human activi-
ties, either increasing or decreasing the emissions reductions required 
to reach GHG-concentration goals. For example, a warmer climate is 
likely to lead to higher demand for air conditioning (Mansur et  al., 
2008), which will lead to higher emissions if this increased electric-
ity demand is met by electric power generated with fossil fuels. On 
the other hand, a warmer climate will lead to reductions in heating 
demand, which would lower emissions from fuels used in heating. 
Also, impacts could potentially lead to lower economic growth and 
thus lower emissions. Further, because electricity is relatively easier 
to decarbonize than solid, liquid, or gaseous fuels, changing in heat-
ing and cooling demands could reduce the economic costs of mitiga-
tion (Isaac and van Vuuren, 2009; Zhou et al., 2013). Climate change 
will also change the ability of the terrestrial biosphere to store car-
bon. Again, there is a limited number of studies that account for this 
adaptive response to climate change (Bosello et al., 2010b; Eboli et al., 
2010; Anthoff et  al., 2011) or optimal mitigation levels when adap-
tation responses are included (Patt et  al., 2009). Finally, mitigation 
strategies will need to compete with adaptation strategies for scarce 
investment and R&D resources, assuming these occur contemporane-
ously. A number of studies account for competition for investment and 
R&D resources. In a cost benefit framework, several modelling studies 
Figure 6�15 | Cumulative global coal, oil, and gas use between 2010 and 2100 in baseline and mitigation scenarios compared to reserves and resources. Estimates of reserves and 
resources (‘R+R’) are shown as shaded areas and historical cumulative use until 2010 is shown as dashed black line. Dots correspond to individual scenarios, of which the number 
in each sample is indicated at the bottom of each panel. Note that the horizontal distribution of dots does not have a meaning, but avoids overlapping dots. Source: WG III AR5 
Scenario Database (Annex II.10). Includes only scenarios based on idealized policy implementation. Reserve, resource, and historical cumulative use from Table 7.1 in Section 7.4.1.
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(Bosello et al., 2010a, 2010b; de Bruin et al., 2009) adaptation, and 
mitigation are both decision variables and compete for investment 
resources. Competition for investment resources is also captured in 
studies measuring the economic impacts of climate impacts, but rather 
than competing with mitigation investments, competition is between 
investment in adaptation and consumption (Bosello et al., 2007) and 
other capital investments (Darwin and Tol, 2001). Some simulation 
studies that estimate the economic cost of climate damages add adap-
tation cost to the cost of climate impacts and do not capture crowd-
ing out of other expenditures, such as investment and R&D (Hope, 
2006). No existing study, however, examines how this crowding out 
will affect an economy’s ability to invest in mitigation options to reach 
concentration goals.
6�3�4 Energy sector in transformation 
pathways 
The fundamental transformation required in the energy system to meet 
long-term concentration goals is a phase-out in the use of freely emit-
ting fossil fuels, the timing of which depends on the concentration goal 
(Fischedick et  al., 2011). Baseline scenarios indicate that scarcity of 
fossil fuels alone will not be sufficient to limit CO2eq concentrations to 
levels such as 450, 550, or 650 ppm by 2100 (Verbruggen and Al Mar-
chohi, 2010; Riahi et al., 2012; Bauer et al., 2014b; Calvin et al., 2014b; 
McCollum et al., 2014a, see also Section 7.4.1). Mitigation scenarios 
indicate that meeting long-term goals will most significantly reduce 
coal use, followed by unconventional oil and gas use, with conven-
tional oil and gas affected the least (Bauer et al., 2014a, 2014b; McCol-
lum et al., 2014a) (Figure 6.15). This will lead to strong re-allocation 
effects on international energy markets (Section 6.3.6.6). 
The reduction in freely emitting fossil fuels necessary for mitigation is 
not necessarily equal to the reduction in fossil fuels more generally, 
however, because fossil resources can be used in combination with 
CCS to serve as a low-carbon energy source (McFarland et al., 2009; 
Bauer et  al., 2014b; McCollum et  al., 2014a, see also Sections 7.5.5 
and 7.11.2). This means that the total use of fossil fuels can exceed the 
use of freely emitting fossil fuels. 
To accommodate this reduction in freely emitting fossil fuels, trans-
formations of the energy system rely on a combination of three high-
level strategies: (1) decarbonization of energy supply, (2) an associated 
switch to low-carbon energy carriers such as decarbonized electric-
ity, hydrogen, or biofuels in the end-use sectors, and (3) reductions in 
energy demand. The first two of these can be illustrated in terms of 
changes in the carbon intensity of energy. The last can be illustrated in 
terms of energy intensity of GDP, energy per capita, or other indexed 
measures of energy demand.
The integrated modelling literature suggests that the first of these two 
(carbon intensity of energy) will make the largest break from past trends 
in the long run on pathways toward concentration goals (Figure 6.16). 
The fundamental reason for this is that the ultimate potential for end-
use demand reduction is limited; some energy will always be required 
to provide energy services. Bringing energy system CO2 emissions down 
toward zero, as is ultimately required for meeting any concentration goal, 
requires a switch from carbon-intensive (e. g., direct use of coal, oil, and 
natural gas) to low-carbon energy carriers (most prominently electricity, 
but also heat and hydrogen) in the end-use sectors in the long run.
At the same time, integrated modelling studies also sketch out a 
dynamic in which energy intensity reductions equal or outweigh decar-
Figure 6�16 | Final energy intensity of GDP (left panel) and carbon intensity of primary energy (right panel) in mitigation and baseline scenarios, normalized to 1 in 2010 showing 
the full scenario range. GDP is aggregated using base-year market exchange rates. Sources: WGIII AR5 Scenario Database (Annex II.10). Historic data: JRC / PBL (2013), IEA (2012a), 
see Annex II.9; Heston et al. (2012); World Bank (2013); BP (2013).
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bonization of energy supply in the near term when the supply system is 
still heavily reliant on largely carbon-intensive fossil fuels, and then the 
trend is reversed over time (Figure 6.17, see Fisher et al. (2007, Figure 
3.21)). At the most general level, this results directly from assumptions 
about the flexibility to achieve end-use demand reductions relative to 
decarbonization of supply in integrated models (Kriegler et al., 2014b), 
about which there is a great deal of uncertainty (see Section 6.8). More 
specifically, one reason for this dynamic is that fuel-switching takes 
time to take root as a strategy because there is little incentive to 
switch, say, to electricity early on when electricity may still be very 
carbon-intensive. As electricity generation decreases in carbon inten-
sity through the use of low-carbon energy sources (see Section 7.11.3), 
there is an increasing incentive to increase its use relative to sources 
associated with higher emissions, such as natural gas. A second factor 
is that there may be low-cost demand reduction options available in 
the near term, although there is limited consensus on the costs of 
reducing energy demand. Indeed, much of the energy reduction takes 
place in baseline scenarios. Of importance, these trends can be very 
Figure 6�17 | Development of carbon-intensity vs. final energy-intensity reduction relative to 2010 in selected baseline and mitigation scenarios reaching 530 – 580 ppm and 
430 – 480 ppm CO2eq concentrations in 2100 (left panel) and relative to baseline in the same scenarios (right panel). Consecutive dots represent 10-year time steps starting in 2010 
at the origin and going out to 2100. Source: WG III AR5 Scenario Database (Annex II.10). Sample includes only 2100 scenarios with idealized policy implementation for which a 
baseline, a 530 – 580 ppm and a 430 – 480 ppm CO2eq scenario are available from the same set.
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Figure 6�18 | Global low-carbon primary energy supply (direct equivalent, see Annex II.4) vs. total final energy use by 2030 and 2050 for idealized implementation scenarios. Low-
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regional in character. For example, the value of fuel-switching will be 
higher in countries that already have low-carbon electricity portfolios.
The decarbonization of the energy supply will require a significant 
scaleup of low-carbon energy supplies, which may impose significant 
challenges (see Section 7.11.2). The deployment levels of low-carbon 
energy technologies are substantially higher than today in the vast 
majority of scenarios, even under baseline conditions, and particularly 
for the most stringent concentration categories. Scenarios based on an 
idealized implementation approach in which mitigation begins imme-
diately across the world and with a full portfolio of supply options 
indicate a scaleup of anywhere from a modest increase to upwards of 
three times today’s low-carbon energy by 2030 to bring concentrations 
to about 450 ppm CO2eq by 2100. A scaleup of anywhere from roughly 
a tripling to over seven times today’s levels in 2050 is consistent with 
this same goal Figure 6.18, Section 7.11.4). The degree of scaleup 
depends critically on the degree of overshoot, which allows emissions 
reductions to be pushed into the future.
The degree of low-carbon energy scaleup also depends crucially on the 
degree that final energy use is altered along a transformation path-
way. All other things being equal, higher low-carbon energy technology 
deployment tends to go along with higher final energy use and vice 
versa (Figure 6.18, Figure 7.11). Final energy demand reductions will 
occur both in response to higher energy prices brought about by mitiga-
tion as well as by approaches to mitigation focused explicitly on reduc-
ing energy demand. Hence, the relative importance of energy supply-
and-demand technologies varies across scenarios (Riahi et al., 2012).
A major advance in the literature since AR4 is the assessment of sce-
narios with limits on available technologies or variations in the cost 
and performance of key technologies. These scenarios are intended as 
a rough proxy for economic and various non-economic obstacles faced 
by technologies. Many low-carbon supply technologies, such as nuclear 
power, CO2 storage, hydro, or wind power, face public acceptance 
issues and other barriers that may limit or slow down their deployment 
(see Section 7.9.4). In general, scenarios with limits on available tech-
nologies or variations in their cost and performance demonstrate the 
simple fact that reductions in the availability and / or performance or an 
increase in costs of one technology will necessarily result in increases 
in the use of other options. The more telling result of these scenarios is 
that limits on the technology portfolio available for mitigation can sub-
stantially increase the costs of meeting long-term goals. Indeed, many 
models cannot produce scenarios leading to 450 ppm CO2eq when par-
ticularly important technologies are removed from the portfolio. This 
topic is discussed in more detail in Section 6.3.6.3.
Delays in climate change mitigation both globally and at regional levels 
simply alter the timing of the deployment of low-carbon energy sources 
and demand reductions. As noted in Sections 6.3.2 and 6.4, less mitiga-
tion over the coming decades will require greater emissions reductions 
in the decades that follow to meet a particular long-term climate goal. 
The nature of technology transitions follows the emissions dynamic 
directly. Delays in mitigation in the near term will lower the rate of 
energy system transformation over the coming decades but will call for 
a more rapid transformation in the decades that follow. Delays lead 
to higher utilization of fossil fuels, and coal in particular, in the short 
run, which can be prolonged after the adoption of stringent mitigation 
action due to carbon lock-ins. To compensate for the prolonged use of 
fossil fuels over the next decades, fossil fuel use — particularly oil and 
gas — would need to be reduced much more strongly in the long run. 
One study found that this leads to a reduction in overall fossil energy 
use over the century compared to a scenario of immediate mitigation 
(Bauer et  al., 2014a). Another study (Riahi et  al., 2014) found that if 
2030 emissions are kept to below 50 GtCO2eq, then low-carbon energy 
deployment is tripled between 2030 and 2050 in most scenarios reach-
ing concentrations of about 450 ppm CO2eq by 2100. In contrast, if 
emissions in 2030 are greater than 55 GtCO2eq in 2030, then low-car-
bon energy deployment increases by five-fold in most scenarios meet-
ing this same long-term concentration goal (see Section 7.11.4, specifi-
cally Figure 7.15).
Beyond these high-level characteristics of the energy system trans-
formation lie a range of more detailed characteristics and tradeoffs. 
Important issues include the options for producing low-carbon energy 
and the changes in fuels used in end uses, and the increase in electric-
ity use in particular, both with and without mitigation. These issues are 
covered in detail in Section 6.8 and Chapter 7 through 12.
6�3�5 Land and bioenergy in transformation 
pathways
Scenarios suggest a substantial cost-effective, and possibly essential, 
role for land in transformation pathways (Section 6.3.2.4 and Section 
11.9), with baseline land-use emissions and sequestration an impor-
tant uncertainty (Section 6.3.1.4). Changes in land use and manage-
ment will result from a confluence of factors, only some of which are 
due to mitigation. The key forces associated with mitigation are (1) 
the demand for bioenergy, (2) the demand to store carbon in land by 
reducing deforestation, encouraging afforestation, and altering soil 
management practices, and (3) reductions in non-CO2 GHG emissions 
by changing management practices. Other forces include demand for 
food and other products, such as forest products, land for growing 
urban environments, and protecting lands for environmental, aesthetic, 
and economic purposes. Currently, only a subset of models explicitly 
model LUC in scenarios. The development of fully integrated land use 
models is an important area of model development.
Scenarios from integrated models suggest the possibility of very dif-
ferent landscapes relative to today, even in the absence of mitigation. 
Projected global baseline changes in land cover by 2050 typically 
exhibit increases in non-energy cropland and decreases in ‘other’ land, 
such as abandoned land, other arable land, and non-arable land (Fig-
ure 6.19). On the other hand, projected baseline pasture and forest 
land exhibit both increases and decreases. The projected increases in 
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non-energy cropland and decreases in forest area through 2050 are 
typically projected to outpace historical changes from the previous 40 
years (+165 and – 105 million hectares of crop and forest area 
changes, respectively, from 1961 – 2005 (Food and Agriculture Organi-
zation of the United Nations (FAO), 2012). Energy cropland is typically 
projected to increase as well, but there is less agreement across sce-
narios. Overall, baseline projections portray large differences across 
models in the amount and composition of the land converted by agri-
cultural land expansion. These baseline differences are important 
because they represent differences in the opportunity costs of land 
use and management changes for mitigation. (See Chapter 11.9 for 
regional baseline, and mitigation, land cover projections for a few 
models and scenarios.)
Mitigation generally induces greater land cover conversion than in 
baseline scenarios, but for a given level of mitigation, there is large 
variation in the projections (Figure 6.19). Projections also suggest 
additional land conversion with tighter concentration goals, but 
declining additional conversion with increased mitigation stringency. 
This is consistent with the declining relative role of land-related miti-
gation with the stringency of the mitigation goal (Rose et al., 2012). 
However, additional land conversion with more stringent goals could 
be substantial if there are only bioenergy incentives (see below). 
A common, but not universal, characteristic of mitigation scenarios is 
an expansion of energy cropland to support the production of mod-
ern bioenergy. There is also a clear tradeoff in the scenarios between 
energy cropland cover and other cover types. Most scenarios project 
reduced non-energy cropland expansion, relative to baseline expan-
sion, with some projections losing cropland relative to today. On the 
other hand, there are projected pasture changes of every kind. Forest 
changes depend on the incentives and constraints considered in each 
scenario. Some of the variations in projected land cover change are 
attributable to specific assumptions, such as fixed pasture acreage, pri-
oritized food provision, land availability constraints for energy crops, 
and the inclusion or exclusion of afforestation options (e. g. Popp et al., 
2014). Others are more subtle outcomes of combinations of model-
ling assumption and structure, such as demands for food and energy, 
land productivity and heterogeneity, yield potential, land-production 
options, and land-conversion costs. 
Which mitigation activities are available or incentivized has important 
implications for land conversion (Figure 6.19). Bioenergy incentives 
alone can produce energy cropland expansion, with increased forest 
and other land conversion (Wise et al., 2009; Reilly et al., 2012). In gen-
eral, forest land contraction results when increased demand for energy 
crops is not balanced by policies that incentivize or protect the storage 
Figure 6�19 | Global land cover change by 2050 from 2005 for a sample of baseline and mitigation scenarios with different technology assumptions. ‘REM-MAg’ = REMIND-
MAgPIE. Sources: EMF27 Study (Kriegler et al., 2014a), Reilly et al. (2012), Melillo et al. (2009), Wise et al. (2009). Notes: default (see Section 6.3.1) fossil fuel, industry, and land 
mitigation technology incentives assumed except as indicated by the following — ‘bioe’ = only land-based mitigation incentive is for modern bioenergy, ‘nobioe’ = land incentives 
but not for modern bioenergy, ‘bioe+land’ = modern bioenergy and land carbon stocks incentives, ‘bioe+agint’ = modern bioenergy incentive and agricultural intensification 
response allowed, ‘lowbio’ = global modern bioenergy constrained to 100 EJ / year, ‘noccs’ = CCS unavailable for fossil or bioenergy use. Other land cover includes abandoned land, 
other arable land, and non-arable land.
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of carbon in terrestrial systems. However, the degree of this forest con-
version will depend on a range of factors, including the potential for 
agricultural intensification and underlying modelling approaches. For 
example, Melillo et al. (2009) find twice as much forest land conversion 
by 2050 when they ignore agricultural intensification responses. Forest 
land expansion is projected when forests are protected, there are con-
straints on bioenergy deployment levels, or there are combined incen-
tives for bioenergy and terrestrial carbon stocks (e. g., Wise et al., 2009; 
Reilly et al., 2012, and GCAM-EMF27 in Figure 6.19). Differences in for-
est land expansion result largely from differences in approaches to 
incorporating land carbon in the mitigation regime. For example, in Fig-
ure 6.19, GCAM-EMF27 (all variants), Wise et al. (2009) (low bioe+land) 
and Reilly et  al. (2012)(low bioe and bioe+land) include an explicit 
price incentive to store carbon in land, which serves to encourage affor-
estation and reduce deforestation of existing forests, and discourage 
energy cropland expansion. In contrast, other scenarios consider only 
avoided deforestation (REMIND-MAgPIE-EMF27), or land conversion 
constraints (IMAGE-EMF27). Both protect existing forests, but neither 
encourages afforestation. In other studies, Melillo et al. (2009) protect 
existing natural forests based on profitability and Popp et al. (2011a) 
(not shown) impose conservation policies that protect forest regardless 
of cost. The explicit pricing of land carbon incentives can lead to large 
land use carbon sinks in scenarios, and an afforestation incentive or 
constraint on bioenergy use can result in less land conversion from bio-
energy, but not necessarily less land conversion as afforestation may 
increase. 
An important issue with respect to bioenergy, and therefore to land 
transformation, is the availability and use of BECCS. As discussed in 
Section 6.3.2, BECCS could be valuable for reaching lower-concentra-
tion levels, in part by facilitating concentration overshoot. The avail-
ability of CCS could therefore also have land-use implications. Con-
straints on the use of CCS would prohibit BECCS deployment. However, 
CCS (for BECCS as well as fossil energy with CCS) may not increase 
land conversion through 2050 relative to scenarios without BECCS. 
Instead, the presence of BECCS could decrease near-term energy crop 
expansion as some models project delayed mitigation with BECCS 
(Rose et al., 2014a, 6.3.2.2). In addition to biomass feedstock require-
ments, BECCS land considerations include bioenergy CCS facility land, 
as well as optimal siting relative to feedstock, geologic storage, and 
infrastructure.
As noted above, land transformation is tightly linked to the role of 
bioenergy in mitigation. To understand bioenergy’s role in transforma-
tion pathways, it is important to understand bioenergy’s role within 
the energy system. The review by Chum et al. (2011) estimated techni-
cal potential for bioenergy of 300 and 500 EJ / year in 2020 and 2050, 
respectively, and deployment of 100 to 300 EJ of biomass for energy 
globally in 2050, while Rose et al. (2012) found bioenergy contribut-
ing up to 15 % of cumulative primary energy over the century under 
climate policies. Rose et al. (2014a) analyze more recent results from 
15 models (Figure 6.20). They find that modelled bioenergy structures 
vary substantially across models, with differences in feedstock assump-
tions, sustainability constraints, and conversion technologies. Nonethe-
less, the scenarios project increasing deployment of, and dependence 
on, bioenergy with tighter climate change goals, both in a given year 
as well as earlier in time. Shares of total primary energy increase under 
climate policies due to both increased deployment of bioenergy and 
Figure 6�20 | Annual global modern biomass primary energy supply and bioenergy share of total primary energy supply (top panels) and BECCS share of modern bioenergy (bot-
tom panels) in baseline, 550 ppm and 450 ppm CO2eq scenarios in 2030, 2050, and 2100. Source: Rose et al. (2014a). Notes: All scenarios shown assume idealized implementation. 
Results for 15 models shown (3 models project to only 2050). Also, some models do not include BECCS technologies and some no more than biopower options.
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shrinking energy systems. Bioenergy’s share of total regional electricity 
and liquid fuels is projected to be up to 35 % and 75 %, respectively, 
by 2050. However, there is no single vision about where biomass is 
cost-effectively deployed within the energy system (electricity, liquid 
fuels, hydrogen, and / or heat), due in large part to uncertainties about 
relative technology options and costs over time. (See Chapter 7 for 
more detail on bioenergy’s role in energy supply.) As noted above, the 
availability of CCS, and therefore BECCS, has important implications for 
bioenergy deployment. In scenarios that do include BECCS technolo-
gies, BECCS is deployed in greater quantities and earlier in time the 
more stringent the goal, potentially representing 100 % of bioenergy in 
2050 (Figure 6.20).
Models universally project that the majority of biomass supply for bio-
energy and bioenergy consumption will occur in developing and tran-
sitional economies. For instance, one study (Rose et al., 2014a) found 
that 50 – 90 % of global bioenergy primary energy is projected to come 
from non-OECD countries in 2050, with the share increasing beyond 
2050. Developing and transitional regions are also projected to be the 
home of the majority of agricultural and forestry mitigation.
Finally, a number of integrated models have explicitly modelled land 
use with full emissions accounting, including indirect land cover 
change and agricultural intensification. These models have suggested 
that it could be cost-effective to tradeoff lower land carbon stocks 
from land cover change and increase N2O emissions from agricultural 
intensification for the long-run climate change management benefits 
of bioenergy (Popp et al., 2014; Rose et al., 2014a). 
Overall, the integrated modelling literature suggests opportunities 
for large-scale global deployment of bioenergy and terrestrial carbon 
gains. However, the transformations associated with mitigation will 
be challenging due to the regional scale of deployments and imple-
mentation issues, including institution and program design, land use 
and regional policy coordination, emissions leakage, biophysical and 
economic uncertainties, and potential non-climate social implica-
tions. Among other things, bioenergy deployment is complicated by a 
variety of social concerns, such as land conversion and food security 
(See Section 6.6 and the Chapter 11 Bioenergy Annex). Coordination 
between land-mitigation policies, regions, and activities over time will 
affect forestry-, agricultural-, and bioenergy-mitigation costs and net 
GHG mitigation effectiveness. When land options and bioenergy are 
included in mitigation scenarios, it is typically under the assumption 
of a highly idealized implementation, with immediate, global, and 
comprehensive availability of land-related mitigation options. In these 
cases, models are assuming a global terrestrial carbon-stock incentive 
or global forest-protection policy, global incentives for bioenergy feed-
stocks, and global agriculture-mitigation policies. They also assume no 
uncertainty, risk, or transactions costs. For a discussion of these issues, 
see Lubowski and Rose (2013). The literature has begun exploring 
more realistic policy contexts and found that there is likely less avail-
able mitigation potential in the near term than previously estimated, 
and possibly unavoidable emissions leakage associated with getting 
programs in place, as well as with voluntary mitigation supply mecha-
nisms (Section 11.9, Section 6.8). Additional exploration into the need 
for and viability of large-scale land-based mitigation is an important 
area for future research.
6�3�6 The aggregate economic implications of 
transformation pathways
6�3�6�1 Overview of the aggregate economic 
implications of mitigation
Mitigation will require a range of changes, including behavioural 
changes and the use of alternative technologies. These changes will 
affect economic output and the consumption of goods and services. 
The primary source of information on these costs over multi-decade 
or century-long time horizons are integrated models such as those 
reviewed in this chapter.
Mitigation will affect economic conditions through several avenues, 
only some of which are included in estimates from integrated models. 
To a first-order, mitigation involves reductions in the consumption of 
energy services, and perhaps agricultural products, and the use of more 
expensive technologies. This first-order effect is the predominant fea-
ture and focus of the integrated modelling estimates discussed in this 
chapter and will lead to aggregate economic losses. However, mitiga-
tion policies may interact with pre-existing distortions in labour, capi-
tal, energy, and land markets, and failures in markets for technology 
adoption and innovation, among other things. These interactions might 
increase or decrease economic impacts (Sections 3.6.3 and 6.3.6.5).
Estimates of the potential aggregate economic effects from mitigation 
are generally expressed as deviations from a counter-factual baseline 
scenario without mitigation policies; that is, the difference in economic 
conditions relative to what would have happened without mitigation. 
They can be expressed in terms of changes in these economic condi-
tions at a particular point in time (for example, reductions in total con-
sumption or GDP at a given point in time) or in terms of reductions in 
the growth rates leading to these economic conditions (for example, 
reductions in the rate of consumption or GDP growth). The estimates, 
and those discussed in this section, generally do not include the ben-
efits from reducing climate change, nor do they consider the interac-
tions between mitigation, adaptation, and climate impacts (Section 
6.3.3). In addition, the estimates do not take into account important 
co-benefits and adverse side-effects from mitigation, such as impacts 
on land use and health benefits from reduced air pollution (Sections 
11.13.6 and 6.6).
A wide range of methodological issues attends the estimation of 
aggregate economic costs in integrated models, one of which is 
the metric itself. (For more discussion on these issues in estimating 
aggregate economic costs, see Annex II.3.2 on mitigation costs met-
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rics and Chapter 3.) A change in welfare due to changes in house-
hold consumption is commonly measured in terms of equivalent and 
compensating variation, but other, more indirect cost measures such 
as GDP losses, consumption losses, and area under the marginal 
abatement cost function are more widely used (Paltsev and Capros, 
2013). For consistency, results in this section are presented preferen-
tially in terms of cost measures commonly reported by the models: 
consumption losses and GDP losses for general-equilibrium models, 
and area under the marginal abatement cost function or reduction 
of consumer and producer surplus (in the following summarized with 
the term abatement cost) for partial-equilibrium models. These cost 
metrics differ in terms of whether or not general equilibrium effects 
in the full economy have been taken into account and whether or 
not the direct impact on households or the intermediate impact on 
economic output is measured. They are therefore treated separately 
in this chapter.
Emissions prices (carbon prices) are also assessed in this chapter. How-
ever, they are not a proxy for aggregate economic costs for two pri-
mary reasons. First, emissions prices measure marginal cost, that is, the 
cost of an additional unit of emissions reduction. In contrast, total eco-
nomic costs represent the costs of all mitigation that has taken place. 
Second, emissions prices can interact with other policies and measures, 
such as regulatory policies or subsidies directed at low-carbon tech-
nologies, and will therefore indicate a lower marginal cost than is actu-
ally warranted if mitigation is achieved partly by these other measures.
Different methods can be used to sum costs over time. For this pur-
pose, in the absence of specific information from individual models 
about the discount rate used in studies, the estimates of net pres-
ent value (NPV) costs in this chapter are aggregated ex-post using 
a discount rate of 5 %. This is roughly representative of the aver-
age interest rate that underlies the discounting approach in most 
models (Kriegler et al., 2014a). Other rates could have been used to 
conduct this ex-post aggregation. Since mitigation costs tend to rise 
over time, lower (higher) rates would lead to higher (lower) aggre-
gate costs than what are provided here. However, it is important to 
note that constructing NPV metrics based on other rates is not the 
same as actually evaluating scenarios under alternative discounting 
assumptions and will not accurately reflect aggregate costs under 
such assumptions. 
Estimates of aggregate economic effects from integrated models vary 
substantially. This arises because of differences in assumptions about 
driving forces such as population and economic growth and the policy 
environment in the baseline, as well as differences in the structures 
and scopes of the models (Section 6.2). In addition, aggregate eco-
nomic costs are influenced by the future cost, performance, and avail-
ability of mitigation technologies (Section 6.3.6.3), the nature of inter-
national participation in mitigation (Section 6.3.6.4), and the policy 
instruments used to reduce emissions and the interaction between 
these instruments and pre-existing distortions and market failures 
(Section 6.3.6.5).
6�3�6�2 Global aggregate costs of mitigation in idealized 
implementation scenarios
A valuable benchmark for exploring aggregate economic mitigation 
costs is estimates based on the assumption of a stylized implementa-
tion approach in which a ubiquitous price on carbon and other GHGs 
is applied across the globe in every sector of every country and rises 
over time in a way that minimizes the discounted sum of costs over 
time. These ‘idealized implementation’ scenarios are included in most 
studies as a benchmark against which to compare results based on 
less-idealized circumstances. One reason that these idealized scenarios 
have been used as a benchmark is that the implementation approach 
provides the lowest costs under idealized implementation conditions 
of efficient global markets in which there are no pre-existing distor-
tions or interactions with other, non-climate market failures. For this 
reason, they are often referred to as ‘cost-effective’ scenarios. However, 
the presence of pre-existing market distortions, non-climate market 
failures, or complementary policies means that the cost of the idealized 
approach could be lower or higher than in an idealized implementation 
environment, and that the idealized approach may not be the least-
cost strategy (see Section 6.3.6.5). Most of the idealized implementa-
tion scenarios assessed here consider these additional factors only to 
a limited degree or not at all, and the extent to which a non-idealized 
implementation environment is accounted for varies between them. 
A robust result across studies is that aggregate global costs of mitiga-
tion tend to increase over time and with stringency of the concentration 
goal (Figure 6.21). According to the idealized implementation scenarios 
collected in the WG III AR5 Scenario Database (Annex II.10), the central 
70 % (10 out of 14) of global consumption loss estimates for reaching 
levels of 430 – 480 ppm CO2eq by 2100 range between 1 % to 4 % in 
2030, 2 % to 6 % in 2050, and 3 % to 11 % in 2100 relative to consump-
tion in the baseline (Figure 6.21, panel c). These consumption losses cor-
respond to an annual average reduction of consumption growth by 0.06 
to 0.20 percentage points from 2010 to 2030 (median of 0.09), 0.06 to 
0.17 percentage points through 2050 (median of 0.09), and 0.04 to 0.14 
percentage points over the century (median of 0.06). To put these losses 
in context, studies assume annual average consumption growth rates 
without mitigation between 1.9 % and 3.8 % per year until 2050 and 
between 1.6 % and 3.0 % per year over the century. These growth rates 
correspond to increases in total consumption by roughly a factor of 2 to 
4.5 by 2050, and from roughly four-fold to over ten-fold over the century 
(values are based on global projections in market exchange rates).
An important caveat to these results is that they do not account for a 
potential model bias due to the fact that higher-cost models may have 
not been able to produce low-concentration scenarios and have there-
fore not reported results for these scenarios (see discussion of model 
failures in Section 6.2, and Tavoni and Tol, 2010). They also do not 
capture uncertainty in model parameter assumptions (Webster et al., 
2012). Since scenario samples for different concentration levels do not 
come from precisely the same models, it is informative to look at the 
cost changes between different concentration levels as projected by 
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individual models within a given study (Figure 6.22). This can partly 
remove model bias, although the bias from a lack of models that could 
not produce low-concentration scenarios remains. The large majority 
of studies in the scenario database for AR5 report a factor 1.5 to 3 
higher global consumption and GDP losses, and 2 to 4 times higher 
abatement costs, for scenarios reaching 430 – 530 ppm CO2eq by 2100 
compared to the 530 – 650 ppm CO2eq range.
Aggregate economic costs vary substantially, even in idealized scenar-
ios. The variation of cost estimates for individual CO2eq concentration 
ranges can be attributed, among other things, to differences in assump-
tions about driving forces such as population and GDP and differences 
in model structure and scope (see Section 6.2 for a discussion of model 
differences). Diagnostic studies have indicated that the assumed avail-
ability and flexibility of low-carbon technologies to substitute fossil 
energy is a key factor influencing the level of carbon prices for a given 
level of emissions reductions (Kriegler et al., 2014a). The extent to which 
carbon prices translate into mitigation costs through higher energy 
prices is another factor that differs between models. Both the variation 
of carbon prices and the variation of the economic impact of higher 
prices are major determinants of the observed range of aggregate eco-
nomic costs for a given amount of emissions reductions. Assumptions 
about the implementation environment can be another important driver 
of costs. For example, the highest consumption and GDP losses in the 
scenario sample are from a model with an emphasis on market imper-
fections, infrastructure lock-ins, and myopia (Waisman et al., 2012).
It is possible to control for several key sources of variation by relat-
ing mitigation costs to cumulative emissions reductions from baseline 
emissions (Figure 6.23). As expected, carbon prices and mitigation 
costs increase with the amount of mitigation. Since different models 
have different capabilities for deep emissions reductions, the inter-
model spread in carbon price and cost estimates increases as well. In 
other words, scenarios indicate greater consensus regarding the nature 
of mitigation costs at higher-concentration levels than those at lower 
levels. This increase in variation reflects the challenge associated with 
modelling energy and other human systems that are dramatically dif-
ferent than those of today.
6�3�6�3 The implications of technology portfolios for 
aggregate global economic costs
Because technology will underpin the transition to a low-carbon 
economy, the availability, cost, and performance of technologies will 
exert an influence on economic costs. Several multi-model studies and 
a wide range of individual model studies have explored this space 
(see Section 6.1.2.2). A precise understanding of the implications of 
technology availability on costs is confounded by several factors. One 
issue is that the sensitivities among technologies are not necessarily 
comparable across models or scenarios. Some models do not repre-
sent certain technologies such as BECCS and therefore do not exhibit 
a strong cost increase if these options are restricted. These models 
may instead have difficulties in achieving tighter concentration goals 
regardless of the restriction (Krey et al., 2014). In addition, assump-
tions about cost and performance can vary across models, even within 
a single, multi-model study. Moreover, many limited technology sce-
narios are characterized by frequent model infeasibilities, as shown by 
the fraction of models in the EMF27 study (Kriegler et al., 2014a) able 
to meet a particular goal with different technology combinations at 
the bottom of Figure 6.24. (See Section 6.2.4 regarding interpretation 
of model infeasibility). 
Despite these limitations, the literature broadly confirms that mitiga-
tion costs are heavily influenced by the availability, cost, and perfor-
mance of mitigation technologies. In addition, these studies indicate 
that the influence of technology on costs generally increases with 
increasing stringency of the concentration goal (Figure 6.24). The 
effect on mitigation costs varies by technology, however, the ranges 
reported by the different models tend to strongly overlap (Figure 6.24, 
Krey et al., 2014), reflecting the general variation of mitigation costs 
across models (Section 6.3.6.2, Fisher et al., 2007). In general, models 
have been able to produce scenarios leading to about 550 ppm CO2eq 
by 2100, even under limited technology assumptions. However, many 
models could not produce scenarios leading to about 450 ppm CO2eq 
by 2100 with limited technology portfolios, particularly when assump-
tions preclude or limit the use of BECCS (Azar et al., 2006; van Vliet 
et al., 2009; Krey et al., 2014; Kriegler et al., 2014a).
As noted above, the lack of availability of CCS is most frequently 
associated with the most significant cost increase (Edenhofer et  al., 
2010; Tavoni et al., 2012; Krey et al., 2014; Kriegler et al., 2014a; Riahi 
et al., 2014), particularly for concentration goals approaching 450 ppm 
CO2eq, which are characterized by often substantial overshoot. One 
fundamental reason for this is that the combination of biomass with 
CCS can serve as a CDR technology in the form of BECCS (Azar et al., 
2006; Krey and Riahi, 2009; van Vliet et  al., 2009; Edmonds et  al., 
2013; Kriegler et  al., 2013a; van Vuuren et  al., 2013) (see Sections 
6.3.2 and 6.9). In addition to the ability to produce negative emis-
sions when coupled with bioenergy, CCS is a versatile technology that 
Figure 6�21 | Global mitigation costs of idealized implementation scenarios. Panels show the development of (a) carbon prices, (c) consumption losses, (e) GDP losses and 
(f) abatement costs over time, and (b) the average carbon price (2015 – 2100), and (d) the NPV mitigation costs (2015 – 2100) discounted at a 5 % discount rate. Costs are expressed 
as a fraction of economic output — or in the case of consumption losses — consumption in the baseline. The number of scenarios included in the boxplots is indicated at the bot-
tom of the panels, 2030 numbers also apply for 2020 and 2050. The number of scenarios outside the figure range is noted at the top. One model shows NPV consumption losses 
of 13 % / 9.5 %, and GDP losses of 15 % / 11 % for 430 – 480 / 530 – 580 ppm CO2eq (see text). Source: WG III AR5 Scenario Database (Annex II.10).The scenario selection includes 
all idealized implementation scenarios that reported costs or carbon prices to 2050 or 2100 (only the latter are included in aggregate cost and price plots) after removal of similar 
scenarios (in terms of reaching similar goals with similar overshoots and assumptions about baseline emissions) from the same model.
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Figure 6�22 | Carbon price (left panel) and global mitigation cost changes (right panel) for idealized implementation scenarios relative to a reference concentration category 
(530 – 650 ppm CO2eq in 2100). Results for NPV costs are shown by consumption losses, GDP losses, and abatement costs. Results are based on pairs of idealized implementation 
scenarios, one in the 530 – 650 ppm CO2eq range and one in a neighbouring concentration range, from a single model and study. Cost changes were calculated on the basis of NPV 
economic costs (discounted at 5 % per year) and carbon price changes on the basis of average discounted values for the period 2015 – 2100. See Figure 6.21 caption for further 
explanation on the presentation of results. Source: WG III AR5 Scenario Database (Annex II.10).
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Figure 6�23 | Average carbon prices (left panel) and global mitigation costs (right panel) as a function of residual cumulative CO2 emissions expressed as fraction of cumulative 
baseline emissions over the period 2011 – 2100. Emissions reductions relative to baseline can be deduced by subtracting the fraction of residual cumulative emissions from unity. 
Mitigation costs are reported in NPV consumption losses in percent baseline consumption for general equilibrium (GE) models and abatement costs in percent baseline GDP for 
partial equilibrium (PE) models. A discount rate of 5 % per year was used for calculating average carbon prices and net present value mitigation costs. See description of Figure 6.21 
for the selection of scenarios. Source: WG III AR5 Scenario Database (Annex II.10).
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can be combined with electricity, synthetic fuel, and hydrogen produc-
tion from several feedstocks and in energy-intensive industries such 
as cement and steel. The CCS can also act as bridge technology that is 
compatible with existing fossil-fuel dominated supply structures (see 
Sections 7.5.5, 7.9, and 6.9 for a discussion of challenges and risks of 
CCS and CDR). Bioenergy shares some of these characteristics with 
CCS. It is also an essential ingredient for BECCS, and it can be applied 
in various sectors of the energy system, including for the provision of 
liquid low-carbon fuels for transportation (see Chapter 11, Bioenergy 
Annex for a discussion of related challenges and risks). In contrast, 
those options that are largely confined to the electricity sector (e. g., 
wind, solar, and nuclear energy) and heat generation tend to show a 
lower value, both because they cannot be used to generate negative 
emissions and because there are a number of low-carbon electricity 
supply options available that can generally substitute each other (Krey 
et al., 2014).
Scenarios also suggest that energy end-use technologies and mea-
sures have an important influence on mitigation costs. For example, 
in the EMF27 and AMPERE multi-model studies, reductions in the 
final energy demand of 20 – 30 % by 2050 and 35 – 45 % by 2100 led 
to reductions in the cumulative discounted aggregate mitigation costs 
on the order of 50 % (Krey et  al., 2014; Kriegler et  al., 2014a; Riahi 
et al., 2014). An important caveat to these results is that the costs of 
achieving these reductions were not considered nor were the policy 
or technology drivers that led to them. Energy end-use measures are 
important not just for reducing energy consumption, but also for facili-
tating the use of low-carbon fuels. For example, a number of studies 
(Kyle and Kim, 2011; Riahi et al., 2012; Pietzcker et al., 2014; McCol-
lum et al., 2014b) show that allowing electricity or hydrogen in trans-
portation lowers mitigation costs by opening up additional supply 
routes to the transportation sector (see Section 6.8 for more on this 
topic). An increasing ability to electrify the end-use sectors and trans-
port in particular, in turn, tends to reduce the importance of CCS and 
bioenergy technologies for achieving lower-concentration goals such 
as 450 ppm CO2eq. 
6�3�6�4 Economic implications of non-idealized 
international mitigation policy implementation
Research has consistently demonstrated that delaying near-term global 
mitigation as well as reducing the extent of international participation 
in mitigation can significantly affect aggregate economic costs of miti-
Figure 6�24 | Relative increase of NPV mitigation costs (period 2015 – 2100, 5 % discount rate) from technology portfolio variations compared to a scenario with default technol-
ogy availability. Scenario names on the horizontal axis indicate the technology variation relative to the default assumptions: Low Energy Intensity = higher energy intensity improve-
ments leading to energy demand reductions of 20 – 30 % by 2050 and 35 – 45 % by 2100 relative to the default baseline; No CCS = unavailability of CCS; Nuclear Phase Out = No 
addition of nuclear power plants beyond those under construction; existing plants operated until the end of their lifetime; Limited Solar / Wind = a maximum of 20 % global electric-
ity generation from solar and wind power in any year of these scenarios; Limited Bioenergy = maximum of 100 EJ / yr of modern bioenergy supply globally; Conventional Energy 
Future = combining pessimistic assumptions for renewable energy (Limited Solar / Wind + Limited Bioenergy); Energy efficiency and Renewables = combining low energy intensity 
with non-availability of CCS and nuclear phase-out; Limited Technology Future = all supply-side options constrained and energy intensity developing in line with historical records 
in the baseline. Source: EMF27 study, adapted from (Kriegler et al., 2014a). Only those scenarios from the EMF27 study are included that reached the 430 – 480 and 530 – 580 ppm 
CO2eq concentration ranges or were close to it (see footnotes in the figure).
* Number of models successfully vs. number of models attempting running the respective technology variation scenario
‡ Scenarios from two models reach concentration levels in 2100 that are slightly above the 430-480 ppm CO2eq category.
† Scenarios from one model reach concentration levels in 2100 that are slightly below the 530-580 ppm CO2eq category
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gation. One way in which aggregate mitigation costs are increased is 
by delaying near-term global mitigation relative to what would be 
warranted in the hypothetical idealized case that a long-term goal was 
adopted and a least-cost approach to reach the global mitigation goal 
was implemented immediately. This represents one manifestation of 
not undertaking mitigation ‘when’ it is least expensive (Keppo and 
Rao, 2007; Bosetti et  al., 2009b; Krey and Riahi, 2009; Jakob et  al., 
2012; Kriegler et al., 2013b; Luderer et al., 2013; Rogelj et al., 2013b; 
Riahi et al., 2014). In scenarios in which near-term global mitigation is 
limited, the increase in mitigation costs is significantly and positively 
related to the gap in short-term mitigation with respect to the ideal-
ized scenarios (Figure 6.25). Costs are lower in the near-term, but 
increase more rapidly in the transition period following the delayed 
mitigation, and are also higher in the longer term. Future mitigation 
costs are higher because delays in near-term mitgation not only require 
deeper reductions in the long run to compensate for higher emissions 
in the short term, but also produce a larger lock-in in carbon infrastruc-
ture, increasing the challenge of these accelerated emissions reduction 
rates. The effects of delay on mitigation costs increase with the strin-
gency of the mitigation goal. Studies suggest that important transi-
tional economic metrics other than aggregate costs — for example, 
reduced growth rates in economic output and consumption, escalating 
energy prices, and increasing carbon rents — may be more affected by 
delayed mitigation than aggregate costs (Kriegler et al., 2013b; Lud-
erer et al., 2014a).
Studies have consistently found that delays through 2030 have sub-
stantially more profound aggregate economic implications than delays 
through 2020, both in terms of higher transitional impacts due to more 
rapidly increasing mitigation costs at the time of adopting the long-
term strategy and higher long-term costs (Kriegler et al., 2013b; Rogelj 
et al., 2013a; Luderer et al., 2014a). This is directly related to prolonged 
delays in mitigation leading to both larger carbon lock-ins and higher 
short term emissions that need to be compensated by deeper emis-
sions cuts in the long run (Sections 6.3.2 and 6.4). Moreover, delayed 
mitigation further increases the dependence on the full availability 
of mitigation options, especially on CDR technologies such as BECCS 
(Luderer et al., 2013; Rogelj et al., 2013b; Riahi et al., 2014). (See Sec-
tion 6.3.6.3, Section 6.4). 
Fragmented action or delayed participation by particular coun-
tries — that is, not undertaking mitigation ‘where’ it is least expen-
Figure 6�25 | Mitigation costs increase as a function of reduced near-term mitigation effort, expressed as relative change to immediate mitigation (idealized implementation) sce-
narios (referred to as the ‘mitigation gap’). Cost increase is shown both in the medium term (2030 – 2050, left panel) and in the long term (2050 – 2100, right panel), calculated on 
undiscounted costs. The mitigation gap is calculated from cumulative CO2 mitigation to 2030. Blue and yellow dots show scenarios reaching concentration goals of 430 – 530 ppm 
and 530 – 650 ppm CO2eq, respectively. The shaded area indicates the range for the whole scenario set (two standard deviations). The bars in the lower panel indicate the mitigation 
gap range where 75 % of scenarios with 2030 emissions, respectively, above and below 55 GtCO2 are found. Not all model simulations of delayed additional mitigation until 2030 
could reach the lower concentration goal of 430 – 530 ppm CO2eq (for 2030 emissions above 55 GtCO2eq, 29 of 48 attempted simulations could reach the goal; for 2030 emissions 
below 55 GtCO2eq, 34 of 51 attempted simulations could reach the goal). Source: WG III AR5 Scenario Database (Annex II.10), differences between delayed mitigation to 2020 and 
2030 and immediate mitigation categories.
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sive — has also been broadly shown to increase global mitigation costs 
(Edmonds et  al., 2008; Calvin et  al., 2009b; Clarke et  al., 2009; Tol, 
2009; Richels et al., 2009; Bosetti et al., 2009d; van Vliet et al., 2009; 
Kriegler et  al., 2014c). Fragmented action will influence aggregate 
global economic costs not only because of misallocation of mitigation 
across countries, but also through emissions leakage and trade-related 
spillover effects (Arroyo-Curras et al., 2014; Babiker, 2005; Bauer et al., 
2014a; Blanford et  al., 2014; Böhringer et  al., 2012; Bosetti and De 
Cian, 2013; Kriegler et  al., 2014c). The range and strength of these 
adverse effects and risks depends on the type of policy intervention 
and the stringency of the mitigation effort. Border carbon adjustments 
have been found to reduce economic impacts of exposed industries, 
but not to yield significant global cost savings (Böhringer et al., 2012). 
Some studies have indicated that the increased costs from fragmented 
action could be counterbalanced by increased incentives to carry out 
innovation, though only to a limited extent (Di Maria and Werf, 2007; 
Golombek and Hoel, 2008; Gerlagh et al., 2009; De Cian and Tavoni, 
2012; De Cian et al., 2014).
Multi model studies have indeed found that the smaller the propor-
tion of total global emissions included in a climate regime due to 
fragmented action, the higher the costs and the more challenging 
it becomes to meet any long-term goal. For example, only 2 (5) of 
10 participating models could produce 450 ppm CO2eq overshoot 
(550 ppm CO2eq not to exceed) scenarios under the regional frag-
mentation assumptions in the EMF22 scenarios (Clarke et al., 2009). 
In these scenarios, the Annex I countries began mitigation immedi-
ately, followed by major emerging economies in 2030, and the rest 
of the world in 2050 (see Table 6.1, (Clarke et al., 2009) (see Section 
6.2 for a discussion of model infeasibility). Discounted global aggre-
gate mitigation costs over the century increased by 50 % to more 
than double for those models that could produce these scenarios 
(FIgure 6.26).
In general, when some countries act earlier than others, the increased 
costs of fragmented action fall on early actors. However, aggregate 
economic costs can also increase for late entrants, even taking into 
account their lower near-term mitigation (Clarke et  al., 2009; Jakob 
et al., 2012). Late entrants benefit in early periods from lower mitiga-
tion; however, to meet long-term goals, they must then reduce emis-
sions more quickly once they begin mitigation, in just the same way 
that global emissions must undergo a more rapid transition if they 
are delayed in total. The increased costs of this rapid and deep miti-
gation can be larger than the reduced costs from delaying near-term 
mitigation (Figure 6.26). The degree to which the late entrants’ miti-
gation costs increase with fragmented action depends on the extent 
of carbon-intensive technologies and infrastructure put in place dur-
ing the period during which they delay reductions and the speed at 
which emissions must be reduced after they begin emissions reduc-
tions. Indeed, in the face of a future mitigation commitment it is opti-
mal to anticipate emissions reductions, reducing the adjustment costs 
of confronting mitigation policy with a more carbon-intensive capital 
stock (Bosetti et al., 2009a; Richels et al., 2009). In addition, countries 
may incur costs from international mitigation policy even if they do not 
participate, for example, from a loss of fossil fuel revenues (Blanford 
et al., 2014).
6�3�6�5 The interactions between policy tools and their 
implementation, pre-existing taxes, market 
failures, and other distortions
The aggregate economic costs reported in Section 6.3.6.2 have 
assumed an idealized policy implementation and in many cases an 
idealized implementation environment with perfectly functioning eco-
nomic markets devoid of market failures, institutional constraints, and 
pre-existing tax distortions. Many models represent some of these dis-
tortions, but most models represent only a small portion of possible 
distortions and market failures. The reality that assumptions of ideal-
ized implementation and idealized implementation environment will 
not be met in practice means that real-world aggregate mitigation 
costs could be very different from those reported here.
Under the assumption of a perfect implementation environment, 
economic analysis has long demonstrated that the way to minimize 
the aggregate economic costs of mitigation is to undertake mitiga-
tion where and when it is least expensive (Montgomery, 1972). This 
implies that policies be flexible and comprehensive with a ubiquitous 
price on GHG emissions, as might be achieved by a cap-and-trade 
policy or carbon tax (Goulder and Parry, 2008). The literature pre-
sented thus far in this section has assumed such an approach. Even 
Figure 6�26 | Impact of fragmented action on the relative mitigation costs of three 
representative regions: Annex I without Russia; Brasil, Russia, India, and China (BRIC); 
and Rest of the World (ROW) from the EMF22 Study. In this study, Annex I (without 
Russia) joins immediately, BRIC in 2030, and ROW in 2050 (see Table 6.1). The vertical 
axis shows the increase in mitigation costs between full participation and fragmented 
action scenarios. Thus, values above 0 indicate that fragmented action increases costs. 
Mitigation costs are calculated relative to baseline over 2015 – 2100 both in NPV at 5 % 
discount rate (left bars) and as maximum losses over the century (right bars). Source: 
EMF22 data base.
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scenarios with fragmented or limited near-term emissions reductions 
have typically assumed efficient, full-economy carbon prices for all 
countries undertaking mitigation. However, real-world approaches 
may very well deviate from this approach. For example, some policies 
may only address particular sectors, such as power generation; other 
policies may regulate the behaviour of particular sectors through 
command and control measures, for example, through renewable 
portfolio standards for power generation or fuel economy standards 
for transport.
In an idealized implementation environment, the literature shows that 
approaches that exclude sectors or regulate reductions by sector will 
lead to higher aggregate mitigation costs, particularly for goals requir-
ing large emissions reductions where coverage and flexibility are most 
important (Paltsev et al., 2008). A wide range of recent studies have 
corroborated this general result, including the large scale multi-model 
comparison studies such as EMF22 (Böhringer et  al., 2009), EMF24 
(Fawcett et  al., 2014), and EMF28 (Knopf et  al., 2013) along with a 
wide range of individual papers. As an example, a survey of results 
(OECD, 2009) indicates that exempting energy-intensive industries 
increases mitigation costs for achieving concentrations of 550 ppm by 
50 % in 2050, and that excluding non-CO2 GHG emissions increases 
the mitigation costs by 75 % in 2050. The EMF22 study (Böhringer 
et al., 2009) find that differential prices for the European Union (EU) 
Emission Trading Scheme (ETS) and non-ETS emissions in the EU and 
the inclusion of a renewable portfolio standard could double the miti-
gation costs for the EU goals for 2020. Wise et al. (2009) found that the 
failure to include changes in land use emissions in mitigation policy 
could double global carbon prices in a 450 ppm CO2 scenario. At the 
same time, it is important to recognize that mitigation may not be the 
only objective of these sectoral approaches and regulatory policies. 
They may also be designed to address other policy priorities such as 
energy security and local environmental concerns.
Climate policies will interact with pre-existing policy structures as 
well as with other market failures beyond the market failure posed 
by climate change — that is, a non-idealized implementation environ-
ment — and these interactions can either increase or decrease policy 
costs. A number of authors have argued that costs could be much 
lower or even negative compared to those produced by studies assum-
ing idealized policy and implementation environments (Bosquet, 2000; 
Bye et  al., 2002; Waisman et  al., 2012). The results of these studies 
rest on one or several assumptions — that mitigation policy be used 
not only to address the climate externality, but also to achieve other 
policy priorities such as sustainable development; the use of mitigation 
policy instruments for the correction of the implementation environ-
ment including removal of market failures and pre-existing distortions; 
and / or on optimistic views of climate-related innovation and technol-
ogy development, adoption, and penetration.
Because technology is so critical to the economic costs of mitigation, 
the economic costs and efficacy of climate policies more generally will 
necessarily be influenced by market failures in markets for technology 
adoption and those for development and R&D (Jaffe, 2012). There are 
numerous market failures, such as research and adoption spillovers, 
limited foresight, limited information, and imperfect capital markets, 
which can cause underinvestment in mitigation technologies, dis-
cussed in more detail in Section 15.6 (Thollander et al., 2010; Allcott, 
2011, 2013; Kalkuhl et al., 2012, among many others). Studies indi-
cate aggregate mitigation costs could be lower if these market fail-
ures could be removed through complementary policies (Jaffe et al., 
2005; Thollander et al., 2010). Additionally, literature that focuses in 
particular on failures in markets for investments in technology and 
R&D has found large reductions in aggregate mitigation costs as a 
result of correcting these failures, for example, through the recycling 
of revenue from climate policies or otherwise using public funds (Bos-
quet, 2000; Edenhofer et al., 2010; Waisman et al., 2012). The litera-
ture has also shown the value of related complementary policies to 
enhance labor flexibility (Guivarch et al., 2011) or impact the mobility 
of demand, such as transportation infrastructures or urban and fiscal 
policies lowering real estate prices and urban sprawl (Waisman et al., 
2012).
Interactions with pre-existing policies and associated distortions will 
also influence economic costs. The EU ETS offers an example where 
an efficient policy tool (cap-and-trade system) that is applied on par-
tial sectors (partial coverage) and interacts with pre-existing distor-
tions (high energy taxes) and other energy policies (renewable energy 
requirements) is affected by over-allocation of permits and slower than 
expected economic growth (Ellerman and Buchner, 2008; Ellerman, 
2010; Batlle et al., 2012). Paltsev et al (2007) show that pre-existing 
distortions (e. g., energy taxes) can greatly increase the cost of a policy 
that targets emission reduction. In contrast, literature has also looked 
into the use of carbon revenues to reduce pre-existing taxes (generally 
known as the ‘double dividends’ literature). This literature indicates 
that total mitigation costs can be reduced through such recycling of 
revenues (Goulder, 1995; Bovenberg and Goulder, 1996). Nonetheless, 
a number of authors have also cautioned against the straight gener-
alization of such results indicating that the interplay between carbon 
policies and pre-existing taxes can differ markedly across countries 
showing empirical cases where a ‘double dividend’ does not exist 
as discussed in Section 3.6.3.3 (Fullerton and Metcalf, 1997; Babiker 
et al., 2003; Metcalf et al., 2004).
6�3�6�6 Regional mitigation costs and effort-sharing 
regimes 
The costs of climate change mitigation will not be identical across 
countries (Clarke et al., 2009; Hof et al., 2009; Edenhofer et al., 2010; 
Lüken et al., 2011; Luderer et al., 2012b; Tavoni et al., 2013; Aboumah-
boub et al., 2014; Blanford et al., 2014). The regional variation in costs 
will be influenced by the nature of international participation in miti-
gation, regional mitigation potentials, and transfer payments across 
regions. In the idealized setting of a universal carbon price leading to 
reductions where they would be least expensive, and in the absence 
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of transfer payments, the total aggregate economic costs of mitiga-
tion would vary substantially across countries and regions. In results 
collected from modelling studies under these circumstances, relative 
aggregate costs in the OECD-1990, measured as a percentage change 
from, or relative to, baseline conditions, are typically lower than the 
global average, those in Latin America are typically around the global 
average, and those in other regions are higher than the global average 
(Figure 6.27) (Clarke et al., 2009; Tavoni et al., 2013).
The variation in these relative regional costs can be attributed to sev-
eral factors (Stern et al., 2012; Tavoni et al., 2013). First, costs are driven 
by relative abatement with respect to emissions in a baseline, or no-
policy, scenario, which are expected to be higher in developing coun-
tries (see Section 6.3.2 for more discussion). Second, developing coun-
tries are generally characterized by higher energy and carbon 
intensities due to the structure of economies in economic transition. 
This induces a higher economic feedback for the same level of mitiga-
tion (Luderer et  al., 2012b). Third, domestic abatement is only one 
determinant of policy costs, since international markets would interact 
with climate policies (Leimbach et al., 2010). For some regions, notably 
the fossil energy exporting countries, higher costs would originate from 
unfavourable terms of trade effects of the mitigation policy (OECD, 
2008; Luderer et al., 2012a; Massetti and Tavoni, 2011; Aboumahboub 
et al., 2014; Blanford et al., 2014), while some regions could experience 
increased bio-energy exports (Persson et al., 2006; Wise et al., 2009; 
Leimbach et al., 2010). A final consideration is that the total costs (as 
opposed to costs measured as a percentage change from baseline con-
ditions) and associated mitigation investments are also heavily influ-
enced by baseline emissions, which are projected to be larger in the 
developing regions than the developed regions (see Section 6.3.1).
A crucial consideration in the analysis of the aggregate economic 
costs of mitigation is that the mitigation costs borne in a region can 
be separated from who pays those costs. Under the assumption of 
efficient markets, effort-sharing schemes have the potential to yield 
a more equitable cost distribution between countries (Ekholm et al., 
2010b; Tavoni et al., 2013). Effort-sharing approaches will not mean-
ingfully change the globally efficient level of regional abatement, but 
can substantially influence the degree to which mitigation costs or 
investments might be borne within a given country or financed by 
other countries (e. g. Edenhofer et al., 2010). A useful benchmark for 
consideration of effort-sharing principles is the analysis of a frame-
work based on the creation of endowments of emission allowances 
and the ability to freely exchange them in an international carbon 
market. Within this framework, many studies have analyzed differ-
ent effort-sharing allocations according to equity principles and other 
indicators (see Section 3.3, Section 4.6.2) (den Elzen and Höhne, 2008, 
2010; Höhne et al., 2014).
Comparing emission allocation schemes from these proposals is com-
plex because studies explore different regional definitions, timescales, 
starting points for calculations, and measurements to assess emission 
allowances such as CO2 only or as CO2eq (see Höhne et al., 2014). The 
range of results for a selected year and concentration goal is relatively 
large due to the fact that the range includes fundamentally different 
effort-sharing approaches and other variations among the assump-
tions of the studies. 
Nonetheless, it is possible to provide a general comparison and charac-
terization of these studies. To allow comparison of substantially different 
proposals, Höhne et al. (2014) developed a categorization into seven cat-
Figure 6�27 | Regional mitigation costs relative to global average for scenarios reaching 430 – 530 ppm CO2eq in 2100 (left panel) and 530 – 650 ppm CO2eq in 2100 (right panel). 
Values above (below) 1 indicate that the region has relative mitigation costs higher (lower) than global average. Relative costs are computed as the cumulative costs of mitigation 
over the period 2020 – 2100, discounted at a 5 % discount rate, divided by cumulative discounted economic output over that period. Scenarios assume no carbon trading across 
regions. The numbers below the regions names indicate the number of scenarios in each box plot. Source: WGIII AR5 Scenario Database (Annex II.10), idealized implementation 
and default (see Section 6.3.1) technology scenarios.
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egories based on three equity principles (see Chapter 4): responsibility, 
capability, and equality (Table 6.5). The first three categories represent 
these equity principles alone. The following three categories represent 
combinations of these principles. ‘Equal cumulative per capita emissions’ 
combines equality (per capita) with responsibility (cumulative account-
ing for historical emissions); ‘responsibility, capability, and need’ includes 
approaches that put high emphasis on historical responsibility and at the 
same time on capability plus the need for sustainable development; 
‘staged approaches’ includes those that already constitute a compro-
mise over several principles. Finally, the last category, ‘equal marginal 
abatement costs’ (implemented in the models as uniform carbon tax 
with no compensatory transfers), represents the initial allocation to that 
which would emerge from a global price on carbon. This is used as a 
reference against which to compare the implications of other regimes.
Table 6�5 | Categories of effort-sharing proposals. Source: Höhne et al. (2014) 
Categories
Re
sp
on
si
bi
lit
y
Ca
pa
bi
lit
y
Eq
ua
lit
y Description References
Responsibility X
The concept to use historical emissions to derive emission goals 
was first directly proposed by Brazil in the run-up of the Kyoto 
negotiations (UNFCCC, 1997), without allocations. Allowances 
based only on this principle were quantified by only a few studies.
Berk and den Elzen (2001)*, Den Elzen et al. 
(2005); Den Elzen and Lucas (2005)
Capability X
Frequently used for allocation relating reduction goals or reduction 
costs to GDP or human development index (HDI). This includes 
also approaches that are focused exclusively on basic needs.
Den Elzen and Lucas (2005); Knopf et al. (2011); Jacoby 
et al. (2009); Miketa and Schrattenholzer (2006); 
Kriegler et al. (2013b) and Tavoni et al. (2013) **
Equality X
A multitude of studies provide allocations based on immediate or 
converging per capita emissions (e. g. Agarwal and Narain, 1991; 
Meyer, 2000). Later studies refine the approach using also per capita 
distributions within countries (e. g. Chakravarty et al., 2009).
Berk and den Elzen (2001)*, Kriegler et al. (2013b) and Tavoni 
et al. (2013)**, Böhringer and Welsch (2006); Bows and Anderson 
(2008); Chakravarty et al. (2009); Criqui et al.(2003); Den Elzen 
and Lucas (2005); Den Elzen and Meinshausen (2006); Den 
Elzen et al.(2005, 2008); Edenhofer et al. (2010); Hof et al. 
(2010b); Höhne and Moltmann (2008, 2009); Knopf et al.(2009, 
2011); Kuntsi-Reunanen and Luukkanen (2006); Nabel et al.
(2011); Miketa and Schrattenholzer (2006); Peterson and Klepper 
(2007); Onigkeit et al. (2009); Van Vuuren et al. (2009a, 2010)
Responsibility, 
capability, and need
X X
Recent studies used responsibility and capability explicitly 
as a basis, e. g., Greenhouse Development Rights 
(Baer et al., 2008); or ‘Responsibility, Capability, and 
Sustainable Development’(Winkler et al., 2011)
Baer et al. (2008); Baer (2013); Höhne and Moltmann 
(2008, 2009); Winkler et al. (2011)
Equal cumulative per 
capita emissions
X X
Several studies allocate equal cumulative per capita emission rights 
based on a global carbon budget (Pan, 2005, 2008). Studies diverge on 
how they assign the resulting budget for a country to individual years.
Bode (2004); Nabel et al. (2011); Jayaraman 
et al. (2011); Schellnhuber et al. (2009); 
Staged approaches X X X
A suite of studies propose or analyze approaches, where 
countries take differentiated commitments in various stages. 
Also approaches based on allocation for sectors such as the 
Triptych approach (Phylipsen et al., 1998) or sectoral approaches 
are included here. Categorization to a stage and the respective 
commitments are determined by indicators using all four equity 
principles. Finally, studies using equal percentage reduction goals, 
also called grandfathering, are also placed in this category.
Bosetti and Frankel (2012); Criqui et al. (2003); Den Elzen 
and Lucas (2005); Den Elzen and Meinshausen (2006); Den 
Elzen et al. (2007, 2008, 2012); Hof et al.(2010a); Höhne and 
Moltmann (2008, 2009); Höhne et al.(2005, 2006); Knopf et al. 
(2011); Vaillancourt and Waaub (2004); Peterson and Klepper 
(2007); Böhringer and Welsch (2006); Knopf et al.(2011)
Berk and den Elzen (2001)
Equal Marginal Abatement 
Costs (for reference)
Modelling studies often use the allocations that would emerge from a 
global carbon price as a reference case for comparing other allocations. 
Peterson and Klepper (2007), Van Vuuren et al. (2009a), 
Kriegler et al. (2013b) and Tavoni et al. (2013) **
* Not included in the quantitative results, because either too old or pending clarifications of the data. 
** This is a model comparison study of seven integrated models as part of the LIMITS research project: PBL, IIASA, FEEM, ECN*, PIK, PNNL, NIES*. Each of these models repre-
sents one data point. Some of these model studies are more extensively described in a particular model study (Kober et al., 2014). 
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The range of allowances can be substantial even within specific cate-
gories of effort sharing, depending on the way the principle is imple-
mented (Figure 6.28). For some effort-sharing categories, the ranges 
are smaller because only a few studies were found. Despite the ranges 
within a category, distributional impacts differ significantly with under-
lying criteria for effort sharing. 
The concentration goal is significant for the resulting emissions allow-
ances (Figure 6.29). Indeed, for many regions, the concentration goal is 
of equal or larger importance for emission allowances than the effort-
sharing approach. For concentration levels between 430 and 480 in 
2100, the allowances in 2030 under all effort-sharing approaches in 
OECD-1990 are approximately half of 2010 emissions with a large 
range, roughly two-thirds in the EITs, roughly at the 2010 emissions 
level or slightly below in ASIA, slightly above the 2010 level in the 
Middle East and Africa, and well below the 2010 level in Latin Amer-
ica. For these same concentration levels, allowances in OECD-1990 
and EITs are a fraction of today’s emissions in 2050, and allowances 
for Asia and Latin America are approximately half of 2010 emission 
levels in 2050. For higher concentration levels, most studies show a 
significant decline in allowances below current levels for OECD-1990 
and EITs by 2050. Most studies show a decline in allowances below 
current levels for the Latin America region, mostly increasing above 
current levels for the Africa and Middle East region, and an inconsis-
tent picture for ASIA.
The creation of endowments of emissions allowances would gener-
ate payment transfers across regions in a global carbon market. These 
transfer payments would depend on the regional abatement opportu-
nities, the distribution of allowances, and the concentration goal. To 
the extent that regional mitigation levels represent the cost-effective 
mitigation strategy across regions, the size of these allocations relative 
to domestic emissions provide an indication of the degree to which 
allowances would be transferred to or from any region. If allocations 
are higher than the ‘equal marginal abatement cost’ allocation in a 
particular country, then the country could possibly improve its financial 
position by reducing emissions and selling the remaining allowances. 
If allocations are lower than the ‘equal marginal abatement cost’ allo-
cation, the country could possibly purchase allowances and therefore 
provide transfers. 
Box 6�2 | Least-developed countries in integrated models 
There are significant data and information deficits pertaining to 
least-developed countries(LDCs) and limits to the modelling of the 
specific features and characteristics of LDCs. For this reason, the 
integrated modelling literature provides relatively little informa-
tion on the specific implications of transformation pathways for 
LDCs. Based on the limited available literature, LDCs contribute 
little to future GHG emissions until 2050 even though they are 
projected to grow faster than global emissions. Post-2050 emis-
sions trends for LDCs depend on highly uncertain projections of 
their long-term economic growth prospects. One study in the 
available integrated modelling literature suggests that LDC’s 
contribution to global emissions increases by about 50 % between 
2000 and 2100 (Calvin et al., 2009b).The mitigation challenges 
for LDCs are particularly significant given their ambitions for 
economic growth, poverty alleviation, and sustainable develop-
ment on the one hand, and their limited means for mitigation 
in terms of technology and finance on the other hand. Tradeoffs 
can include, among other things, a prolonged use of traditional 
bioenergy and a reduction in final energy use. Potential synergies 
include accelerated electrification (Calvin et al., 2014a). 
The literature on the transformation pathways has also indicated 
the need for large deployment of low-carbon technologies. 
These projections pose critical challenges and uncertainties for 
LDCs when taking into account issues related to deployment, 
institutions and program design, and non-climate socioeconomic 
implications. In particular, many scenarios rely on technologies 
with potentially large land footprints, such as bioenergy and 
afforestation or reforestation, to achieve mitigation goals. The 
scenarios surveyed in the chapter universally project the major-
ity of bioenergy primary energy will occur in developing econo-
mies (50 – 90 % in non-OECD in 2050, see Section 6.3.5). These 
abatement patterns imply significant challenges for developing 
countries in general, and LDCs in particular, where large land-use 
abatement potentials lie. 
The literature related to effort-sharing and distributional impli-
cations of mitigation in LDCs is relatively scarce. The literature 
suggests that there are tradeoffs between food security and 
mitigation (e. g. Reilly et al., 2012) with negative impacts for poor, 
developing countries due to the high share of their incomes spent 
on food. Mitigation might increase the rural-urban gap and dete-
riorate the living standards of large sections of the population in 
developing countries (e. g. Liang and Wei, 2012). In contrast, policy 
and measures aligned to development and climate objectives 
can deliver substantial co-benefits and help avoid climate risks in 
developing countries (Shukla et al., 2009). Modelling studies that 
use the ‘low carbon society’ framework arrive at a similar conclu-
sion about co-benefits in developing countries and LDCs (Kainuma 
et al., 2012; Shrestha and Shakya, 2012). Spillover effects from 
trade-related mitigation policies may pose certain risks for LDCs 
such as induced factor mobility, unemployment, and international 
transport-related impacts on food and tourism sectors (Nurse, 
2009; ICTSD, 2010; Pentelow and Scott, 2011). Downscaling of 
integrated modelling to the level of LDCs is a key area for future 
research.
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Figure 6�28 | Emission allowances in 2030 relative to 2010 emissions by effort-sharing category for mitigation scenarios reaching 430 – 480 ppm CO2eq in 2100. GHG emissions 
(all gases and sectors) in GtCO2eq in 1990 and 2010 were 13.4 and 14.2 for OECD-1990, 8.4 and 5.6 for EIT, 10.7 and 19.9 for ASIA, 3.0 and 6.2 for MAF, 3.3 and 3.8 for LAM. 
Emissions allowances are shown compared to 2010 levels, but this does not imply a preference for a specific base-year. For the OECD-1990 in the category ‘responsibility, capabil-
ity, need’ the emission allowances in 2030 is – 106 % to – 128 % (20th to 80th percentile) below 2010 level (therefore not shown here). The studies with the ‘Equal cumulative 
per capita emissions’ approaches do not have the regional representation MAF. For comparison in orange: ‘Equal marginal abatement cost’ (allocation based on the imposition of 
a global carbon price) and baseline scenarios. Source: Adapted from Höhne et al.(2014). Studies were placed in this CO2eq concentration range based on the level that the studies 
themselves indicate. The pathways of the studies were compared with the characteristics of the range, but concentration levels were not recalculated.
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Figure 6�29 | Emission allowances in 2050 relative to 2010 emissions for different 2100 CO2eq concentration ranges by all effort-sharing categories except ‘equal marginal abate-
ment costs’. For comparison in orange: baseline scenarios. Source: Adapted from Höhne et al. (2014). Studies were placed in the CO2eq concentration ranges based on the level that 
the studies themselves indicate. The pathways of the studies were compared with the characteristics of the ranges, but concentration levels were not recalculated.
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Multi-model studies indicate that the size of the carbon market 
transfers would be significant in relation to the total global aggre-
gate economic costs of mitigation, of the order of hundreds of bil-
lions of United States dollars per year before mid-century (Clarke 
et  al., 2009; Luderer et  al., 2012b; Tavoni et  al., 2013). Transfers 
through emissions allowances are also particularly high if the carbon 
price is high, because the transfers are based on the quantity of the 
allowances traded and the price of those allowances. Higher prices 
are associated with more ambitious mitigation. For some regions, 
financial flows could be on the same order of magnitude as the 
investment requirements for emissions reductions (McCollum et al., 
2013b). Transfers are particularly high for some regions for the cat-
egories ‘equal per capita cumulative emissions’ and ‘responsibility, 
capability, and need’ in general and for ‘staged approaches’ in some 
of studies. 
The transfers associated with different effort-sharing schemes have 
a direct impact on the regional distribution of mitigation policy costs 
(Luderer et al., 2012b). These costs are sensitive both to local abate-
ment costs and to size and direction of transfers, both of which are 
related to the effort-sharing scheme as well as the carbon price and 
the associated climate goal (Russ and Criqui, 2007; den Elzen et  al., 
2008; Edenhofer et  al., 2010; Ekholm et  al., 2010b; Luderer et  al., 
2012b). Given the large uncertainty about future transfers and car-
bon prices, the regional distribution of costs under different sharing 
schemes varies widely (Luderer et al., 2012b; Tavoni et al., 2013). For 
example, emerging economies like China could incur relatively high 
expenditures (den Elzen et al., 2012; Johansson et al., 2014), but this 
would change when cumulative past emissions are also accounted for 
(Jiahua, 2008; Ding et al., 2009; He et al., 2009). Moreover, the uneven 
regional distribution of relative mitigation costs observed in Figure 
6.27 in the case without transfers is not significantly alleviated when 
emissions rights are equalized per capita by 2050 and the concentra-
tion goal is stringent, as shown in Figure 6.30. 
Optimal transfers can also be devised as a way to provide economic 
incentives to regions to participate in international climate agree-
ments. When accounting for the strategic behaviour of the various 
regions and countries, the literature suggests that climate coalitions, 
which are self-enforcing and stable, can indeed be effective only in the 
presence of significant compensatory payments across regions (Finus 
et  al., 2003; Nagashima et  al., 2009; Bréchet et  al., 2011). Transfers 
would also occur in the case that different regional social costs of 
carbon were equalized to maximize efficiency (Landis and Bernauer, 
2012).
The impacts of mitigation policies on global fossil fuel trade depend 
on the type of fuel, time horizon, and stringency of mitigation efforts. 
Recent model intercomparison studies focusing on low-concentration 
goals (430 – 530 CO2eq in 2100) have found an unambiguous decrease 
in coal trade over the first half of the century (Cherp et al., 2014; Jewell 
et al., 2013). In contrast, studies indicate that natural gas trade could 
potentially increase over the coming decades as gas serves as a transi-
tion fuel and substitutes for coal (Cherp et al., 2014). Studies present 
a less clear picture regarding the future of oil trade for concentration 
goals in this range. In general, however, studies find oil trade to be less 
sensitive to mitigation policy than coal and gas trade through 2030, 
and perhaps even to 2050 (Bauer et al., 2014a, 2014b; Cherp et al., 
2014; Jewell et al., 2013; McCollum et al., 2014a). 
These changes in trade patterns will have important implications 
for the future trade revenues of fossil-exporting countries. There is 
high agreement among integrated models that revenues from coal 
trade are likely to fall for major exporters (Lüken et al., 2011; Bauer 
et al., 2014a, 2014b). For oil and gas, on the other hand, the effect of 
stringent climate policies on export revenues is less clear, with results 
varying across models. Notwithstanding these differences, the gen-
eral conclusion of recent intercomparison exercises is that there is 
likely to be a decrease in oil and gas revenues for exporting coun-
tries over the first half of the century (IEA, 2009; Haurie and Vielle, 
2010; Bauer et al., 2014a, 2014b; Tavoni et al., 2013; McCollum et al., 
2014a). There are several studies that diverge from the bulk of the lit-
erature and argue that conventional oil exporters could in the short-
term benefit from climate policies under certain conditions related to 
the cost of oil alternatives (biofuels and unconventional oil), the price 
elasticity of oil and the cost of backstop technologies (Persson et al., 
2007; Johansson et  al., 2009; Nemet and Brandt, 2012). Because 
exporters of these resources can benefit from the cheaper extraction 
costs and less carbon-intensive nature of conventional oil (relative to 
unconventional oil deposits and coal- or gas-derived liquids), mitiga-
Figure 6�30 | Regional mitigation costs relative to global average for a 450 ppm CO2eq 
concentration goal for a per capita effort-sharing scheme from the LIMITS multi-model 
study. Values above (below) 1 indicate that the region has relative mitigation costs 
higher (lower) than global average ones. Values below 0 are possible for regions who 
are large net sellers of carbon allowances. Mitigation costs are computed relative to 
the baseline, over 2020 – 2100 in NPV at a 5 % discount rate. Emission allocations are 
based on linear convergence from 2020 levels to equal per capita by 2050, with per 
capita equalization thereafter. Regions are allowed to trade emission rights after 2020 
without any constraint. Source: WG III AR5 Scenario Database (Annex II.10), LIMITS per 
capita scenarios.
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tion efforts could potentially have a positive impact on export rev-
enues for conventional oil. These dynamics depend critically on future 
commodity prices. No global studies have, as yet, systematically 
explored the impact of stringent climate policies on unconventional 
gas trade and export revenues, particularly those where methane 
leakage from extraction activities could be an issue. The deployment 
of fossil fuels is generally higher in scenarios with CCS. The availabil-
ity of CCS would thus reduce the adverse effect of mitigation on the 
value of fossil fuel assets.
6.4 Integrating long- and 
short-term perspectives
6�4�1 Near-term actions in a long-term 
 perspective
Stabilizing atmospheric concentrations of GHGs and radiative forc-
ing is a long-term endeavour. Whether a particular long-term mitiga-
tion goal will be met, and what the costs and other implications will 
be of meeting it, will depend on decisions to be made and uncertain-
ties to be resolved over many decades in the future. For this rea-
son, transformation pathways to long-term climate goals are best 
understood as a process of sequential decision making and learn-
ing. The most relevant decisions are those that must be made in the 
near term with the understanding that new information and oppor-
tunities for strategic adjustments will arrive often in the future, but 
largely beyond the reach of those making decisions today. An impor-
tant question for decision makers today is therefore how near-term 
decisions will influence choices available to future decision makers. 
Some decisions may maintain a range of future options, while oth-
ers may constrain the future set of options for meeting long-term 
climate goals.
6�4�2 Near-term emissions and long-term 
transformation pathways
A key outcome of current decision making will be the level of near-
term global emissions. Scenarios can provide important insights into 
the implications of the near-term (i. e., 2020 – 2030) emissions level 
for long-term climate outcomes. As discussed in Section 6.1.2, a num-
ber of multi-model studies have been designed specifically for this 
purpose, exploring delays in global mitigation, in which near-term 
emissions are held fixed to particular levels, and fragmented action, 
in which only a subset of regions initially respond to a long-term 
goal (see Table 6.1). These scenarios are typically designed as coun-
terpoint to idealized implementation scenarios in which mitigation 
begins immediately, timing of reductions is unconstrained, and full 
participation is assumed from the outset. This distinction is essential 
for characterizing the relationship between the path emissions fol-
low through 2030 and the possible climate outcomes through the 
end of the century. Among idealized implementation scenarios with 
2100 concentrations in the range of 430 – 530 ppm CO2eq, emissions 
in 2020 fall almost exclusively below the range of global GHG emis-
sions implied by the Cancún Pledges (see Section 13.13.1.3 for more 
details), as in Rogelj et al. (2013a) (Figure 6.31, top panel). However, 
several scenarios with delayed mitigation imposed either through 
global delays or delayed participation have 2020 emissions in the 
possible range of the Cancún Agreements and in some cases 2030 
emissions even higher than this range while still remaining consistent 
with the long-term goal (the cost implications of delay are discussed 
in Section 6.3.6.4).
A second distinction that can play a critical role is the extent to which 
CDR options are available and deployed. In scenarios designed with a 
forcing goal applied only at the end of the century, particularly concen-
trations in the range of 430 – 530 ppm CO2eq, idealized implementation 
scenarios often choose to temporarily overshoot the 2100 concentra-
tion (Section 6.3.2). As noted in Section 6.3.2, CDR options, typically 
represented in integrated models by BECCS but also afforestation in 
some cases, facilitate more rapid declines in emissions, amplifying 
this overshoot pattern (Krey et al., 2014). A large number of scenarios 
reaching CO2eq concentrations below 530 ppm CO2eq by 2100 deploy 
CDR technologies at large enough scales that net global emissions 
become negative in the second half of the century. The availability of 
CDR options, as well as the representation of intertemporal flexibility, 
varies significantly across models and studies. The spread in reliance 
on CDR options across scenarios reveals a strong impact on the timing 
of emissions pathways. In scenarios reaching the the 2100 concentra-
tion range of 430 – 530 ppm CO2eq in which global net CO2 emissions 
remain positive through the century, near-term emissions are gener-
ally lower than if the scenario deploys CDR technologies to a large 
enough scale to lead to net negative total global CO2 emissions later 
in the century (Figure 6.31, top panel). More generally, the scenarios 
indicate that a reliance on large-scale CDR, whether or not emissions 
become net negative, leads to higher near-term emissions (van Vuuren 
and Riahi, 2011).
The interaction between delayed mitigation and CDR options is also 
important. Very few scenarios are available to demonstrate emissions 
pathways consistent with 2100 concentrations of 430 – 530 ppm CO2eq 
in which mitigation effort is delayed in some form and global carbon 
emissions do not become net negative. Whether these circumstances 
are not represented because they have been under-examined or 
because they have been examined and the scenarios failed is a crucial 
distinction, yet one that it is currently not possible to fully report (see 
discussion of model infeasibility in Section 6.3.2). However, there are 
instances where the combination of delay and limited options for CDR 
has been explored and has resulted in model infeasibilities (Luderer 
et al., 2013; Rogelj et al., 2013b; Riahi et al., 2014), which supports the 
notion that this combination presents important challenges. For exam-
ple, in the AMPERE study, seven out of nine models could not produce 
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Figure 6�31 | Near-term global GHG emissions from mitigation scenarios reaching 430 – 530 ppm CO2eq (top panel) and 530 – 650 ppm CO2eq (bottom panel) in 2100. Includes 
only scenarios for which temperature exceedance probabilities were calculated (see Section 6.3.2). Individual model results are indicated with a data point when 2 °C exceedance 
probability, based on the MAGICC results, is below 50 % for top panel or when 2.5 °C exceedance probability is below 50 % for bottom panel. For these below-50 % scenarios the 
interquartile range is shown by a black rectangular frame. Colours refer to scenario classification in terms of whether net CO2 emissions become negative before 2100 (Negative vs. 
No Negative) and the timing of international participation in climate mitigation (Immediate vs. Delay 2020 / 2030). Number of reported individual results is shown in legend. The 
range of global GHG emissions in 2020 implied by the Cancún Pledges is based on an analysis of alternative interpretations of national pledges (see Section 13.13.1.3 for details). 
Source: WG III AR5 Scenario Database (Annex II.10). Historic data: JRC / PBL (2013), IEA (2012a), see Annex II.9. Note: Only four reported scenarios were produced based on delayed 
mitigation without net negative emissions while still lying below 530 ppm CO2eq by 2100. They do not appear in the top panel because the model had insufficient coverage of 
non-gas species to enable a temperature calculation (see Section 6.3.2). Delay in these scenarios extended only to 2020, and their emissions fell in the same range as the ‘No Nega-
tive / Immediate’ category. Note: Delayed scenarios include both delayed global action and fragmented action scenarios.
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a scenario with global delay through 2030 and a restriction on CCS 
technology that reached 450 CO2eq by 2100 (one of the remaining 
two had net negative global emissions through other channels and the 
other did not run past 2050). Several individual modelling team stud-
ies have also explored this space, and have found situations in which 
they could not reach solutions for more ambitious goals and delayed 
mitigation or constrained technology, including O’Neill et  al. (2010), 
Edmonds et al. (2008), and Edmonds et al. (2013). Studies have found 
that delayed reductions through 2020 do not have as substantial an 
effect on the cost and challenge more broadly of meeting 2100 con-
centration levels such as 450 ppm CO2eq as delayed reductions 
through 2030 (Kriegler et al., 2013b; Luderer et al., 2013; Rogelj et al., 
2013b) 
The implications of delayed mitigation, CDR options, and overshoot 
for possible temperature outcomes are also significant. Numerous 
studies have attempted to place the possible outcome of the Cancún 
Agreements in the context of longer-term climate goals (Höhne et al., 
2012; UNEP, 2012). Due to the factors discussed above, but also varia-
tion in assumptions about baseline growth, mitigation costs, trad-
eoffs between sectors such as energy and land use, and the evolution 
of non-gas forcing agents, models have found that a wide range of 
near-term emissions could be consistent with a given long-term out-
come. Among scenarios with 2100 concentrations between 430 and 
530 ppm CO2eq, focusing on those scenarios in the AR5 database for 
which temperature implications were calculated (see Section 6.3.2), 
near-term global emissions range from 22 to 56  GtCO2eq in 2020 
and from 18 to 66 GtCO2eq in 2030 (Figure 6.31, top panel). How-
ever, based on the MAGICC results, not all pathways in this range 
are consistent with at least a 50 % chance of remaining below 2 °C, 
in particular those that rely on net negative global emissions. Path-
ways reaching the same 2100 concentration with higher emissions 
in 2030 tend to have more overshoot; when forcing stays higher for 
longer, the likelihood of reaching a temperature threshold increases. 
Based on the MAGICC results, very few scenarios in the 430 – 530 ppm 
CO2eq range have a 50 % chance of remaining below 1.5 °C, and 
none with delay or limited deployment of CDR technologies; most 
have a probability between 0 and 25 %. A few studies have explored 
scenarios that lead to concentrations below 430 ppm CO2eq in 2100 
(e. g., Luderer et  al., 2013, Rogelj et  al., 2013a, b), some of which 
have been found to have more than a 66 % chance of returning to 
1.5 °C by the end of the century after peaking at higher levels; these 
scenarios are characterized by immediate emissions reductions fol-
lowed by very low mid-century emissions and extensive deployment 
of CDR technologies. Based on the MAGICC results, nearly all sce-
narios reaching 2100 concentrations in the range of 530 – 650 ppm 
CO2eq, have a greater than 50 % chance of exceeding 2 °C by 2100, 
but many have a probability of less than 50 % of exceeding 2.5 °C 
(Figure 6.31, bottom panel). Because of the higher long-term forcing 
range, some growth in emissions can occur, and the preferred least-
cost range is similar to the delayed range and largely consistent with 
the global GHG emissions reductions through 2020 implied by the 
Cancún Pledges (see Section 13.13.1.3).
Whether due to delayed mitigation or widespread use of CDR options 
or some combination of the two, higher levels of emissions in the near-
term imply an emissions pathway shifted in time, resulting in steeper 
reductions later to remain consistent with a given long-term forcing 
goal. As discussed in Section 6.3.2, emissions in 2030 have been used 
as a rough indicator for understanding the relationship between near-
term and long-term mitigation. Higher emissions in 2030 require more 
rapid decreases in emissions from 2030 through 2050, both to make 
up for the larger cumulative emissions up through 2030 and because 
emissions must be reduced from a higher 2030 level (Figure 6.32). 
Emissions decline rates for any scenario that meets 2100 concentra-
tion goals such as 450 or 550 ppm CO2eq must at some point push 
beyond historical experience, because emissions have in general fol-
lowed growth, with past instances of decline associated only with 
large-scale disruptions such as the collapse of the Soviet Union or spe-
cial cases of policy intervention such as France and Sweden (see Chap-
ter 5). Less mitigation over the coming decades will only exacerbate 
the required departure from the past to meet long-term goals — path-
ways with emissions above 55 GtCO2eq in 2030 indicate decline rates 
between 2030 and 2050 of around 6 % for scenarios in the range of 
430 – 530 ppm CO2eq in 2100 (Figure 6.32).
6�4�3 The importance of near-term 
 technological investments and 
 development of institutional capacity
While it is clear that some mitigation effort in the near term is crucial 
to preserve the option of achieving low-concentration goals, whether 
these goals are met in the long run depends to a greater extent on 
the potential for deep GHG-emissions reductions several decades from 
now. Thus efforts to begin the transformation to lower concentra-
tions must also be directed toward developing the technologies and 
institutions that will enable deep future emissions cuts rather than 
exclusively on meeting particular near-term goals. The way in which 
countries begin low-carbon technology deployment and the imple-
mentation of climate change mitigation policies may well turn out to 
be quite different from the approach that proves best in the long run. 
The benefit of beginning to create and improve technologies as well 
as to develop appropriate institutional capacity today is that these 
present-day activities create opportunities to make early and mid-
course corrections.
The likelihood of a unified global policy for a deep GHG-emissions 
reduction is low for the near future. Rather, the expectation is that a 
‘mosaic’ of national and regional policies will emerge over the years 
to come. Individual countries will bring different views and values to 
bear on their decisions, which will likely lead to a wide variety of policy 
approaches, some more economically efficient than others. Flexible 
market-based policies with maximal sectoral and geographic coverage 
are generally understood to deliver emissions reductions at the lowest 
economic cost (see Section 6.3.6.5 for a discussion of issues that influ-
ence the efficiency of implementation approaches). Although the added 
Figure 6�32 | The implications of different 2030 GHG emissions levels for the pace of CO2 emissions reductions to 2050 in mitigation scenarios reaching 430 – 530 ppm CO2eq 
by 2100. Left-hand panel shows the development of GHG emissions to 2030. Right-hand panel denotes the corresponding annual CO2 emissions reduction rates for the period 
2030 – 2050. The scenarios are grouped according to different emissions levels by 2030 (colored in dark, medium and light green). The range of global GHG emissions in 2020 
implied by the Cancún Pledges is based on an analysis of alternative interpretations of national pledges (see Section 13.13.1.3 for details). The right-hand panel compares the 
median and interquartile range across scenarios from recent intermodelling comparisons with explicit 2030 interim goals with the range of scenarios in the WG III AR5 Scenario 
Database (Annex II.10). Extreme scenarios with very high net negative emissions (>20 GtCO2 / yr) in 2100 are reported separetly as diamonds. Annual rates of historical emissions 
change between 1900-2010 (sustained over a period of 20 years) and average annual emissions change between 2000-2010 are shown in grey. Sources: Intermodelling compari-
sons with explicit interim goals (AMPERE: Riahi et al., 2013; LIMITS: Kriegler et al., 2013b; ROSE: Luderer et al., 2013) and the WG III AR5 Scenario Database (Annex II.10). Historic 
data: JRC/PBL (2013), IEA (2012a), see Annex II.9. Note: Only scenarios with default technology assumptions are shown. Scenarios with non-optimal timing of mitigation due to 
exogenous carbon price trajectories are excluded.
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a scenario with global delay through 2030 and a restriction on CCS 
technology that reached 450 CO2eq by 2100 (one of the remaining 
two had net negative global emissions through other channels and the 
other did not run past 2050). Several individual modelling team stud-
ies have also explored this space, and have found situations in which 
they could not reach solutions for more ambitious goals and delayed 
mitigation or constrained technology, including O’Neill et  al. (2010), 
Edmonds et al. (2008), and Edmonds et al. (2013). Studies have found 
that delayed reductions through 2020 do not have as substantial an 
effect on the cost and challenge more broadly of meeting 2100 con-
centration levels such as 450 ppm CO2eq as delayed reductions 
through 2030 (Kriegler et al., 2013b; Luderer et al., 2013; Rogelj et al., 
2013b) 
The implications of delayed mitigation, CDR options, and overshoot 
for possible temperature outcomes are also significant. Numerous 
studies have attempted to place the possible outcome of the Cancún 
Agreements in the context of longer-term climate goals (Höhne et al., 
2012; UNEP, 2012). Due to the factors discussed above, but also varia-
tion in assumptions about baseline growth, mitigation costs, trad-
eoffs between sectors such as energy and land use, and the evolution 
of non-gas forcing agents, models have found that a wide range of 
near-term emissions could be consistent with a given long-term out-
come. Among scenarios with 2100 concentrations between 430 and 
530 ppm CO2eq, focusing on those scenarios in the AR5 database for 
which temperature implications were calculated (see Section 6.3.2), 
near-term global emissions range from 22 to 56  GtCO2eq in 2020 
and from 18 to 66 GtCO2eq in 2030 (Figure 6.31, top panel). How-
ever, based on the MAGICC results, not all pathways in this range 
are consistent with at least a 50 % chance of remaining below 2 °C, 
in particular those that rely on net negative global emissions. Path-
ways reaching the same 2100 concentration with higher emissions 
in 2030 tend to have more overshoot; when forcing stays higher for 
longer, the likelihood of reaching a temperature threshold increases. 
Based on the MAGICC results, very few scenarios in the 430 – 530 ppm 
CO2eq range have a 50 % chance of remaining below 1.5 °C, and 
none with delay or limited deployment of CDR technologies; most 
have a probability between 0 and 25 %. A few studies have explored 
scenarios that lead to concentrations below 430 ppm CO2eq in 2100 
(e. g., Luderer et  al., 2013, Rogelj et  al., 2013a, b), some of which 
have been found to have more than a 66 % chance of returning to 
1.5 °C by the end of the century after peaking at higher levels; these 
scenarios are characterized by immediate emissions reductions fol-
lowed by very low mid-century emissions and extensive deployment 
of CDR technologies. Based on the MAGICC results, nearly all sce-
narios reaching 2100 concentrations in the range of 530 – 650 ppm 
CO2eq, have a greater than 50 % chance of exceeding 2 °C by 2100, 
but many have a probability of less than 50 % of exceeding 2.5 °C 
(Figure 6.31, bottom panel). Because of the higher long-term forcing 
range, some growth in emissions can occur, and the preferred least-
cost range is similar to the delayed range and largely consistent with 
the global GHG emissions reductions through 2020 implied by the 
Cancún Pledges (see Section 13.13.1.3).
Figure 6�32 | The implications of different 2030 GHG emissions levels for the pace of CO2 emissions reductions to 2050 in mitigation scenarios reaching 430 – 530 ppm CO2eq 
by 2100. Left-hand panel shows the development of GHG emissions to 2030. Right-hand panel denotes the corresponding annual CO2 emissions reduction rates for the period 
2030 – 2050. The scenarios are grouped according to different emissions levels by 2030 (colored in dark, medium and light green). The range of global GHG emissions in 2020 
implied by the Cancún Pledges is based on an analysis of alternative interpretations of national pledges (see Section 13.13.1.3 for details). The right-hand panel compares the 
median and interquartile range across scenarios from recent intermodelling comparisons with explicit 2030 interim goals with the range of scenarios in the WG III AR5 Scenario 
Database (Annex II.10). Extreme scenarios with very high net negative emissions (>20 GtCO2 / yr) in 2100 are reported separetly as diamonds. Annual rates of historical emissions 
change between 1900-2010 (sustained over a period of 20 years) and average annual emissions change between 2000-2010 are shown in grey. Sources: Intermodelling compari-
sons with explicit interim goals (AMPERE: Riahi et al., 2013; LIMITS: Kriegler et al., 2013b; ROSE: Luderer et al., 2013) and the WG III AR5 Scenario Database (Annex II.10). Historic 
data: JRC/PBL (2013), IEA (2012a), see Annex II.9. Note: Only scenarios with default technology assumptions are shown. Scenarios with non-optimal timing of mitigation due to 
exogenous carbon price trajectories are excluded.
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cost of inefficient policies in the near term may be smaller than in the 
long-term when mitigation requirements will be much larger, their 
implementation now may lead to ‘institutional lock-in’ if policy reform 
proves difficult. Thus a near-term focus on developing institutions to 
facilitate flexible mitigation strategies, as well as political structures to 
manage the large capital flows associated with carbon pricing (see e. g. 
Kober et al., 2014), could provide substantial benefits over the coming 
decades when mitigation efforts reach their full proportions.
R&D investments to bring down the costs of low-emitting technology 
options, combined with early deployment of mitigation technologies to 
improve long-term performance through learning-by-doing, are among 
the most important steps that can be taken in the near term (see e. g. 
Sagar and van der Zwaan, 2006). R&D investments are important for 
bringing down the costs of known low-carbon energy alternatives to 
the current use of predominantly fossil fuels, to develop techniques that 
today only exist on the drawing board, or for generating new concepts 
that have not yet been invented. Early deployment of climate change 
mitigation technologies can lead to both incremental and fundamental 
improvements in their long-term performance through the accumula-
tion of experience or learning by doing. Mitigation policy is essential 
for spurring R&D and learning by doing, because it creates commit-
ments to future GHG-emissions reductions that create incentives today 
for investments in these drivers of technological innovation, and avoids 
further lock-in of long-lived carbon-intensive capital stock.
Even if policies requiring GHG-emissions reductions are not imple-
mented immediately, market participants may act in anticipation of 
future mitigation. Commitments to emissions reductions in the future 
will create incentives for investments in climate change mitigation 
technologies today, which can serve both to reduce current emissions 
and avoid further lock-in of long-lived carbon-intensive capital stock 
and infrastructure (see, for example, Bosetti et al., 2009c; Richels et al., 
2009).
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6.5 Integrating  technological 
and societal change
Technological change occurs as innovations create new possibilities 
for processes and products, and market demand shifts over time in 
response to changes in preferences, purchasing power, and other soci-
etal factors. Societal changes can be viewed as both a requirement for 
and a result of global climate change mitigation. Because the use of 
improved and new technologies is an inherent element of society’s 
transformation required for climate change mitigation, technological 
and societal changes necessarily interact. Their analysis therefore needs 
to be integrated.
6�5�1 Technological change
The development and deployment of technology is central to long-
term mitigation, since established fossil fuel-based energy supply will 
need to be replaced by new low-carbon energy techniques. The impor-
tance of technological change raises key questions about whether cur-
rent technology is sufficient for deep GHG-emissions reductions, the 
best ways to improve the technologies needed for deep emissions 
reductions, and the degree to which current efforts in this regard are 
adequate to the upcoming challenge. Essential questions also surround 
the appropriate timing of investments in technological change relative 
to other efforts to reduce GHG emissions.
A primary question regarding technological change is whether cur-
rent technology is sufficient for the deep emissions reductions ulti-
mately needed to stabilize GHG concentrations. Arguments have 
been made on both sides of this debate (see Hoffert et  al. (2002), 
and Pacala and Socolow (2004), for complementary perspectives on 
this question). The integrated modelling literature provides limited 
information regarding the sufficiency of current technology, because 
virtually all baseline and mitigation scenarios assume that technol-
ogy will improve significantly over time, especially for technologies 
with a large potential for advancement (see Riahi et  al., 2013, and 
van der Zwaan et al., 2013, for two recent cross-model comparison 
examples). There is generally more agreement about the rate of incre-
mental cost and performance improvements for mature technologies 
than for emerging technologies upon which transformation pathways 
may depend (see McCollum et al., 2013b, for a cross-model study on 
the investment dimension of this matter). Nonetheless, the literature 
makes clear that improvements in technology and the availability of 
advanced technologies can dramatically alter the costs of climate 
change mitigation (see also Section 6.3.6.3). The current scientific 
literature also emphasizes that the development and deployment 
of CDR technologies (see Section 6.9), are a further requirement for 
particular transformation pathways, for example those leading to 
450 ppm CO2eq by 2100 yet assuming substantial near-term delays 
in mitigation.
Various steps can be observed in the life of a technology, from inven-
tion through innovation, demonstration, commercialization, diffusion, 
and maturation (see e. g. Grübler et  al., 1999). Both investments in 
R&D and the accumulation of experience through learning by doing 
play important roles in the mechanisms behind technological change. 
These forces are complemented by economies of scale. All these driv-
ers of technological change are complementary yet and interlinked 
(Clarke and Weyant, 2002; Goulder and Mathai, 2000; Sagar and van 
der Zwaan, 2006; Stoneman, 2013). 
Although technological change has received extensive attention and 
analysis in the context of transformation pathways (for recent exam-
ples, see IPCC, 2011; GEA, 2012), a clear systematic understanding of 
the subject matter is still not available. For this reason, most of the 
scenarios developed since the 1970s for energy and climate change 
analysis make exogenous assumptions about the rate of technological 
change. Only since the late 1990s has the effect of induced innova-
tion been considered in a subset of integrated models used for the 
development of these scenarios (such as in Messner, 1997; Goulder 
and Schneider, 1999; van der Zwaan et al., 2002; Carraro et al., 2003). 
This restricted treatment is due to limitations in the ability to repre-
sent the complexity of technological change, and also results from the 
incomplete empirical evidence on the magnitude of the effects of tech-
nological change (Popp, 2006b). More recently, empirical data on tech-
nological change have been incorporated in some integrated models 
(see e. g., Fisher-Vanden, 2008), which advances the endogenous rep-
resentation of technological progress. Unsettled issues remain, how-
ever, including the proper accounting for opportunity costs of climate-
related knowledge generation, the treatment of knowledge spillovers 
and appropriability, and the empirical basis for parameterizing techno-
logical relationships (Gillingham et al., 2008).
The relation between mitigation and innovation, and the presence of 
market failures associated with both, raises the question of the proper 
combination of innovation and mitigation policy for reducing GHG 
emissions over the long term. The modelling literature broadly indicates 
that relying solely on innovation policies would not be sufficient to sta-
bilize GHG concentrations (see e. g. Bosetti et al., 2011; Kalkuhl et al., 
2013), as evidenced by the fact that although most reference scenarios 
assume substantial technological change, none of them lead to emis-
sions reductions on the level of those needed to bring CO2eq concen-
trations to levels such as 650 ppm CO2eq or below by 2100 (see Section 
6.3.2). Climate policies such as carbon pricing could induce significant 
technological change, provided the policy commitment is credible, long 
term, and sufficiently strong (Popp, 2006a; Bosetti et al., 2011), while 
at the same time contributing to emission reductions. The positive 
effect of climate policies on technological change, however, does not 
necessarily obviate the need for specific policies aimed at incentivizing 
R&D investments. Market failures associated with innovation provide 
the strongest rationale for subsidizing R&D (see Section 15.6).
The joint use of R&D subsidies and climate policies has been shown 
to possibly generate further advantages, with some studies indi-
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cating benefits of the order of 10 – 30 % overall climate control cost 
reductions (D. Popp, 2006; V. Bosetti et  al., 2011). Climate-specific 
R&D instruments can step up early innovation and ultimately reduce 
mitigation costs (Gerlagh et al., 2009), although R&D subsidies could 
raise the shadow value of CO2 in the short term because of rebound 
effects from stimulating innovation (Otto and Reilly, 2008) (See Sec-
tion 6.3.6.5 for further discussion of combining policy instruments to 
reduce aggregate mitigation costs). In the absence of explicit efforts 
to address innovation market failures, carbon taxes might be increased 
or differentiated across regions to indirectly address the under provi-
sion of R&D (Golombek and Hoel, 2008; Hart, 2008; Greaker and Pade, 
2009; Heal and Tarui, 2010; De Cian and Tavoni, 2012). 
Although there is no definitive conclusion on the subject matter, sev-
eral studies suggest that the benefits of increased technological 
change for climate change mitigation may be sufficiently high to jus-
tify upfront investments and policy support in innovation and diffu-
sion of energy efficiency and low-carbon mitigation technologies (see 
e. g. Dowlatabadi, 1998; Newell et al., 1999; Nordhaus, 2002; Buon-
anno et al., 2003; Gerlagh and van der Zwaan, 2003). For example, it 
has been suggested that the current rates of investments are rela-
tively low and that an average increase several times from current 
clean energy R&D expenditures may be closer towards optimality to 
stabilize GHG concentrations (Popp, 2006a; Nemet and Kammen, 
2007; Bosetti et  al., 2009a; IEA, 2010a; Marangoni and M. Tavoni, 
2014) (Table 6.6). Bridging a possible ‘R&D gap’ is particularly impor-
tant and challenging, given that public energy R&D investments in 
OECD countries have generally been decreasing as a share of total 
research budgets over the past 30 years (from 11 % down to 4 %, 
according to recent International Energy Agency (IEA) R&D statistics). 
On the other hand, in the private sector the rate of innovation (if 
measured by clean energy patents) seems to have accelerated over 
the past 10 years. 
An unequivocal call for energy innovation policy can be questioned, 
however, when all inventive activities are accounted for. It might also 
not be straightforward to determine the overall effect of mitigation 
policy on technological innovation, since low-carbon energy R&D may 
crowd out other inventive activity and result in lower overall welfare 
(Goulder and Schneider, 1999). The degree of substitutability between 
different inputs of production has been shown to drive the outcome of 
scenarios from integrated models (Otto et al., 2008; Acemoglu et al., 
2009; Carraro et al., 2010). Innovation is found to play an important 
role in attempts to hedge against future uncertainties such as related 
to climate change impacts, technological performance and policy 
implementation (Loschel, 2002; Bohringer and Löschel, 2006; Baker 
and Shittu, 2008; Bosetti and Tavoni, 2009). 
6�5�2 Integrating societal change
Individual behaviour, social preferences, historical legacies, and insti-
tutional structures can influence the use of technologies and mitiga-
tion more generally. Technological transitions necessarily encompass 
more than simply improving and deploying technology. Because they 
co-evolve with technologies, social determinants of individual and col-
lective behaviours can be either causes or consequences of transfor-
mation pathways. Moreover, governance and policies can influence 
these factors and thereby affect transformation pathways. This more 
complex framing of transformation pathways implies the need for a 
broader perspective on mitigation that explicitly considers the obsta-
cles to deployment and mitigation more generally.
Research on these societal change elements is analytically diverse 
and often country-specific, which complicates comparative modelling 
exercises of the type reviewed in this chapter. The difficulty in repre-
senting these processes in models has meant that societal change 
research has often been divorced from the literature on transformation 
pathways. However, significant bodies of literature show how societal 
changes can affect the costs and acceptability of mitigation, and the 
interactions of climate policies and other dimensions of public policies 
beyond the energy sector.
Non-optimal or real world institutional conditions can influence how 
technological pathways evolve even under an economy-wide price on 
carbon. Because of the heterogeneity of the carbon impact of differ-
ent sectors, the impact of a carbon price differs widely across sec-
tors (Smale et  al., 2006; Houser et  al., 2009; Fischer and Fox, 2011; 
Monjon and Quirion, 2011) Demailly et al., 2008). Even in less energy-
intensive sectors, pre-existing characteristics in the national econ-
Table 6�6 | Preliminary findings on energy efficiency and clean energy R&D investments, as suggested in the literature to date, and as needed to attain concentration goals. For 
reference, current public R&D expenditures are approximately 10 Billion USD / yr.
Study
Foreseen total clean 
energy R&D investments
Notes
Nemet and Kammen (2007) based on Davis and Owens (2003) 17 – 27 Billion USD / yr For the period 2005 – 2015
IEA (2010a) 50 – 100 Billion USD / yr To achieve the ‘Blue Map’ scenario in 2050. Roughly half of the 
investments are reserved for advanced vehicle R&D.
Bosetti et al. (2009a) 70 – 90 Billion USD / yr Average to 2050 for a range of climate concentration goals. 
A large share is reserved for low-carbon fuel R&D.
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omy — such as inflexible labour markets — can complicate the deploy-
ment of technologies (Guivarch et al., 2011). A further obstacle is the 
uneven impacts of a carbon price on household purchasing power, 
particularly for lower-income brackets (Combet et al., 2010; Grainger 
and Kolstad, 2010).
Policy uncertainty can have implications for low-carbon technol-
ogy investment. High levels of uncertainty force risk-averse firms 
not to adopt technologies by merit order in terms of net present 
value (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Pindyck, 1982; Majd and Pin-
dyck, 1987). Hallegatte et al. (2008) show the importance of the dif-
ference in investment rules in a managerial economy (Roe, 1994) 
and a shareholder economy (Jensen, 1986). Hadjilambrinos (2000) 
and Finon and Romano (2009) show how differences in regulatory 
regimes may explain differences in technological choices in the elec-
tricity industries. Bosetti et  al. (2011) show that investment uncer-
tainty increases the costs and reduces the pace of transformation 
pathways. Perceived policy risks can not only dampen investment but 
can also encourage perverse outcomes such as non-additionality in 
the CDM (Hultman et al., 2012b). This raises the potential for linking 
mitigation policies, energy sector regulatory reforms, and financial 
policies to increase the risk-averse returns of mitigation investments 
(Hourcade and Shukla, 2013).
Changes in institutional structures will be required to facilitate the 
technological change envisaged in the scenarios reviewed in this 
chapter. Historically, political and institutional pre-conditions, chang-
ing decision routines, and organizational skills help explain why coun-
tries with similar dependence on oil imports adopted very different 
energy responses to oil shocks (Hourcade and Kostopoulou, 1994; 
Hultman et al., 2012a). Similar issues arise in a low-carbon transition. 
New policies and institutional structures might be developed to man-
age infrastructures such as those associated with large quantities of 
intermittent resources on the electric grid, CO2 transport and storage, 
dispersed generation or storage of electricity, or nuclear waste and 
materials. 
Although modelling exercises have been able to assess the possible 
changes in the energy supply portfolio and the pressures to deploy 
energy efficiency technologies, such changes are difficult in practice 
to separate from the evolution of preference and lifestyles. The litera-
ture on energy-efficiency investments highlights the frequent incon-
gruity between perceived economic benefits for energy efficiency 
and actual consumer behaviour that seems often to ignore profitable 
investments. Such behaviour has been shown to stem from perceived 
unreliability, unfounded expectations for maintenance, information 
failures, property rights, split incentives, and differentiation across 
income.
Finally, social factors influence the changes in the way energy systems 
couple with other large-scale systems of production such as the built 
environment, transportation, and agriculture. The way that energy is 
used and consumed in urban areas (such as in transportation, heat-
ing, and air-conditioning) is often driven by the structure and form of 
the urban infrastructure (Leck, 2006). Recent modelling exercises dem-
onstrated the tradeoff between commuting costs and housing costs 
and their impact on the urban sprawl and the mobility needs (Gusdorf 
and Hallegatte, 2007; Gusdorf et al., 2008). In many cases, the price of 
real estate is as powerful a driver of mobility demand as the price of 
transportation fuel, and therefore affects the price of carbon needed 
for meeting a given climate objective (Waisman et al., 2012; Lampin 
et al., 2013). The transport contribution to carbon can be affected by, 
for example, just-in-time processes and geographical splits of the pro-
ductive chains (Crassous and Hourcade, 2006).
6.6 Sustainable development 
and transformation path-
ways, taking into account 
differences across regions
Averting the adverse social and environmental effects of climate 
change is fundamental to sustainable development (WCED, 1987, and 
Chapter 4). Yet, climate change is but one of many challenges fac-
ing society in the 21st century. Others include, for instance, providing 
access to clean, reliable, and affordable energy services to the world’s 
poorest; maintaining stable and plentiful employment opportuni-
ties; limiting air pollution, health damages, and water impacts from 
energy and agriculture; alleviating energy security concerns; minimiz-
ing energy-driven land use requirements and biodiversity loss; and 
maintaining the security of food supplies. A complex web of interac-
tions and feedback effects links these various policy objectives, all of 
which are important for sustainable development (see Section 4.8 and 
Table 4.1). 
Implementation of mitigation policies and measures therefore may 
be adequately described within a multi-objective framework and may 
be aligned with other objectives to maximize synergies and minimize 
tradeoffs. Because the relative importance of individual objectives dif-
fers among diverse stakeholders and may change over time, transpar-
ency on the multiple effects that accrue to different actors at different 
points of time is important for decision making (see Sections 2.4, 3.6.3, 
3.7.1, and 4.8).
Although the scientific literature makes very clear that a variety of 
policies and measures exist for mitigating climate change, the impacts 
of each of these options along other, non-climate dimensions have 
received less attention. To the extent these mitigation side-effects are 
positive, they can be deemed ‘co-benefits’; if adverse, they imply ‘risks’ 
with respect to the other non-climate objectives (see Annex I for defini-
tions). Despite their importance for mitigation strategies, side-effects 
are often not monetized or even quantified in analyses of climate 
change (see e. g. Levine et al., 2007).
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ct
. C
o-
be
ne
fit
s 
an
d 
ad
ve
rs
e 
sid
e-
ef
fe
ct
s 
de
pe
nd
 o
n 
lo
ca
l c
irc
um
st
an
ce
s 
as
 w
el
l a
s 
on
 th
e 
im
pl
em
en
ta
tio
n 
pr
ac
tic
e,
 p
ac
e,
 a
nd
 s
ca
le
 (s
ee
 Ta
bl
es
 7
.3
, 8
.4
, 9
.7
, 1
0.
5,
 1
1.
9,
 1
1.
12
). 
Co
lu
m
n 
tw
o 
pr
ov
id
es
 th
e 
co
nt
rib
ut
io
n 
of
 d
iff
er
en
t s
ec
to
ra
l m
iti
ga
tio
n 
st
ra
te
gi
es
 to
 s
tri
ng
en
t m
iti
ga
tio
n 
sc
en
ar
io
s 
re
ac
hi
ng
 a
tm
os
ph
er
ic 
CO
2e
q 
co
nc
en
tra
tio
ns
 o
f 4
30
 – 
53
0 
pp
m
 in
 2
10
0.
 T
he
 in
te
rq
ua
rti
le
 ra
ng
es
 o
f t
he
 s
ce
na
rio
 re
su
lts
 fo
r t
he
 y
ea
r 2
05
0 
sh
ow
 th
at
 th
er
e 
is 
fle
xi
bi
lit
y 
in
 th
e 
ch
oi
ce
 o
f m
iti
ga
tio
n 
st
ra
te
gi
es
 w
ith
in
 a
nd
 a
cr
os
s 
se
ct
or
s 
co
ns
ist
en
t w
ith
 lo
w
-c
on
ce
nt
ra
tio
n 
go
al
s 
(s
ee
 S
ec
tio
ns
 6
.4
 a
nd
 6
.8
). 
Sc
en
ar
io
 re
su
lts
 fo
r e
ne
rg
y 
su
pp
ly 
an
d 
en
d-
us
e 
se
ct
or
s 
ar
e 
ba
se
d 
on
 th
e 
AR
5 
Sc
en
ar
io
 D
at
ab
as
e 
(s
ee
 A
nn
ex
 II
.1
0)
. F
or
 a
n 
as
se
ss
m
en
t o
f m
ac
ro
ec
on
om
ic,
 c
ro
ss
-s
ec
to
ra
l e
ffe
ct
s a
ss
oc
ia
te
d 
w
ith
 m
iti
ga
tio
n 
po
lic
ie
s (
e.
 g
., 
on
 e
ne
rg
y 
pr
ice
s, 
co
ns
um
pt
io
n,
 g
ro
w
th
, a
nd
 tr
ad
e)
, s
ee
 S
ec
tio
ns
 3
.9
, 6
.3
.6
, 1
3.
2.
2.
3,
 a
nd
 1
4.
4.
2.
 Th
e 
un
ce
rta
in
ty
 q
ua
lifi
er
s 
in
 b
ra
ck
et
s 
de
no
te
 th
e 
le
ve
l o
f e
vi
de
nc
e 
an
d 
ag
re
em
en
t o
n 
th
e 
re
sp
ec
tiv
e 
ef
fe
ct
s. 
Ab
br
ev
ia
tio
ns
 fo
r e
vi
de
nc
e:
 l 
=
 li
m
ite
d,
 m
 =
 m
ed
iu
m
, r
 =
 ro
bu
st
; f
or
 a
gr
ee
m
en
t: 
l =
 lo
w
, m
 =
 m
ed
iu
m
, h
 =
 h
ig
h.
Se
ct
or
al
 m
it
ig
at
io
n 
m
ea
su
re
s 
In
te
gr
at
ed
 m
od
el
 r
es
ul
ts
 fo
r 
st
ri
ng
en
t 
m
it
ig
at
io
n 
sc
en
ar
io
s
Ef
fe
ct
 o
n 
ad
di
ti
on
al
 o
bj
ec
ti
ve
s /
 co
nc
er
ns
Ec
on
om
ic
So
ci
al
En
vi
ro
nm
en
ta
l
O
th
er
En
er
gy
 S
up
pl
y
D
ep
lo
ym
en
 t 1
 
Ra
te
 o
f 
ch
an
ge
 
[%
 / y
r]
Fo
r p
os
si
bl
e 
up
st
re
am
 e
ffe
ct
s 
of
 b
io
m
as
s 
su
pp
ly
 fo
r b
io
en
er
gy
, s
ee
 A
FO
LU
.
20
10
20
50
N
uc
le
ar
 r
ep
la
ci
ng
 
co
al
 p
ow
er
 
10
 
EJ
 / y
r
(4
 – 2
2)
17
 – 4
7 
EJ
 / y
r
(–
 2
 – 2
)
1 –
 4
↑ ↑ ↑
En
er
gy
 s
ec
ur
ity
 (r
ed
uc
ed
 e
xp
os
ur
e 
to
 fu
el
 p
ric
e 
vo
la
til
ity
) (
m
 / m
)
Lo
ca
l e
m
pl
oy
m
en
t i
m
pa
ct
 (b
ut
 
un
ce
rta
in
 n
et
 e
ffe
ct
) (
l / 
m
)
Le
ga
cy
 c
os
t o
f w
as
te
 a
nd
 
ab
an
do
ne
d 
re
ac
to
rs
 (m
 / h
)
 ↓  ↑  ↑
He
al
th
 im
pa
ct
 v
ia
 
Ai
r p
ol
lu
tio
n 
an
d 
co
al
 m
in
in
g 
ac
cid
en
ts
 (m
 / h
)
N
uc
le
ar
 a
cc
id
en
ts
 a
nd
 w
as
te
 
tre
at
m
en
t, 
ur
an
iu
m
 m
in
in
g 
an
d 
m
ill
in
g 
(m
 / l
)
Sa
fe
ty
 a
nd
 w
as
te
 c
on
ce
rn
s 
(r
 / h
)
 ↓ ↑
Ec
os
ys
te
m
 im
pa
ct
 v
ia
 
Ai
r p
ol
lu
tio
n 
(m
 / h
) a
nd
 c
oa
l m
in
in
g 
(l /
 h)
N
uc
le
ar
 a
cc
id
en
ts
 (m
 / m
)
Pr
ol
ife
ra
tio
n 
ris
k 
(m
 / m
)
Re
ne
w
ab
le
 e
ne
rg
y 
(w
in
d,
 p
ho
to
vo
lt
ai
c 
(P
V)
, c
on
ce
nt
ra
te
d 
so
la
r 
po
w
er
 (C
SP
), 
hy
dr
o,
 g
eo
th
er
m
al
, 
bi
oe
ne
rg
y)
 
re
pl
ac
in
g 
co
al
 
62
 
EJ
 / y
r
(6
6 –
 12
5)
19
4 –
 28
2 
EJ
 / y
(0
.2
 – 2
)
3 –
 4
↑  ↑ ↑  ↑
En
er
gy
 s
ec
ur
ity
 (r
es
ou
rc
e 
su
ffi
cie
nc
y, 
di
ve
rs
ity
 in
 th
e 
ne
ar
 / m
ed
iu
m
 te
rm
) (
r /
 m
)
Lo
ca
l e
m
pl
oy
m
en
t i
m
pa
ct
 (b
ut
 
un
ce
rta
in
 n
et
 e
ffe
ct
) (
m
 / m
)
Irr
ig
at
io
n,
 fl
oo
d 
co
nt
ro
l, n
av
ig
at
io
n,
 w
at
er
 
av
ai
la
bi
lit
y 
(fo
r m
ul
tip
ur
po
se
 u
se
 o
f 
re
se
rv
oi
rs
 a
nd
 re
gu
la
te
d 
riv
er
s)
 (m
 / h
)
Ex
tra
 m
ea
su
re
s 
to
 m
at
ch
 d
em
an
d 
(fo
r P
V,
 w
in
d 
an
d 
so
m
e 
CS
P)
 (r
 / h
)
 ↓ ↓ ↑ ?  ↑
He
al
th
 im
pa
ct
 v
ia
 
Ai
r p
ol
lu
tio
n 
(e
xc
ep
t b
io
en
er
gy
) (
r /
 h)
Co
al
 m
in
in
g 
ac
cid
en
ts
 (m
 / h
)
Co
nt
rib
ut
io
n 
to
 (o
ff-
gr
id
) 
en
er
gy
 a
cc
es
s 
(m
 / l
)
Pr
oj
ec
t-s
pe
cifi
c 
pu
bl
ic 
ac
ce
pt
an
ce
 
co
nc
er
ns
  
(e
. g
., 
vi
sib
ili
ty
 o
f w
in
d)
 (l
 / m
)
Th
re
at
 o
f d
isp
la
ce
m
en
t (
fo
r 
la
rg
e 
hy
dr
o)
 (m
 / h
)
 ↓ ↓ ↑ ↑ ↓ ↑
Ec
os
ys
te
m
 im
pa
ct
 v
ia
 
Ai
r p
ol
lu
tio
n 
(e
xc
ep
t b
io
en
er
gy
) (
m
 / h
)
Co
al
 m
in
in
g 
(l /
 h)
Ha
bi
ta
t i
m
pa
ct
 (f
or
 s
om
e 
hy
dr
o)
 (m
 / m
)
La
nd
sc
ap
e 
an
d 
w
ild
lif
e 
im
pa
ct
 (f
or
 w
in
d)
 m
 / m
)
W
at
er
 u
se
 (f
or
 w
in
d 
an
d 
PV
) (
m
 / m
)
W
at
er
 u
se
 (f
or
 b
io
en
er
gy
, C
SP
, g
eo
th
er
m
al,
 
an
d 
re
se
rv
oi
r h
yd
ro
) (
m
 / h
)
Hi
gh
er
 u
se
 o
f c
rit
ica
l m
et
al
s 
fo
r P
V 
an
d 
di
re
ct
 d
riv
e 
w
in
d 
tu
rb
in
es
 (r
 / m
)
Fo
ss
il 
CC
S 
re
pl
ac
in
g 
co
al
 
0 
G
t 
CO
2 / 
yr
 
st
or
ed
(0
)
4 –
 12
 
CO
2 / 
yr
 
st
or
ed
(0
)
N
A
↑ ↑
Pr
es
er
va
tio
n 
vs
. l
oc
k-
in
 o
f h
um
an
 a
nd
 
ph
ys
ic
al
 c
ap
ita
l i
n 
th
e 
fo
ss
il 
in
du
st
ry
 (m
 / m
)
 ↑ ↑ ↑
He
al
th
 im
pa
ct
 v
ia
Ri
sk
 o
f C
O
2 l
ea
ka
ge
 (m
 / m
)
Up
st
re
am
 s
up
pl
y-
ch
ai
n 
ac
tiv
iti
es
 (m
 / h
)
Sa
fe
ty
 c
on
ce
rn
s 
(C
O
2 
st
or
ag
e 
an
d 
tra
ns
po
rt)
 (m
 / h
)
↑ ↑
Ec
os
ys
te
m
 im
pa
ct
 v
ia
 u
ps
tre
am
 
su
pp
ly-
ch
ai
n 
ac
tiv
iti
es
  (
m
 / m
)
W
at
er
 u
se
 (m
 / h
)
Lo
ng
-te
rm
 m
on
ito
rin
g 
of
 C
O
2 s
to
ra
ge
 (m
 / h
)
BE
CC
S 
re
pl
ac
in
g 
co
al
0 
G
t 
CO
2 / 
yr
(0
)
0 –
 6 
CO
2 / 
yr
N
A
Se
e 
fo
ss
il 
CC
S 
w
he
re
 a
pp
lic
ab
le
. F
or
 p
os
si
bl
e 
up
st
re
am
 e
ffe
ct
 o
f b
io
m
as
s 
su
pp
ly
, s
ee
 a
gr
ic
ul
tu
re
, f
or
es
tr
y,
 a
nd
 o
th
er
 la
nd
 u
se
 (A
FO
LU
). 
M
et
ha
ne
 le
ak
ag
e 
pr
ev
en
ti
on
, c
ap
tu
re
 
or
 t
re
at
m
en
t
N
A
N
A
N
A
↑
En
er
gy
 s
ec
ur
ity
 (p
ot
en
tia
l t
o 
us
e 
ga
s 
in
 s
om
e 
ca
se
s)
 (l
 / h
)
↓ ↑
He
al
th
 im
pa
ct
 v
ia
 re
du
ce
d 
ai
r p
ol
lu
tio
n 
(m
 / m
)
O
cc
up
at
io
na
l s
af
et
y 
at
 c
oa
l m
in
es
 (m
 / m
)
↓
Ec
os
ys
te
m
 im
pa
ct
 v
ia
 re
du
ce
d 
ai
r p
ol
lu
tio
n 
(l /
 m
)
1)
 
 De
pl
oy
m
en
t l
ev
el
s 
fo
r b
as
el
in
e 
sc
en
ar
io
s 
(in
 p
ar
en
th
es
es
) a
nd
 s
tri
ng
en
t m
iti
ga
tio
n 
sc
en
ar
io
s 
le
ad
in
g 
to
 4
30
 – 5
30
 p
pm
 C
O
2e
q 
in
 2
10
0 
(in
 it
al
ics
). 
Ra
ng
es
 c
or
re
sp
on
d 
to
 th
e 
25
th
 to
 7
5t
h 
pe
rc
en
til
e 
in
te
rq
ua
rti
le
 a
cr
os
s 
th
e 
sc
en
ar
io
 
en
se
m
bl
e 
of
 th
e 
AR
5 
Sc
en
ar
io
 D
at
ab
as
e 
(fo
r m
iti
ga
tio
n 
sc
en
ar
io
s, 
on
ly 
as
su
m
in
g 
id
ea
liz
ed
 p
ol
icy
 im
pl
em
en
ta
tio
n)
. D
at
a 
fo
r 2
01
0 
is 
hi
st
or
ic 
da
ta
 fr
om
 IE
A 
(2
01
2c
, 2
01
2d
).
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Chapter 6
Se
ct
or
al
 m
it
ig
at
io
n 
m
ea
su
re
s 
In
te
gr
at
ed
 m
od
el
 
re
su
lts
 fo
r s
tr
in
ge
nt
 
m
iti
ga
tio
n 
sc
en
ar
io
s
Ef
fe
ct
 o
n 
ad
di
ti
on
al
 o
bj
ec
ti
ve
s /
 co
nc
er
ns
Ec
on
om
ic
So
ci
al
En
vi
ro
nm
en
ta
l
O
th
er
Tr
an
sp
or
t
Sc
en
ar
io
 re
su
lts
Fo
r p
os
si
bl
e 
up
st
re
am
 e
ffe
ct
s 
of
 lo
w
-c
ar
bo
n 
el
ec
tr
ic
ity
, s
ee
 E
ne
rg
y 
Su
pp
ly
. F
or
 p
os
si
bl
e 
up
st
re
am
 e
ffe
ct
s 
of
 b
io
m
as
s 
su
pp
ly
, s
ee
 A
FO
LU
.
Re
du
ct
io
n 
of
 fu
el
 
ca
rb
on
 in
te
ns
it
y:
 
el
ec
tr
ic
it
y,
 
hy
dr
og
en
 (H
2)
, 
co
m
pr
es
se
d 
na
tu
ra
l 
ga
s 
(C
N
G
), 
bi
of
ue
ls
 
In
te
rq
ua
rt
ile
 ra
ng
es
 
fo
r t
he
 w
ho
le
 
se
ct
or
 in
 2
05
0 
w
ith
 
43
0 –
 53
0 
pp
m
 C
O
2e
q 
co
nc
en
tr
at
io
ns
 in
 
21
00
 (s
ee
 F
ig
ur
es
 
6.
37
 &
 6
.3
8)
:
1)
 F
in
al
 e
ne
rg
y 
lo
w
-
ca
rb
on
 fu
el
 s
ha
re
s 
27
 – 4
1 
%
2)
 F
in
al
 e
ne
rg
y 
re
du
ct
io
n 
re
la
tiv
e 
to
 b
as
el
in
e 
20
 – 4
5 
%
↑  ↑
En
er
gy
 s
ec
ur
ity
 (d
iv
er
sifi
ca
tio
n,
 
re
du
ce
d 
oi
l d
ep
en
de
nc
e 
an
d 
ex
po
su
re
 
to
 o
il 
pr
ice
 v
ol
at
ili
ty
) (
m
 / m
)
Te
ch
no
lo
gi
ca
l s
pi
llo
ve
rs
 (e
. g
., 
ba
tte
ry
 
te
ch
no
lo
gi
es
 fo
r c
on
su
m
er
 e
le
ct
ro
ni
cs
) (
l / 
l)
 ? ↓ ↑ ↓ ↓
He
al
th
 im
pa
ct
 v
ia
 u
rb
an
 a
ir 
po
llu
tio
n 
by
CN
G,
 b
io
fu
el
s: 
ne
t e
ffe
ct
 u
nc
le
ar
 (m
 / l
)
El
ec
tri
cit
y, 
H 2
: r
ed
uc
in
g 
m
os
t p
ol
lu
ta
nt
s 
(r
 / h
)
Di
es
el
: p
ot
en
tia
lly
 in
cr
ea
sin
g 
po
llu
tio
n 
(l /
 m
)
He
al
th
 im
pa
ct
 v
ia
 re
du
ce
d 
no
ise
 
(e
le
ct
rifi
ca
tio
n 
an
d 
fu
el
 c
el
l L
DV
s)
 (l
 / m
)
Ro
ad
 sa
fe
ty
 (s
ile
nt
 e
le
ct
ric
 L
DV
s a
t l
ow
 sp
ee
d)
 (l
 / l
)
 ↓ ↑ ?
Ec
os
ys
te
m
 im
pa
ct
 o
f e
le
ct
ric
ity
 a
nd
 h
yd
ro
ge
n 
vi
a
Ur
ba
n 
ai
r p
ol
lu
tio
n 
(m
 / m
)
M
at
er
ia
l u
se
 (u
ns
us
ta
in
ab
le
 re
so
ur
ce
 m
in
in
g)
 (l
 / l
)
Ec
os
ys
te
m
 im
pa
ct
 o
f b
io
fu
el
s: 
se
e 
AF
O
LU
Re
du
ct
io
n 
of
 
en
er
gy
 in
te
ns
it
y
↑
En
er
gy
 s
ec
ur
ity
 (r
ed
uc
ed
 o
il 
de
pe
nd
en
ce
 
an
d 
ex
po
su
re
 to
 o
il 
pr
ice
 v
ol
at
ili
ty
) (
m
 / m
)
↓ ↑
He
al
th
 im
pa
ct
 v
ia
 re
du
ce
d 
ur
ba
n 
ai
r p
ol
lu
tio
n 
(r
 / h
)
Ro
ad
 sa
fe
ty
 (v
ia
 in
cr
ea
se
d 
cr
as
h-
w
or
th
in
es
s)
 (m
 / m
)
↓
Ec
os
ys
te
m
 a
nd
 b
io
di
ve
rs
ity
 im
pa
ct
 v
ia
 
re
du
ce
d 
ur
ba
n 
ai
r p
ol
lu
tio
n 
(m
 / h
)
Co
m
pa
ct
 u
rb
an
 
fo
rm
 a
nd
 im
pr
ov
ed
 
tr
an
sp
or
t 
in
fr
as
tr
uc
tu
re
M
od
al
 s
hi
ft
 
↑  ↑  ?
En
er
gy
 s
ec
ur
ity
 (r
ed
uc
ed
 o
il 
de
pe
nd
en
ce
 
an
d 
ex
po
su
re
 to
 o
il 
pr
ice
 v
ol
at
ili
ty
) (
m
 / m
)
Pr
od
uc
tiv
ity
 (r
ed
uc
ed
 u
rb
an
 c
on
ge
st
io
n 
an
d 
tra
ve
l t
im
es
, a
ffo
rd
ab
le
 a
nd
 
ac
ce
ss
ib
le
 tr
an
sp
or
t) 
(m
 / h
)
Em
pl
oy
m
en
t o
pp
or
tu
ni
tie
s 
in
 th
e 
pu
bl
ic 
tra
ns
po
rt 
se
ct
or
 v
s 
ca
r m
an
uf
ac
tu
rin
g 
jo
bs
 (l
 / m
)
 ↓ ↑ ↓ ↑  ↑
He
al
th
 im
pa
ct
 fo
r n
on
-m
ot
or
ize
d 
m
od
es
 v
ia
 
In
cr
ea
se
d 
ph
ys
ica
l a
ct
iv
ity
 (r
 / h
)
Po
te
nt
ia
lly
 h
ig
he
r e
xp
os
ur
e 
to
 a
ir 
po
llu
tio
n 
(r
 / h
)
N
oi
se
 (m
od
al
 s
hi
ft 
an
d 
tra
ve
l r
ed
uc
tio
n)
 (r
 / h
)
Eq
ui
ta
bl
e 
m
ob
ili
ty
 a
cc
es
s 
to
 e
m
pl
oy
m
en
t 
op
po
rtu
ni
tie
s, 
pa
rti
cu
la
rly
 in
 d
ev
el
op
in
g 
co
un
tri
es
 (D
Cs
) (
r /
 h)
Ro
ad
 s
af
et
y 
(v
ia
 m
od
al
 s
hi
ft 
an
d /
 or
 in
fra
st
ru
ct
ur
e 
fo
r p
ed
es
tri
an
s 
an
d 
cy
cli
st
s)
 (r
 / h
)
 ↓ ↓
Ec
os
ys
te
m
 im
pa
ct
 v
ia
 re
du
ce
d 
Ur
ba
n 
ai
r p
ol
lu
tio
n 
(r
 / h
)
La
nd
-u
se
 c
om
pe
tit
io
n 
(m
 / m
)
Jo
ur
ne
y 
di
st
an
ce
 
re
du
ct
io
n 
an
d 
av
oi
da
nc
e
↑ ↑
En
er
gy
 s
ec
ur
ity
 (r
ed
uc
ed
 o
il 
de
pe
nd
en
ce
 
an
d 
ex
po
su
re
 to
 o
il 
pr
ice
 v
ol
at
ili
ty
) (
r /
 h)
Pr
od
uc
tiv
ity
 (r
ed
uc
ed
 u
rb
an
 c
on
ge
st
io
n,
 
tra
ve
l t
im
es
, w
al
ki
ng
) (
r /
 h)
↓
He
al
th
 im
pa
ct
 (f
or
 n
on
-m
ot
or
iz
ed
 
tra
ns
po
rt 
m
od
es
) (
r /
 h)
 ↓ ↑ ↓
Ec
os
ys
te
m
 im
pa
ct
 v
ia
 
Ur
ba
n 
ai
r p
ol
lu
tio
n 
(r
 / h
)
N
ew
 / s
ho
rte
r s
hi
pp
in
g 
ro
ut
es
 (r
 / h
)
La
nd
-u
se
 c
om
pe
tit
io
n 
fro
m
 tr
an
sp
or
t i
nf
ra
st
ru
ct
ur
e 
(r
 / h
)
Bu
ild
in
gs
Sc
en
ar
io
 re
su
lts
Fo
r p
os
si
bl
e 
up
st
re
am
 e
ffe
ct
s 
of
 fu
el
 s
w
itc
hi
ng
 a
nd
 R
ES
, s
ee
 E
ne
rg
y 
Su
pp
ly
.
Fu
el
 s
w
it
ch
in
g,
 
in
co
rp
or
at
io
n 
of
 
re
ne
w
ab
le
 e
ne
rg
y,
 
gr
ee
n 
ro
of
s, 
an
d 
ot
he
r 
m
ea
su
re
s 
re
du
ci
ng
 G
H
G
 
em
is
si
on
s 
in
te
ns
it
y 
In
te
rq
ua
rt
ile
 ra
ng
es
 
fo
r t
he
 w
ho
le
 
se
ct
or
 in
 2
05
0 
w
ith
 
43
0 –
 53
0 
pp
m
 C
O
2e
q 
co
nc
en
tr
at
io
ns
 in
 
21
00
 (s
ee
 F
ig
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6�6�1 Co-benefits and adverse side-effects 
of mitigation measures: Synthesis of 
 sectoral information and linkages to 
transformation pathways 
One source of information on side-effects emerges from literature 
exploring the nature of individual technological or sectoral mitigation 
measures. These studies are covered in Chapters 7 – 12. Based on those 
assessments, Table 6.7 provides an aggregated but qualitative over-
view of the potential co-benefits and adverse side-effects that could be 
realized if certain types of mitigation measures are enacted in different 
sectors: energy supply-side transformations; technological and behav-
ioural changes in the transport, buildings, and industry end-use sec-
tors; and modified agriculture, forestry, and land use practices. These 
co-benefits and adverse side-effects can be classified by the nature of 
their sustainable development implications: economic, social, or envi-
ronmental (see Sections 4.2 and 4.8 for a discussion of the three pillars 
of sustainable development). Other types of impacts are also possible 
and are highlighted in the table where relevant. 
Whether or not any of these side-effects actually materialize, and to 
what extent, will be highly case- and site-specific, as they will depend 
importantly on local circumstances and the scale, scope, and pace 
of implementation, among other factors. Measures undertaken in 
an urbanized area of the industrialized world, for instance, may not 
yield the same impacts as when enacted in a rural part of a devel-
oping country (Barker et  al., 2007). Such detailed considerations are 
not reflected in Table 6.7, which is meant to give an aggregated sense 
of the potential co-benefits and adverse side-effects throughout the 
world when mitigation policies are in place. Details are discussed in 
each of the respective sectoral chapters (see Chapters 7 – 12). Note 
that in addition to the qualitative information on potential side-effects 
summarized below, Table 6.7 also provides quantitative information 
for each sector regarding the mid-century contribution of the respec-
tive (group of) mitigation measures to reach stringent mitigation goals 
(see Sections 6.8, 7.11, and 11.9 for the underlying data). 
The compilation of sectoral findings in Table 6.7 suggests that the 
potential for co-benefits clearly outweighs that of adverse side-effects 
in the case of energy end-use mitigation measures (transport, buildings, 
and industry), whereas the evidence suggests this may not be the case 
for all supply-side and AFOLU measures. Although no single category 
of mitigation measures is completely devoid of risk, Table 6.7 high-
lights that certain co-benefits are valid across all sectors. For instance, 
by contributing to a phaseout of conventional fossil fuels, nearly all 
mitigation measures have major health and environmental benefits for 
society, owing to significant reductions in both outdoor and indoor air 
pollution, and lead to improved energy security at the national level for 
most countries. In addition to the many sector-specific co-benefits and 
adverse side-effects, sectoral employment and productivity gains, tech-
nological spillovers, and more equitable energy / mobility access offer 
examples of co-benefits that are possible across all demand sectors. 
While energy demand reductions additionally mitigate risks associated 
with energy supply technologies (see also Rogelj et  al., 2013b), the 
upstream effects of fuel switching are more complex and depend to a 
large extent on local circumstances (see Section 7.11).
Moreover, while nearly all mitigation measures for reducing (fuel) 
carbon and energy intensity have higher up-front investment require-
ments than conventional technologies, their often lower operating 
costs, and sometimes even lifecycle costs, can contribute to reduced 
energy service prices for consumers, depending on local and national 
institutional settings (see Section 7.9.1). If, on the other hand, energy 
prices rise as a consequence, so do the political challenges of imple-
mentation, such as those associated with the provision of universal 
energy access and associated economic, social, environmental, and 
health risks for the poorest members of society (Markandya et  al., 
2009; Sathaye et al., 2011; Rao, 2013). Well-designed policies are thus 
important to avoid perverse incentives of climate policies, including 
increasing traditional biomass use for heating and cooking (see Bollen 
et al., 2009a, b, and Section 9.7.1). 
In addition to furthering the achievement of various global goals 
for sustainability, namely those of the major environmental conven-
tions (e. g., the United Nations’ Convention to Combat Desertification 
(UNCCD, 2004), Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD, 1992), ‘Sus-
tainable Energy for All’ initiative, and the Millennium Development 
Goals (MDG)), mitigation can potentially yield positive side-effects in 
the impacts, adaptation, and vulnerability (IAV) dimensions (see Sec-
tion 6.6.2.5 and 11.7, Haines et  al., 2009; Rogelj et  al., 2013c). For 
instance, decentralized renewable energy systems can help to build 
adaptive capacity in rural communities (Venema and Rehman, 2007), 
and sustainable agricultural practices (e. g., conservation tillage and 
water management) can improve drought resistance and soil conser-
vation and fertility (Uprety et al., 2012).
6�6�2 Transformation pathways studies with 
links to other policy objectives
As indicated above, the overall nature and extent of the co-benefits 
and risks arising from global transformation pathways depends impor-
tantly on which mitigation options are implemented and how. The full 
systems-level welfare impacts for multi-objective decision making are 
therefore best viewed from an integrated perspective that permits 
the full accounting of the impacts of each of the objectives on social 
welfare (see Section 3.5.3) (Bell et al., 2008; Sathaye et al., 2011; Rao 
et al., 2013). Taking such a perspective poses a significant challenge, 
since the costs of mitigation need to be weighed against the multiple 
benefits and adverse side-effects for the other objectives. To compli-
cate matters further, these other objectives are traditionally measured 
in different units (e. g., health benefits of reduced air pollution in terms 
of deaths avoided). In addition, combining the different objectives into 
a single overall welfare formulation implies subjective choices about 
the ranking or relative importance of policy priorities. Such a ranking 
is highly dependent on the policy context (see Sections 2.4 and 3.6.3).
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Since AR4, a number of scenario studies have been conducted to 
shed light on the global implications of transformation pathways for 
other objectives. Earlier scenario literature primarily focused on the 
health and ecosystem benefits of mitigation via reduced air pollu-
tion; some evidence of co-benefits for employment and energy secu-
rity was also presented in AR4. More recent studies have broadened 
their focus to include energy security, energy access, biodiversity 
conservation, water, and land-use requirements (see Section 11.13.7 
for a review of scenario studies focusing on water and land use and 
implications for food security). Many of these newer analyses use 
globally consistent methods, meaning they employ long-term, multi-
region frameworks that couple models of both bio-geophysical and 
human processes, thereby permitting the consideration of targeted 
policies for the additional objectives in their own right. While the 
majority of these studies focus on two-way interactions (e. g., the 
effect of mitigation on air pollution in a given country or across 
groups of countries — or vice versa), a few recent analyses have 
looked at three or more objectives simultaneously (Section 6.6.2.7). 
Important to note in this context is that many of the non-technical 
measures listed in Table 6.7 (e. g., behavioral changes) are not fully 
taken into account by models, though the state-of-the-art continues 
to improve.
6�6�2�1 Air pollution and health
Greenhouse gas and air pollutant emissions typically derive from the 
same sources, such as power plants, factories, and cars. Hence, miti-
gation strategies that reduce the use of fossil fuels typically result 
in major cuts in emissions of black carbon (BC), sulfur dioxide (SO2), 
nitrogen oxides (NOx), and mercury (Hg), among other harmful species. 
Together with tropospheric ozone and its precursors (mainly deriving 
from AFOLU and fossil fuel production / transport processes), these pol-
lutants separately or jointly cause a variety of detrimental health and 
ecosystem effects at various scales (see Section 7.9.2). The magnitude 
of these effects varies across pollutants and atmospheric concentra-
tions (as well as the concentrations of pollutants created via further 
chemical reactions) and is due to different degrees of population 
exposure, whether indoor or outdoor or in urban or rural settings (see 
Barker et al., 2007; Bollen et al., 2009b; Markandya et al., 2009; Smith 
et al., 2009; Sathaye et al., 2011; GEA, 2012). The term ‘fine particulate 
matter (PM2.5)’ is frequently used to refer to a variety of air pollutants 
that are extremely small in diameter and therefore cause some of the 
most serious health effects. 
The literature assessed in AR4 focused on air pollution reductions 
in individual countries and regions, pointing to large methodologi-
cal differences in, for example, the type of pollutants analyzed, sec-
toral focus, and the treatment of existing air pollution policy regimes. 
As confirmed by recent literature (Friel et al., 2009; Wilkinson et al., 
2009; Woodcock et al., 2009; Markandya et al., 2009; Haines et al., 
2009; Smith et al., 2009; Nemet et al., 2010), AR4 showed that the 
monetized air quality co-benefits from mitigation are of a similar 
order of magnitude as the mitigation costs themselves (see Sec-
tions 3.6.3 and 5.7.1). For instance, taking into account new findings 
on the relationship between chronic mortality and exposure to PM 
and ozone as well as the effect of slowing climate change on air 
quality, West et  al. (2013) calculate global average monetized co-
benefits of avoided mortality of 55 – 420 USD2010 / tCO2. They find that 
the values for East Asia far exceed the marginal mitigation costs in 
2030. (See Section 5.7 for a broader review of this issue, as well as a 
discussion of the importance of baseline conditions for these results.) 
Furthermore, it has been noted that reductions in certain air pollut-
ants can potentially increase radiative forcing (see Sections 1.2.5, 
5.2, and WG  I Chapter 7). This is an important adverse side-effect, 
and one that is not discussed here due to the lack of scenario stud-
ies addressing the associated tradeoff between health and climate 
benefits.
The available evidence indicates that transformation pathways lead-
ing to 430 – 530 ppm CO2eq in 2100 will have major co-benefits in 
terms of reduced air pollution (Figure 6.33, top right panel). Recent 
integrated modelling studies agree strongly with earlier findings by 
van Vuuren et al. (2006) and Bollen et al. (2009a) in this regard. For 
example, Rose et al. (2014b) find that national air pollution policies 
may no longer be binding constraints on pollutant emissions depend-
ing on the stringency of climate policies. In China, for instance, miti-
gation efforts consistent with a global goal of 3.7 W / m2 (2.8 W / m2) 
in 2100 result in SO2 emissions 15 to 55 % (25 – 75 %) below refer-
ence levels by 2030 and 40 to 80 % (55 – 80 %) by 2050. Chaturvedi 
and Shukla (2014) find similar results for India. Globally, Rafaj et al. 
(2013b) calculate that stringent mitigation efforts would simulta-
neously lead to near-term (by 2030) reductions of SO2, NOx, and 
PM2.5 on the order of 40 %, 30 %, and 5 %, respectively, relative to 
a baseline scenario. Riahi et  al. (2012) find that by further exploit-
ing the full range of opportunities for energy efficiency and ensuring 
access to modern forms of energy for the world’s poorest (hence less 
indoor / household air pollution), the near-term air pollution co-bene-
fits of mitigation could be even greater: 50 % for SO2, 35 % for NOx, 
and 30 % for PM2.5 by 2030. Additionally, Amann et al. (2011) and Rao 
et al. (2013) find significant reductions in air quality control costs due 
to mitigation policies (see Section 6.6.2.7). Riahi et al. (2012) further 
estimate that stringent mitigation efforts can help to reduce globally 
aggregated disability-adjusted life years (DALYs) by more than 10 mil-
lion by 2030, a decrease of one-third compared to a baseline scenario. 
The vast majority of these co-benefits would accrue in urban house-
holds of the developing world. Similarly, West et al. (2013) find that 
global mitigation (RCP 4.5) can avoid 0.5 ± 0.2, 1.3 ± 0.5, and 2.2 
± 0.8 million premature deaths in 2030, 2050, and 2100, relative to 
a baseline scenario that foresees decreasing PM and ozone (O3) con-
centrations. Regarding mercury, Rafaj et al. (2013a) show that under 
a global mitigation regime, atmospheric releases from anthropogenic 
sources can be reduced by 45 % in 2050, relative to a a baseline sce-
nario without climate measures. 
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Several studies published since AR4 have analyzed the potential cli-
mate impacts of methane mitigation and local air pollutant emissions 
control (West et al., 2006, 2007; Shine et al., 2007; Reilly et al., 2007; 
Ramanathan and Carmichael, 2008; Jerrett et  al., 2009; Anenberg 
et al., 2012). For instance, Shindell et al. (2012) identify 14 different 
methane and BC mitigation measures that, in addition to slowing the 
growth in global temperatures in the medium term (~0.5 °C lower 
by 2050, central estimate), lead to important near-term (2030) co-
benefits for health (avoiding 0.7 to 4.7 million premature deaths from 
outdoor air pollution globally) and food security (increasing annual 
crop yields globally by 30 to 135 million metric tons due to ozone 
reductions; see Section 11.13.7 for a further discussion of the rela-
tionship between mitigation and food security). Smith and Mizrahi 
(2013) also acknowledge the important co-benefits of reducing cer-
tain short-lived climate forcers (SLCF) but at the same time conclude 
that (1) the near-to-medium term climate impacts of these measures 
are likely to be relatively modest (0.16 °C lower by 2050, central esti-
mate; 0.04 – 0.35 °C considering the various uncertainties), and (2) the 
additional climate benefit of targeted SLCF measures after 2050 is 
comparatively low. 
6�6�2�2 Energy security
A number of analyses have studied the relationship between mitiga-
tion and energy security. The assessment here focuses on energy secu-
rity concerns that relate to (1) the sufficiency of resources to meet 
national energy demand at competitive and stable prices, and (2) the 
resilience of energy supply (see Section 7.9.1 for a broader discus-
sion). A number of indicators have been developed to quantitatively 
express these concerns (Kruyt et al., 2009; Jewell, 2011; Jewell et al., 
2014). The most common indicators of sufficiency of energy supply are 
energy imports (see SRREN (IPCC, 2011) Figure 9.6) and the adequacy 
of the domestic resource base (Gupta, 2008; Kruyt et al., 2009; Le Coq 
and Paltseva, 2009; IEA, 2011; Jewell, 2011; Jewell et al., 2013). Resil-
ience of energy systems is commonly measured by the diversity of 
energy sources and carriers (Stirling, 1994, 2010; Grubb et al., 2006; 
Bazilian and Roques, 2009; Skea, 2010) and the energy intensity of 
GDP (Gupta, 2008; Kruyt et al., 2009; Jewell, 2011; Cherp et al., 2012).
Recent studies show that mitigation policies would likely increase 
national energy sufficiency and resilience (Figure 6.33, top left panel). 
Mitigation policies lead to major reductions in the import dependency of 
many countries, thus making national and regional energy systems less 
vulnerable to price volatility and supply disruptions (Criqui and Mima, 
2012; Shukla and Dhar, 2011; Jewell et al., 2013). One multi-model study 
finds that in stringent mitigation scenarios, global energy trade would 
be 10 – 70 % lower by 2050 and 40 – 74 % by 2100 than in the baseline 
scenario (Jewell et al., 2013). Most of the decrease in regional import 
dependence would appear after 2030 since mitigation decreases the 
use of domestic coal in the short term, which counteracts the increase 
in domestic renewables (Akimoto et al., 2012; Jewell et al., 2013). At 
the same time mitigation leads to much lower extraction rates for fos-
sil resources (Kruyt et  al., 2009; Jewell et  al., 2013; McCollum et  al., 
2014a). The IEA, for example, finds that rapid deployment of energy 
efficiency technologies could reduce oil consumption by as much as 13 
million barrels a day (IEA, 2012). Mitigation actions could thus alleviate 
future energy price volatility, given that perceptions of resource scarcity 
are a key driver of rapid price swings. This would mean that domestic 
fossil resources could act as a ‘buffer of indigenous resources’ (Turton 
and Barreto, 2006). Improved energy security of importers, however, 
could adversely impact the ‘demand security’ of exporters (Luft, 2013); 
indeed, most of the modeling literature indicates that climate mitigation 
would decrease oil export revenues of oil exporters (IEA, 2009; Haurie 
and Vielle, 2010; Bauer et al., 2014a, 2014b; Tavoni et al., 2013; McCol-
lum et al., 2013a). However, three recent studies argue that if the cost of 
alternatives to conventional oil is high enough, conventional oil export-
ers could benefit from climate policies, particularly in the near term 
(Persson et al. 2007; Johansson et al. 2009; Nemet and Brandt, 2012). 
Although there is broad agreement in the literature about the overall 
negative effect on oil export revenues, the distribution of this effect will 
differ between exporters of conventional vs unconventional oil export-
ers. (See Section 6.3.6.6 regarding the impacts that these trade shifts 
would have on major energy exporters.) 
Studies also indicate that mitigation would likely increase the resil-
ience of energy systems (Figure 6.33, top left panel). The diversity 
of energy sources used in the transport and electricity sectors would 
rise relative to today and to a baseline scenario in which fossils 
remain dominant (Grubb et al., 2006; Riahi et al., 2012; Cherp et al., 
2014; Jewell et al., 2013). Additionally, energy trade would be much 
less affected by fluctuations in GDP growth and by uncertainties 
in fossil resource endowments and energy demand growth (Cherp 
et al., 2014; Jewell et al., 2013). These developments (mitigation and 
energy-efficiency improvements) would make energy systems more 
resilient to various types of shocks and stresses and would help 
insulate economies from price volatility and supply disruptions (see 
Chapters 8 – 10).
Figure 6�33 | Co-benefits of mitigation for energy security and air quality in scenarios with stringent climate policies (reaching 430 – 530 ppm CO2eq concentrations in 2100). 
Upper panels show co-benefits for different energy security indicators and air pollutant emissions. Lower panel shows related global policy costs of achieving the energy security, 
air quality, and mitigation objectives, either alone (w, x, y) or simultaneously (z). Integrated approaches that achieve these objectives simultaneously show the highest cost-
effectiveness due to synergies (w+x+y>z). Policy costs are given as the increase in total energy system costs relative to a no-policy baseline; hence, they only capture the mitigation 
component and do not include the monetized co-benefits of, for example, reduced health impacts or climate damages. In this sense, costs are indicative and do not represent full 
uncertainty ranges. Sources: LIMITS model intercomparison (Jewell et al., 2013; Tavoni et al., 2013), WGIII AR5 Scenario Database (Annex II.10, includes only scenarios based on 
idealized policy implementation and full technology availability), Global Energy Assessment (GEA) scenarios (Riahi et al., 2012; McCollum et al., 2013a).
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6�6�2�3 Energy access
According to the literature, providing universal energy access (see Sec-
tion 7.9.1 for a broader discussion) would likely result in negligible 
impacts on GHG emissions globally (PBL, 2012; Riahi et al., 2012). Rog-
elj et al (2013c) find that the United Nation’s (UN) energy access goals 
for 2030 are fully consistent with stringent mitigation measures while 
other scenario analyses indicate that deployment of renewable energy 
in LDCs can help to promote access to clean, reliable, and afford-
able energy services (Kaundinya et  al., 2009; Reddy et  al., 2009). In 
addition, a number of recent integrated modelling studies ensure, by 
design, that developing country household final energy consumption 
levels are compatible with minimal poverty thresholds (Ekholm et al., 
2010a; van Ruijven et  al., 2011; Daioglou et  al., 2012; Narula et  al., 
2012; Krey et al., 2012). An important message from these studies is 
that the provision of energy access in developing countries should not 
be confused with broader economic growth. The latter could have a 
pronounced GHG affect, particularly in today’s emerging economies 
(see Section 6.3.1.3).
The primary risk from mitigation is that an increase in energy prices 
for the world’s poor could potentially impair the transition to univer-
sal energy access by making energy less affordable (see Sections 6.6.1 
and 7.9.1). A related concern is that increased energy prices could also 
delay structural changes and the build-up of physical infrastructure 
(Goldemberg et al., 1985; Steckel et al., 2013; Jakob and Steckel, 2014). 
Isolating these effects has proven to be difficult in the integrated mod-
elling context because these models typically aggregate consumption 
losses from climate policies (see Section 6.3.6).
6�6�2�4 Employment
The potential consequences of climate policies on employment are 
addressed in the scientific literature in different ways. One strand 
of literature analyzes the employment impacts associated with the 
deployment of specific low-carbon technologies, such as renewables 
or building retrofits (see Sections 7.9.1 and 9.7.2.1). This literature 
often finds a significant potential for gross job creation, either directly 
or indirectly; however, a number of issues are left unresolved regard-
ing the methodologies used in computing those impacts on one hand 
and the gap between this potential and net employment impacts in 
a particular sector on the other hand (see Wei et  al., 2010). The net 
effect is typically addressed in general equilibrium literature. Although 
many integrated models used to develop long-term scenarios are gen-
eral equilibrium models, they usually assume full employment and are 
therefore not well-suited to addressing gross versus net employment-
related questions.
According to the literature, employment benefits from mitigation 
depend on the direction and strength of income / output and substitu-
tion impacts of mitigation. These impacts are governed by two inter-
related sets of factors related to mitigation technologies and general 
equilibrium effects. One set involves the characteristics of mitigation 
technologies, including (1) their costs per job created, which deter-
mines the crowding out of jobs in other sectors when capital is con-
strained (Frondel et al., 2010); (2) the portion of the low-carbon tech-
nologies that is imported, which determines domestic job creation and 
the net positive impact on the trade balance; and (3) the availability of 
skills in the labor force, as well as its capacity to adapt (Babiker and 
Eckaus, 2007; Fankhauser et  al., 2008; Guivarch et  al., 2011), which 
determines the pace of job creation and the real cost of low-carbon 
technology deployment in terms of increased wages due to skilled 
labor scarcities.
A second set of factors encompasses all the general equilibrium effects, 
some of which are triggered by the above parameters and others by 
the net income effects of higher carbon prices (see Section  3.6.3). 
Recycling the revenues from carbon pricing and subsequently lower-
ing labor taxes changes the relative prices of labor and energy (and 
to a lesser extent the costs of production inputs), which in turn leads 
to a redirection of technology choices and innovation towards more 
labor-intensive techniques. In addition, by contributing to higher 
energy costs, climate policies change the relative prices of energy- and 
non-energy intensive goods and services, thereby causing households 
to consume more of the latter. These mechanisms operate differently 
in developed, emerging, and developing economies, particularly with 
respect to the various forms of informal labor. Some of the mechanisms 
operate over the medium (more labor-intensive techniques) and long 
term (structural change) (Fankhauser et  al., 2008). Others, however, 
operate over the short term and might therefore be influenced by near-
term mitigation policies.
6�6�2�5 Biodiversity conservation
The concept of biodiversity can be interpreted in different ways. Mea-
suring it therefore presents a challenge. One indicator that has been 
used in the integrated modelling literature for assessing the biodiversity 
implications of global transformation pathways is that of mean species 
abundance (MSA), which uses the species composition and abundance 
of the original ecosystem as a reference situation. According to PBL 
(2012), globally averaged MSA declined continuously from approxi-
mately 76 % in 1970 to 68 % in 2010 (relative to the undisturbed states 
of ecosystems). This was mostly due to habitat loss resulting from con-
version of natural systems to agriculture uses and urban areas. 
The primary biodiversity-related side-effects from mitigation involve 
the potentially large role of reforestation and afforestation efforts 
and of bioenergy production. These elements of mitigation strategy 
could either impose risks or lead to co-benefits, depending on where 
and how they are implemented (see Table 6.7). The integrated model-
ling literature does not at this time provide an explicit enough treat-
ment of these issues to effectively capture the range of transforma-
tion pathways. One study (PBL, 2012) suggests that it is possible to 
stabilize average global biodiversity at the 2020 / 2030 level (MSA = 
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65 %) by 2050 even if land-use mitigation measures are deployed. 
Such an achievement represents more than a halving of all biodiver-
sity loss projected to occur by mid-century in the baseline scenario 
and is interpreted to be in accordance with the Aichi Biodiversity Tar-
gets (CBD, 2010). Of critical importance in this regard are favourable 
institutional and policy mechanisms for reforestation / afforestation 
and bioenergy that complement mitigation actions (as described in 
Section 11.13).
6�6�2�6 Water use
The last decades have seen the world’s freshwater resources come 
under increasing pressure. Almost three billion people live in water-
scarce regions (Molden, 2007), some two billion in areas of severe 
water stress in which demand accounts for more than 40 % of total 
availability (PBL, 2012). Water withdrawals for energy and industrial 
processes (currently 20 % globally) and municipal applications (10 %) 
are projected to grow considerably over the next decades, jointly sur-
passing irrigation (70 %) as the primary water user by 2050 (Alcamo 
and Henrichs, 2002; Shiklomanov and Rodda, 2003; Molden, 2007; 
Fischer et  al., 2007; Shen et  al., 2008; Bruinsma, 2011). This growth 
is projected to be greatest in areas already under high stress, such as 
South Asia. 
Renewable energy technologies such as solar PV and wind power will 
reduce freshwater withdrawals for thermal cooling relative to fossil 
alternatives. On the other hand, CCS and some forms of renewable 
energy, especially bioenergy, could demand a significant amount of 
water (see Table 6.7 and Section 7.9.2). For bioenergy in particular, the 
overall effect will depend importantly on which feedstocks are grown, 
where, and if they require irrigation (see Section 11.13.7). Similarly, 
reforestation and afforestation efforts, as well as attempts to avoid 
deforestation, will impact both water use and water quality. The net 
effects could be either positive (Townsend et  al., 2012) or negative 
(Jackson et  al., 2005), depending on the local situation (see Section 
11.7). 
When accounting for the system dynamics and relative econom-
ics between alternative mitigation options (both in space and time), 
recent integrated modelling scenarios generally indicate that stringent 
mitigation actions, combined with heightened water-use efficiency 
measures, could lead to significant reductions in global water demand 
over the next several decades. PBL (2012), for instance, calculates a 
25 % reduction in total demand by 2050, translating to an 8 % decline 
in the number of people living in severely water-stressed regions 
worldwide. Other studies by Hanasaki et al. (2013) and Hejazi et al.
(2013) find the co-benefits from mitigation to be of roughly the same 
magnitude: reductions of 1.0 – 3.9 % and 1.2 – 5.5 %, respectively, in 
2050. Hejazi et al. (2013) note, however, that water scarcity could be 
exacerbated if mitigation leads to more intensive production of bio-
energy crops. In contrast, Akimoto et  al. (2012) find that stringent 
mitigation increases water-stressed populations globally (+3 % in 
2050) as a result of decreases in annual water availability in places 
like South Asia. 
6�6�2�7 Integrated studies of multiple objectives
Integrated scenario research is just beginning to assess multiple sustain-
able development objectives in parallel. This emerging literature gener-
ally finds that mitigation goals can be achieved more cost-effectively if 
the objectives are integrated and pursued simultaneously rather than in 
isolation. Recent examples of such studies include Bollen et al. (2010) 
and the Global Energy Assessment (GEA) (McCollum et al., 2011, 2013a; 
Riahi et al., 2012). These two analyses are unique from other integrated 
studies (see e. g., Shukla et  al., 2008; Skea and Nishioka, 2008; Stra-
chan et al., 2008; IEA, 2011; Shukla and Dhar, 2011; PBL, 2012; Akimoto 
et al., 2012; Howells et al., 2013) because they attempt to quantify key 
interactions in economic terms on a global scale, employing varying 
methodologies to assess the interactions between climate change, air 
pollution, and energy security policies. Bollen et  al. (2010) employ a 
cost-benefit social welfare optimization approach while the GEA study 
employs a cost-effectiveness approach (see Section 3.7.2.1). Despite 
these differences, the two studies provide similar insights. Both suggest 
that near-term synergies can be realized through decarbonization and 
energy efficiency and that mitigation policy may be seen as a strategic 
entry point for reaping energy security and air quality co-benefits. The 
GEA study in particular finds major cost savings from mitigation policy 
in terms of reduced expenditures for imported fossil fuels and end-of-
pipe air pollution control equipment (see bottom panel of Figure 6.33). 
The magnitude of these co-benefits depends importantly on the future 
stringency of energy security and air pollution policies in the absence of 
mitigation policy. If these are more aggressive than currently planned, 
then the co-benefits would be smaller. 
Another class of sustainable development scenarios are the Low-Carbon 
Society (LCS) assessments (Kainuma et  al., 2012), which collectively 
indicate that explicit inclusion of mitigation co-benefits in the cost cal-
culation results in a lower-carbon price in the LCS scenarios than in a 
scenario that only considers mitigation costs (Shukla et al., 2008). A key 
message from these studies is that co-benefits are neither automatic nor 
assured, but result from conscious and carefully coordinated policies and 
implementation strategies, such as lifestyle changes, green manufactur-
ing processes, and investments into energy efficient devices, recycling 
measures, and other targeted actions (Shukla and Chaturvedi, 2012). 
Finally, studies suggest that co-benefits could influence the incen-
tives for global climate agreements discussed in Section 13.3 (Pittel 
and Rübbelke, 2008; Bollen et al., 2009b; Wagner, 2012). At the pres-
ent time, however, international policy regimes for mitigation and its 
important co-benefits remain separate (Holloway et  al., 2003; Swart 
et al., 2004; Nemet et al., 2010; Rao et al., 2013). Dubash et al. (2013) 
propose a methodology for operationalizing co-benefits in mitigation 
policy formulation, thus helping to bring the varied policy objectives 
closer together (see Section 15.2).
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6.7 Risks of  transformation 
pathways
Mitigation will be undertaken within the context of a broad set of pol-
icy objectives, existing societal structures, institutional frameworks, and 
physical infrastructures. The relationship between these broader char-
acteristics of human societies and the particular implications of mitiga-
tion activities will be both complex and uncertain. Mitigation will also 
take place under uncertainty about the underlying physical processes 
that govern the climate. All of these indicate that there is a range of 
different risks associated with different transformation pathways.
The various risks associated with transformation pathways can be 
grouped into several categories, and many of these are discussed else-
where in this chapter. One set of risks is associated with the linkage 
of mitigation with other policy objectives, such as clean air, energy 
security, or energy access. These linkages may be positive (co-benefits) 
or negative (risks). These relationships are discussed in Section  6.6. 
Another set of risks is associated with the possibility that particular 
mitigation measures might be taken off the table because of perceived 
negative side-effects and that stabilization will prove more challenging 
that what might have been expected (Strachan and Usher, 2012). These 
issues are discussed in Section 6.3 as well as elsewhere in the chapter, 
including Section 6.9 for CDR options. Another risk is that the economic 
costs may be higher or lower than anticipated, because the implications 
of mitigation cannot be understood with any degree of certainty today, 
for a wide range of reasons. This issue is discussed in Section 6.3.6. It is 
important to emphasize that both the economic costs and the economic 
benefits of mitigation are uncertain. One of the most fundamental risks 
associated with mitigation is that any transformation pathway may 
not maintain temperatures below a particular threshold, such as 2 °C 
or 1.5 °C above preindustrial levels due to limits in our understanding 
of the relationship between emissions and concentrations and, more 
importantly, the relationship between GHG concentrations and atmo-
spheric temperatures. This topic is discussed in Section 6.3.2.
A broad risk that underpins all the mitigation scenarios in this chapter 
is that every long-term pathway depends crucially not just on actions by 
today’s decision makers, but also by future decision-makers and future 
generations. Indeed, mitigation must be framed within a sequential-
decision making not just because it is good practice, but more funda-
mentally because decision makers today cannot make decisions for 
those in the future. A consistent risk is that future decision makers may 
not undertake the mitigation that is required to meet particular long-
term goals. In this context, actions today can be seen as creating or 
limiting options to manage risk rather than leading to particular goals. 
This topic is discussed in Sections 6.3 and 6.4 through the exploration 
of the consequences of different levels of near-term mitigation. This 
issue is particularly important in the context of scenarios that lead to 
concentration goals such as 450 ppm CO2eq by 2100. The vast majority 
of these scenarios temporarily overshoot the long-term goal and then 
descend to it by the end of the century through increasing emissions 
reductions. When near-term mitigation is not sufficiently strong, future 
mitigation must rely heavily on CDR technologies such as BECCS, put-
ting greater pressure on future decision makers and highlighting any 
uncertainties and risks surrounding these technologies. While these sce-
narios are possible in a physical sense, they come with a very large risk 
that future decision makers will not take on the ambitious action that 
would ultimately be required. Indeed, studies have shown that delayed 
and fragmented mitigation can lead to a relaxation of long-term goals 
if countries that delay their participation in a global mitigation strategy 
are not willing or unable to pick up the higher costs of compensating 
higher short-term emissions (Blanford et al., 2014; Kriegler et al., 2014c).
6.8 Integrating sector 
 analyses and 
 transformation scenarios
6�8�1 The sectoral composition of GHG 
 emissions along transformation 
pathways
Options for reducing GHG emissions exist across a wide spectrum of 
human activities. The majority of these options fall into three broad 
areas: energy supply, energy end-use, and AFOLU. The primary focus 
of energy supply options is to provide energy from low- or zero-car-
bon energy sources; that is, to decarbonize energy supply. Options 
in energy end-use sectors focus either on reducing the use of energy 
and / or on using energy carriers produced from low-carbon sources, 
including electricity generated from low-carbon sources. Direct 
options in AFOLU involve storing carbon in terrestrial systems (for 
example, through afforestation). This sector is also the source of bio-
energy. Options to reduce non-CO2 emissions exist across all these 
sectors, but most notably in agriculture, energy supply, and industry.
These sectors and the associated options are heavily interlinked. For 
example, energy demand reductions may be evident not only as direct 
emissions reductions in the end-use sectors but also as emissions 
reductions from the production of energy carriers such as electricity 
(‘indirect emissions’, see Annex A.II.5). Replacing fossil fuels in energy 
supply or end-use sectors by bioenergy reduces emissions in these sec-
tors, but may increase land-use emissions in turn (see Chapter 11, Bio-
energy Appendix). In addition, at the most general level, sectoral miti-
gation actions are linked by the fact that reducing emissions through a 
mitigation activity in one sector reduces the required reductions from 
mitigation activities in other sectors to meet a long-term CO2-equiva-
lent concentration goal.
The precise set of mitigation actions taken in any sector will depend on 
a wide range of factors, including their relative economics, policy struc-
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tures, and linkages to other objectives (see Section 6.6) and interac-
tions among measures across sectors. Both integrated models, such as 
those assessed in this chapter, and sectorally focused research, such as 
that assessed in Chapters 7 – 11, offer insights into the options for miti-
gation across sectors. The remainder of this section first assesses the 
potential for mitigation within the sectors based on integrated studies 
and then in each of the emitting sectors based on the combined assess-
ments from sectoral and integrated studies. Important questions are 
how consistent the results from integrated modelling studies are with 
sectorally-focused literature and how they complement each other.
6�8�2 Mitigation from a cross-sectoral 
 perspective: Insights from integrated 
models
Integrated models are a key source of research on the tradeoffs and 
synergies in mitigation across sectors. In scenarios from these models, 
energy sector emissions are the dominant source of GHG emissions in 
baseline scenarios, and these emissions continue to grow over time 
relative to net AFOLU CO2 emissions and non-CO2 GHG emissions (Sec-
tion 6.3.1 and Figure 6.34). Within the energy sector, direct emissions 
from energy supply, and electricity generation in particular, are larger 
than the emissions from any single end-use sector (Figure 6.34). Direct 
emissions, however, do not provide a full representation of the impor-
tance of different activities causing the emissions, because the con-
sumption of energy carriers such as electricity by the end-use sectors, 
leads to indirect emissions from the production of those energy car-
riers (consumption-based approach). An alternative perspective is to 
allocate these indirect energy supply emissions to the end-use sectors 
that use these supplies (see, for example, in Figure 6.34). At present, 
indirect emissions from electricity use are larger than direct emissions 
in buildings and constitute an important share of industrial emissions 
while they are small in transport compared to direct CO2 emissions.
In mitigation scenarios from integrated models, decarbonization of the 
electricity sector takes place at a pace more rapid than reduction of 
direct emissions in the energy end-use sectors (see Sections 7.11.3 and 
Figure 6.35). For example, in 450 ppm CO2eq scenarios, the electricity 
sector is largely decarbonized by 2050, whereas deep reductions in direct 
emissions in the end-use sectors largely arise beyond mid-century. More 
so than any other energy supply technology, the availability of BECCS 
and its role as a primary CDR technology (Sections 6.3.2 and 6.9) has a 
substantial effect on this dynamic, allowing for energy supply sectors to 
serve as a net negative emissions source by mid-century and allowing for 
more gradual emissions reductions in other sectors. In contrast, sectoral 
studies show available pathways to deep reductions in emissions (both 
direct and indirect) already by mid-century (see, e. g., Chapter 9).
Figure 6�34 | Direct (left panel) and direct and indirect emissions (right panel) of CO2 and non-CO2 GHGs across sectors in baseline scenarios. Note that in the case of indirect emis-
sions, only electricity emissions are allocated from energy supply to end-use sectors. In the left panel electricity sector emissions are shown (“Electricity*”) in addition to energy sup-
ply sector emissions which they are part of, to illustrate their large role on the energy supply side. The numbers at the bottom refer to the number of scenarios included in the ranges 
that differ across sectors and time due to different sectoral resolution and time horizon of models. Source: WG III AR5 Scenario Database (Annex II.10). Includes only baseline scenar-
ios. Note that scenarios from the AMPERE study were excluded due to large overlap with the EMF27 study. Historical data: JRC / PBL (2013), IEA (2012), see Annex II.9 and Annex II.5.
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Within the end-use sectors, deep emissions reductions in transport 
are generally the last to emerge in integrated modelling studies 
because of the assumption that options to switch to low-carbon 
energy carriers in transport are more limited than in buildings and 
industry, and also because of the expected high growth for mobility 
and freight transport (Section 8.9.1). In the majority of baseline sce-
narios from integrated models, net AFOLU CO2 emissions largely dis-
appear by mid-century, with some models projecting a net sink after 
2050 (Section 6.3.1.4). There is a wide uncertainty in the role of affor-
estation and reforestation in mitigation, however. In some mitigation 
scenarios the AFOLU sectors can become a significant carbon sink 
(Section 6.3.2.4).
6�8�3 Decarbonizing energy supply
Virtually all integrated modelling studies indicate that decarbonization 
of electricity is critical for mitigation, but there is no general consensus 
regarding the precise low-carbon technologies that might support this 
decarbonization (Fischedick et al., 2011; Clarke et al., 2012) (Section 
7.11.3). These studies have presented a wide range of combinations 
of renewable energy sources (Krey and Clarke, 2011; Luderer et  al., 
2014b), nuclear power (Bauer et  al., 2012; Rogner and Riahi, 2013), 
and CCS-based technologies (McFarland et  al., 2009; Bauer et  al., 
2014a; McCollum et al., 2014a; van der Zwaan et al., 2014) as both 
viable and cost-effective (see Section 7.11). The breadth of different, 
potentially cost-effective strategies raises the possibility not only that 
future costs and performances of competing electricity technologies 
are uncertain today, but also that regional circumstances, including 
both energy resources and links to other regional objectives (e. g., 
national security, local air pollution, energy security, see Section 6.6), 
might be as important decision making factors as economic costs (Krey 
et al., 2014). The one exception to this flexibility in energy supply sur-
rounds the use of BECCS. CDR technologies such as BECCS are fun-
damental to many scenarios that achieve low-CO2eq concentrations, 
particularly those based on substantial overshoot as might occur if 
near-term mitigation is delayed (Sections 6.3.2 and 6.4). In contrast to 
the electricity sector, decarbonization of the non-electric energy-supply 
sector (e. g., liquid fuels supply) is progressing typically at much lower 
pace (Section 7.11.3, Figures 7.14 and 7.15) and could therefore con-
stitute a bottleneck in the transformation process.
6�8�4 Energy demand reductions and fuel 
switching in end-use sectors
The two major groups of options in energy end-use sectors are those 
that focus on reducing the use of energy and / or those that focus on 
using energy carriers produced from low-carbon sources. Three impor-
tant issues are therefore the potential for fuel switching, the potential 
Figure 6�35 | Direct emissions of CO2 and non-CO2 GHGs across sectors in mitigation scenarios that reach around 450 (430 – 480) ppm CO2eq concentrations in 2100 with using 
CCS (left panel) and without using CCS (right panel). The numbers at the bottom of the graphs refer to the number of scenarios included in the ranges that differ across sectors and 
time due to different sectoral resolution and time horizon of models. White dots in the right panel refer to emissions of individual scenarios to give a sense of the spread within the 
ranges shown due to the small number of scenarios. Source: WG III AR5 Scenario Database (Annex II.10). Includes only scenarios based on idealized policy implementation that 
provide emissions at the sectoral level. Note that scenarios from the AMPERE study were excluded due to large overlap with the EMF27 study. Historical data: JRC / PBL (2013), IEA 
(2012), see Annex II.9.
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for reductions of energy use per unit of output / service, and the rela-
tionship and timing between the two. In general, as discussed in Sec-
tion 6.3.4, integrated studies indicate that energy intensity (per unit of 
GDP) reductions outweigh decarbonization of energy supply in the 
near term when the energy-supply system is still heavily reliant on 
largely carbon-intensive fossil fuels (Figure 6.17). Over time, the miti-
gation dynamic switches to one focused on carbon-intensity reduc-
tions (see AR4, Fisher et al., 2007, Section 3.3.5.2). From the perspec-
tive of end-use sectors, decarbonization of energy involves both the 
decarbonization of existing sources, for example, by producing electric-
ity from low-carbon sources or using liquid fuels made from bioenergy, 
and an increase in the use of lower-carbon fuels, for example, through 
an increase in the use of electricity (Edmonds et al., 2006; Kyle et al., 
2009; Sugiyama, 2012; Williams et al., 2012; Krey et al., 2014; Yama-
moto et al., 2014). It should be noted that there is generally an autono-
mous increase in electrification in baseline scenarios that do not 
assume any climate policies, which reflects a trend toward more con-
venient grid-based fuels due to higher affluence (Nakicenovic et  al., 
1998; Schäfer, 2005), as well as electricity typically showing a slower 
cost increase over time compared to other energy carriers (Edmonds 
et al., 2006; Krey et al., 2014).
The comparison between integrated and sectoral studies is difficult 
with regard to the timing and tradeoffs between fuel switching and 
energy reduction, because few sectoral studies have attempted to 
look concurrently at both fuel switching and energy-reduction strat-
egies. Instead, the majority of sectoral studies have focused most 
heavily on energy reduction, asking how much energy use for a par-
ticular activity can be reduced with state-of-the-art technology. One 
reason for this focus on energy reduction is that sectoral research 
is more commonly focused on near-term actions based on available 
mitigation technologies and, in the near-term, major fuel sources 
such as liquid fuels and electricity may have high-carbon intensities. 
This means that energy reductions will have substantial near-term 
mitigation effects. In the longer term, however, these fuel sources 
will be largely decarbonized along low-concentration transformation 
pathways, meaning that energy reductions will not so clearly lead to 
reductions in indirect emissions (note that this does not mean they 
do not continue to be important, because they decrease the need for 
utilizing energy sources and the associated co-benefits and risks, see 
Section 6.6).
This evolution can be clearly seen through a comparison of direct and 
indirect emissions in end-use sectors in integrated modelling scenarios 
(Figure 6.36). In 2010, the largest part of emissions from the buildings 
sector are the indirect emissions from electricity. This trend continues in 
baseline scenarios (Figure 6.36). However, in deep emission-reduction 
scenarios, indirect emissions from electricity are largely eliminated by 
2050, and in many scenarios, the electricity sector even becomes a sink 
for CO2 through the use of BECCS (Figure 6.35, left panel). There are 
only minimal indirect emissions from electricity in the transport sector 
today and by 2050 in mitigation scenarios. Those scenarios that decar-
bonize the transportation sector through electrification do so by taking 
advantage of a largely decarbonized electricity sector. The industrial 
sector lies between the buildings and transport sectors. Of importance, 
the observed trends can be very regional in character. For example, 
the value of electrification will be higher in countries or regions that 
already have low-carbon electricity portfolios.
The primary distinction between sectoral studies and integrated model-
ling studies with regard to end-use options for fuel switching and end-
use reductions is that integrated models typically represent end-use 
options at a more aggregated scale than sectoral studies. In addition, 
however, there is an important difference in the way that the two types 
of studies attempt to ascertain opportunities (see Section 8.9). Long-
term mitigation scenarios from integrated models achieve reductions 
from baseline emissions based almost exclusively on the imposition of a 
carbon price and generally assume functioning markets and may not 
Figure 6�36 | Direct CO2 emissions vs. indirect CO2 emissions from electricity in the transport, buildings, and industry sectors in 2050 for baseline and mitigation scenarios reach-
ing 430 – 480 ppm and 530 – 580 ppm CO2eq in 2100. Source: WG III AR5 Scenario Database (Annex II.10). Includes only scenarios based on idealized policy implementation that 
provide emissions at the sectoral level. Historical data from JRC / PBL (2013), IEA (2012a), see Annex II.9.
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fully represent existing barriers, in particular in end-use sectors. In con-
trast, sectoral studies explore options for energy-demand reduction 
based on engineering and / or local details and do so based on cost-
effectiveness calculations regarding a typically much richer portfolio of 
tailored options. They also recognize that there are many boundaries to 
consumer rationality and thus not all options that are cost-effective hap-
pen automatically in a baseline, but are mobilized by mitigation policies. 
It is also challenging to compare the potential for energy reductions 
across sectoral and integrated studies, because of difficulties to discern 
the degree of mitigation that has occurred in the baseline itself in these 
studies. Therefore any comparisons must be considered approximate at 
best. It is important to note that the emphasis on economic instruments 
like carbon pricing in integrated studies leads to a negative correlation 
between energy-demand reduction and the option of switching to low-
carbon energy carriers at modest cost. Therefore, integrated studies that 
foresee a significant potential for switching to electricity, for example, in 
an end-use sector at modest costs, usually show a lower need for reduc-
ing energy demand in this sector and the other way around. It should 
also be noted that there is not always a clear cut distinction between 
sectoral and integrated studies. Some sectoral studies, in particular 
those that provide estimates for both energy savings and fuel switching, 
are in fact integrated studies with considerable sectoral detail such as 
the IEA World Energy Outlook (IEA, 2010b, 2012b) or the Energy Tech-
nology Perspectives report (IEA, 2008, 2010c) (see Annex II.10). 
In general, in the transport sector, the opportunities for energy-use 
reductions and fuel switching are broadly consistent between inte-
grated and sectoral studies (Figures 6.37 and 6.38, Section 8.9). 
However, the underlying mechanisms utilized in these studies may 
be different. Comprehensive transport sector studies tend to include 
technical efficiency measures, switching to low-carbon fuels, behav-
ioural changes that affect both the modal split and the amount of 
transport services demanded, and a broader set of infrastructural 
characteristics such as compact cities. In integrated studies, these 
factors are not always addressed explicitly, and the focus is usually 
on technical efficiency measures, fuel switching and service demand 
reduction. Regarding fuel choice, the majority of integrated stud-
ies indicate a continued reliance on liquid and gaseous fuels, sup-
ported by an increase in the use of bioenergy up to 2050. Many inte-
grated studies also include substantial shares of electricity through, 
for example, the use of electric vehicles for light-duty transporta-
tion, usually during the second-half of the century. Hydrogen has 
also been identified by numerous studies as a potential long-term 
solution should storage, production, and distribution challenges be 
overcome (Section 8.9.1). While electricity and hydrogen achieve 
substantial shares in some scenarios, many integrated modelling sce-
narios show no dominant transport fuel source in 2100. This prevails 
in scenarios leading to 430 – 530 ppm CO2eq concentration levels in 
2100 with the median values for the share of electricity and hydro-
Figure 6�37 | Sectoral final energy demand reduction relative to baseline in the energy end-use sectors, transport, buildings, and industry by 2030 and 2050 in mitigation scenarios 
reaching 430 – 530 ppm and 530 – 650 ppm CO2eq in 2100 (see Section 6.3.2) compared to sectoral studies assessed in Chapters 8 – 10. Filled circles correspond to sectoral studies 
with full sectoral coverage while empty circles correspond to studies with only partial sectoral coverage (e. g., heating and cooling only for buildings). Source: WG III AR5 Scenario 
Database (Annex II.10). Includes only scenarios based on idealized policy implementation. Sectoral studies as provided by Chapters 8, 9, and 10, see Annex II.10.
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gen in 2100 being 22 % and 25 % of final energy, respectively (Sec-
tion 8.9.1, Figure 8.9.4).
Detailed building sector studies indicate energy savings potential 
by 2050 on the upper end of what integrated studies show (Section 
9.8.2, Figure 9.19), and both sectoral and integrated studies show 
modest opportunities for fuel switching due to the already high 
level of electricity consumption in the buildings sector, particularly 
in developed countries (Figures 6.37 and 6.38). Building sector stud-
ies have focused largely on identifying options for saving energy 
whereas fuel switching as a means for reducing emissions is not con-
sidered in detail by most studies. In general, both sectoral and inte-
grated studies indicate that electricity will supply a dominant share 
of building energy demand over the long term, especially if heating 
demand decreases due to a combination of efficiency gains, better 
architecture and climate change. Best case new buildings can reach 
90 % lower space heating and cooling energy use compared to the 
existing stock (Section 9.3.3), while for existing buildings, deep ret-
rofits can achieve heating and cooling energy savings in the range of 
50 – 90 % (Section 9.3.4).
Detailed industry sector studies tend to be more conservative regard-
ing savings in industrial final energy compared to baseline, but on the 
other hand foresee a greater potential for switching to low-carbon 
fuels, including electricity, heat, hydrogen and bioenergy than inte-
grated studies (Figures 6.37 and 6.38). Sectoral studies, which are 
often based on micro unit-level analyses, indicate that the broad appli-
cation of best available technologies for energy reduction could lead to 
about 25 % of energy savings in the sector with immediate deployment 
and similar contributions could be achieved with new innovations 
and deployment across a large number of production processes (Sec-
tion 10.4). Integrated models in general (with exceptions, see Section 
10.10.1) treat the industry sector in a more aggregated fashion and 
mostly do not provide detailed sub-sectoral material flows, options for 
reducing material demand, and price-induced inter-input substitution 
possibilities explicitly (Section  10.10.1). Similar to the transportation 
sector, there is no single perceived near- or long-term configuration 
for industrial energy (see Sections 10.4 and 10.7). Multiple pathways 
may be pursued or chosen depending on process selection and tech-
nology development. For the industry sector to achieve near-zero 
emission with carbonaceous energy, carriers will need CCS facilities 
though market penetration of this technology is still highly uncertain 
and only limited examples are in place so far. Some integrated studies 
indicate a move toward electricity whereas others indicate a continued 
reliance on liquid or solid fuels, largely supported through bioenergy 
(Section 10.10.1, Figure 10.14). Due to the heterogeneous character of 
the industry sector a coherent comparison between sectoral and inte-
grated studies remains difficult.
Figure 6�38 | Development of final energy low-carbon fuel shares in the energy end-use sectors transport, buildings, and industry by 2030 and 2050 in baseline and mitigation 
scenarios reaching 430 – 530 ppm and 530 – 650 ppm CO2eq in 2100 (see Section 6.3.2) compared to sectoral studies assessed in Chapters 8 – 10. Low-carbon fuels include electric-
ity, hydrogen, and liquid biofuels in transport, electricity in buildings and electricity, heat, hydrogen, and bioenergy in industry. Filled symbols correspond to sectoral studies with 
additional climate policies whereas empty symbols correspond to studies with baseline assumptions. Source: WG III AR5 Scenario Database (Annex II.10). Includes only scenarios 
based on idealized policy implementation. Sectoral studies as provided by Chapters 8, 9, and 10, see Annex II.10. Historical data from IEA (2012c; d).
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6�8�5 Options for bioenergy production, 
reducing land-use change emissions, and 
creating land-use GHG sinks
As noted in Section 6.3.5, land use has three primary roles in miti-
gation: bioenergy production, storage of carbon in terrestrial systems, 
mitigation of non-CO2 GHGs. It also influences mitigation through 
biogeophysical factors such as albedo. Integrated modelling studies 
are the primary means by which the tradeoffs and synergies between 
these different roles, in particular the first two, might unfold over the 
rest of the century. The integrated modelling studies sketch out a wide 
range of ways in which these forces might affect the land surface, from 
widespread afforestation under comprehensive climate policies to 
widespread deforestation if carbon storage on land is not included in 
the mitigation policy (Sections 6.3.5 and 11.9).
Sectoral studies complement integrated modelling studies by explor-
ing the ability of policy and social structures to support broad 
changes in land-use practices over time (Section 11.6). In general, 
sectoral studies point to the challenges associated with making 
large-scale changes to the land surface in the name of mitigation, 
such as challenges associated with institutions, livelihoods, social 
and economic concerns, and technology and infrastructure. These 
challenges raise questions about transformation pathways (Section 
11.6). For example, although increasing the land area covered by nat-
ural forests could enhance biodiversity and a range of other ecosys-
tem services, afforestation occurring through large-scale plantations 
could negatively impact biodiversity, water, and other ecosystem 
services (Sections 11.7 and 11.13.6). Similarly, the use of large land 
areas for afforestation or dedicated feedstocks for bioenergy could 
increase food prices and compromise food security if land normally 
used for food production is converted to bioenergy or forests (Sec-
tion 11.4). The degree of these effects is uncertain and depends on 
a variety of sector-specific details regarding intensification of land 
use, changes in dietary habits, global market interactions, and bio-
physical characteristics and dynamics. The implications of transfor-
mation pathways that rely heavily on reductions of non-CO2 GHGs 
from agriculture depend on whether mitigation is achieved through 
reduced absolute emissions, or through reduced emissions per unit of 
agricultural product (Section 11.6), and the role of large-scale inten-
sive agriculture, which has often not been implemented sustainably 
(e. g., large areas of monoculture food or energy crops or intensive 
livestock production, potentially damaging ecosystem services). Fur-
thermore, sector studies are beginning to elucidate implementation 
issues, such as the implications of staggered and / or partial regional 
adoption of land mitigation policies, as well as institutional design. 
For example, realizing large-scale bioenergy without compromising 
the terrestrial carbon stock might require strong institutional condi-
tions, such as an implemented and enforced global price on land car-
bon. Finally, sector studies will continue to provide revised and new 
characterizations of mitigation technologies that can be evaluated in 
a portfolio context (Section 11.9). 
6.9 Carbon and  radiation 
management and 
other geo- engineering 
options including 
 environmental risks
Some scientists have argued that it might be useful to consider, in 
addition to mitigation and adaptation measures, various intentional 
interventions into the climate system as part of a broader climate 
policy strategy (Keith, 2000; Crutzen, 2006). Such technologies have 
often been grouped under the blanket term ‘geoengineering’ or, alter-
natively, ‘climate engineering’ (Keith, 2000; Vaughan and Lenton, 
2011). Calls for research into these technologies have increased in 
recent years (Caldeira and Keith, 2010; Science and Technology Com-
mittee, 2010), and several assessments have been conducted (Royal 
Society, 2009; Edenhofer et al., 2011; Ginzky et al., 2011; Rickels et al., 
2011). Two categories of geoengineering are generally distinguished. 
Removal of GHGs, in particular carbon dioxide termed ‘carbon diox-
ide removal’ or CDR, would reduce atmospheric GHG concentrations. 
The boundary between some mitigation and some CDR methods is 
not always clear (Boucher et al., 2011, 2013). ‘Solar radiation manage-
ment’ or SRM technologies aim to increase the reflection of sunlight to 
cool the planet and do not fall within the usual definitions of mitiga-
tion and adaptation. Within each of these categories, there is a wide 
range of techniques that are addressed in more detail in Sections 6.5 
and 7.7 of the WG I report. 
Many geoengineering technologies are presently only hypothetical. 
Whether or not they could actually contribute to the avoidance of future 
climate change impacts is not clear (Blackstock et al., 2009; Royal Soci-
ety, 2009). Beyond open questions regarding environmental effects and 
technological feasibility, questions have been raised about the socio-
political dimensions of geoengineering and its potential implications 
for climate politics (Barrett, 2008; Royal Society, 2009; Rickels et  al., 
2011). In the general discussion, geoengineering has been framed in a 
number of ways (Nerlich and Jaspal, 2012; Macnaghten and Szerszyn-
ski, 2013; Luokkanen et al., 2013; Scholte et al., 2013), for instance, as 
a last resort in case of a climate emergency (Blackstock et  al., 2009; 
McCusker et al., 2012), or as a way to buy time for implementing con-
ventional mitigation (Wigley, 2006; Institution of Mechanical Engineers, 
2009; MacCracken, 2009). Most assessments agree that geoengineer-
ing technologies should not be treated as a replacement for conven-
tional mitigation and adaptation due to the high costs involved for 
some techniques, particularly most CDR methods, and the potential 
risks, or pervasive uncertainties involved with nearly all techniques 
(Royal Society, 2009; Rickels et al., 2011). The potential role of geoengi-
neering as a viable component of climate policy is yet to be determined, 
and it has been argued that geoengineering could become a distraction 
from urgent mitigation and adaptation measures (Lin; Preston, 2013). 
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6�9�1 Carbon dioxide removal
6�9�1�1 Proposed carbon dioxide removal methods and 
characteristics
Proposed CDR methods involve removing CO2 from the atmosphere 
and storing the carbon in land, ocean, or geological reservoirs. These 
methods vary greatly in their estimated costs, risks to humans and 
the environment, potential scalability, and notably in the depth of 
research about their potential and risks. Some techniques that fall 
within the definition of CDR are also regarded as mitigation mea-
sures such as afforestation and BECCS (see Glossary). The term 
‘negative emissions technologies’ can be used as an alternative to 
CDR (McGlashan et al., 2012; McLaren, 2012; Tavoni and Socolow, 
2013).
The WG I report (Section 6.5.1) provides an extensive but not exhaus-
tive list of CDR techniques (WG I Table 6.14). Here only techniques that 
feature more prominently in the literature are covered. This includes 
(1) increased land carbon sequestration by reforestation and affores-
tation, soil carbon management, or biochar (see WG  III Chapter 11); 
(2) increased ocean carbon sequestration by ocean fertilization; (3) 
increased weathering through the application of ground silicates to 
soils or the ocean; and (4) chemical or biological capture with geologi-
cal storage by BECCS or direct air capture (DAC). CDR techniques can 
be categorized in alternative ways. For example, they can be catego-
rized (1) as industrial technologies versus ecosystem manipulation; (2) 
by the pathway for carbon dioxide capture (e. g. McLaren, 2012; Cal-
deira et al., 2013); (3) by the fate of the stored carbon (Stephens and 
Keith, 2008); and (4) by the scale of implementation (Boucher et al., 
2013). Removal of other GHGs, e. g., CH4 and N2O, have also been pro-
posed (Boucher and Folberth, 2010; de Richter and Caillol, 2011; Sto-
laroff et al., 2012). 
All CDR techniques have a similar slow impact on rates of warming as 
mitigation measures (van Vuuren and Stehfest, 2013) (see WG I Section 
6.5.1). An atmospheric ‘rebound effect’ (see WG  I Glossary) dictates 
that CDR requires roughly twice as much CO2 removed from the atmo-
sphere for any desired net reduction in atmospheric CO2 concentration, 
as some CO2 will be returned from the natural carbon sinks (Lenton 
and Vaughan, 2009; Matthews, 2010). Permanence of the storage res-
ervoir is a key consideration for CDR efficacy. Permanent (larger than 
tens of thousands of years) could be geological reservoirs while non-
permanent reservoirs include oceans and land (the latter could, among 
others, be affected by the magnitude of future climate change) (see 
WG I Section 6.5.1). Storage capacity estimates suggest geological res-
ervoirs could store several thousand GtC; the oceans a few thousand 
GtC in the long term, and the land may have the potential to store 
the equivalent to historical land-use loss of 180 ± 80 GtC (also see 
Table 6.15 of WG  I)(IPCC, 2005; House et  al., 2006; Orr, 2009; Mat-
thews, 2010). 
Ocean fertilization field experiments show no consensus on the effi-
cacy of iron fertilization (Boyd et  al., 2007; Smetacek et  al., 2012). 
Modelling studies estimate between 15 ppm and less than 100 ppm 
drawdown of CO2 from the atmosphere over 100 years (Zeebe and 
Archer, 2005; Cao and Caldeira, 2010) while simulations of mechanical 
upwelling suggest 0.9 Gt / yr (Oschlies et al., 2010). The latter technique 
has not been field tested. There are a number of possible risks including 
downstream decrease in productivity, expanded regions of low-oxygen 
concentration, and increased N2O emissions (See WG I Section 6.5.3.2) 
(low confidence). Given the uncertainties surrounding effectiveness 
and impacts, this CDR technique is at a research phase with no active 
commercial ventures. Furthermore, current international governance 
states that marine geoengineering including ocean fertilization is to 
be regulated under amendments to the London Convention / London 
Protocol on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes 
and Other Matter, only allowing legitimate scientific research (Güssow 
et al., 2010; International Maritime Organization, 2013).
Enhanced weathering on land using silicate minerals mined, crushed, 
transported, and spread on soils has been estimated to have a poten-
tial capacity, in an idealized study, of 1 GtC / yr (Köhler et al., 2010). 
Ocean-based weathering CDR methods include use of carbonate or 
silicate minerals processed or added directly to the ocean (see WG I 
Section 6.5.2.3). All of these measures involve a notable energy 
demand through mining, crushing, and transporting bulk materials. 
Preliminary hypothetical cost estimates are in the order of 23 – 66 
USD / tCO2 (Rau and Caldeira, 1999; Rau et  al., 2007) for land and 
51 – 64 USD / tCO2 for ocean methods (McLaren, 2012). The confidence 
level on the carbon cycle impacts of enhanced weathering is low 
(WG I Section 6.5.3.3). 
The use of CCS technologies (IPCC, 2005) with biomass energy also 
creates a carbon sink (Azar et  al., 2006; Gough and Upham, 2011). 
BECCS is included in the RCP 2.6 (van Vuuren et al., 2007, 2011b) and 
a wide range of scenarios reaching similar and higher concentration 
goals. From a technical perspective, BECCS is very similar to a com-
bination of other techniques that are part of the mitigation portfolio: 
the production of bio-energy and CCS for fossil fuels. Estimates of the 
global technical potential for BECCS vary greatly ranging from 3 to 
more than 10 GtCO2 / yr (Koornneef et  al., 2012; McLaren, 2012; van 
Vuuren et al., 2013), while initial cost estimates also vary greatly from 
around 60 to 250 USD / tCO2 (McGlashan et al., 2012; McLaren, 2012). 
Important limiting factors for BECCS include land availability, a sus-
tainable supply of biomass and storage capacity (Gough and Upham, 
2011; McLaren, 2012). There is also a potential issue of competition for 
biomass under bioenergy-dependent mitigation pathways.
Direct air capture uses a sorbent to capture CO2 from the atmosphere 
and the long-term storage of the captured CO2 in geological reservoirs 
(GAO, 2011; McGlashan et al., 2012; McLaren, 2012). There are a number 
of proposed capture methods including adsorption of CO2 using amines 
in a solid form and the use of wet scrubbing systems based on calcium 
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or sodium cycling. Current research efforts focus on capture methodolo-
gies (Keith et al., 2006; Baciocchi et al., 2006; Lackner, 2009; Eisenberger 
et al., 2009; Socolow et al., 2011) with storage technologies assumed 
to be the same as CCS (IPCC, 2005). A U. S. Government Accountabil-
ity Office (GAO) (2011) technology assessment concluded that all DAC 
methods were currently immature. A review of initial hypothetical cost 
estimates, summarizes 40 – 300 USD / tCO2 for supported amines and 
165 – 600 USD / tCO2 for sodium or calcium scrubbers (McLaren, 2012) 
reflecting an ongoing debate across very limited literature. Carbon diox-
ide captured through CCS, BECCS, and DAC are all intended to use the 
same storage reservoirs (in particular deep geologic reservoirs), poten-
tially limiting their combined use under a transition pathway. 
6�9�1�2 Role of carbon dioxide removal in the context of 
transformation pathways
Two of the CDR techniques listed above, BECCS and afforestation, are 
already evaluated in the current integrated models. For concentration 
goals on the order of 430 – 530 ppm CO2eq by 2100, BECCS forms an 
essential component of the response strategy for climate change in 
the majority of scenarios in the literature, particularly in the context of 
concentration overshoot. As discussed in Section 6.2.2, BECCS offers 
additional mitigation potential, but also an option to delay some of the 
drastic mitigation action that would need to happen to reach lower 
GHG-concentration goals by the second half of the century. In sce-
narios aiming at such low-concentration levels, BECCS is usually com-
petitive with conventional mitigation technologies, but only after these 
have been deployed at very large scale (see Azar et al., 2010; Tavoni 
and Socolow, 2013). At same time, BECCS applications do not feature 
in less ambitious mitigation pathways (van Vuuren et al., 2011a). Key 
implications of the use of BECCS in transition pathways is that emis-
sion reduction decisions are directly related to expected availability and 
deployment of BECCS in the second half of the century and that scenar-
ios might temporarily overshoot temperature or concentration goals. 
The vast majority of scenarios in the literature show CO2 emissions of 
LUC become negative in the second half of the century — even in the 
absence of mitigation policy (see Section 6.3.2). This is a consequence 
of demographic trends and assumptions on land-use policy. Addition-
ally afforestation as part of mitigation policy is included in a smaller 
set of models. In these models, afforestation measures increase for 
lower-concentration categories, potentially leading to net uptake of 
carbon of around 10 GtCO2 / yr.
There are broader discussions in the literature regarding the techno-
logical challenges and potential risks of large-scale BECCS deploy-
ment. The potential role of BECCS will be influenced by the sustain-
able supply of large-scale biomass feedstock and feasibility of capture, 
transport, and long-term underground storage of CO2 as well as the 
perceptions of these issues. The use of BECCS faces large challenges in 
financing, and currently no such plants have been built and tested at 
scale. Integrated modeling studies have therefore explored the sensi-
tivities regarding the availability of BECCS in the technology portfolio 
by limiting bioenergy supply or CCS storage (Section 6.3.6.3).
Only a few papers have assessed the role of DAC in mitigation scenar-
ios (e. g. Keith et al., 2006; Keller et al., 2008a; Pielke Jr, 2009; Nemet 
and Brandt, 2012; Chen and Tavoni, 2013). These studies generally 
show that the contribution of DAC hinges critically on the stringency 
of the concentration goal, the costs relative to other mitigation tech-
nologies, time discounting and assumptions about scalability. In these 
models, the influence of DAC on the mitigation pathways is similar to 
that of BECCS (assuming similar costs). That is, it leads to a delay in 
short-term emission reduction in favour of further reductions in the 
second half of the century. Other techniques are even less mature and 
currently not evaluated in integrated models.
There are some constraints to the use of CDR techniques as empha-
sized in the scenario analysis. First of all, the potential for BECCS, 
afforestation, and DAC are constrained on the basis of available land 
and / or safe geologic storage potential for CO2. Both the potential for 
sustainable bio-energy use (including competition with other demands, 
e. g., food, fibre, and fuel production) and the potential to store > 100 
GtC of CO2 per decade for many decades are very uncertain (see previ-
ous section) and raise important societal concerns. Finally, the large-
scale availability of CDR, by shifting the mitigation burden in time, 
could also exacerbate inter-generational impacts.
6�9�2 Solar radiation management
6�9�2�1 Proposed solar radiation management methods 
and characteristics
SRM geoengineering technologies aim to lower the Earth’s tempera-
ture by reducing the amount of sunlight that is absorbed by the Earth’s 
surface, and thus countering some of the GHG induced global warm-
ing. Most techniques work by increasing the planetary albedo, thus 
reflecting a greater fraction of the incoming sunlight back to space. A 
number of SRM methods have been proposed:
•	 Mirrors (or sunshades) placed in a stable orbit between the Earth 
and Sun would directly reduce the insolation the Earth receives 
(Early, 1989; Angel, 2006). Studies suggest that such a technology 
is unlikely to be feasible within the next century (Angel, 2006). 
•	 Stratospheric aerosol injection would attempt to imitate the global 
cooling that large volcanic eruptions produce (Budyko and Miller, 
1974; Crutzen, 2006; Rasch et al., 2008). This might be achieved by 
lofting sulphate aerosols (or other aerosol species) or their precur-
sors to the stratosphere to create a high-altitude reflective layer 
that would need to be continually replenished. Section 7.7.2.1 of 
WG I assessed that there is medium confidence that up to 4 W/m2 
of forcing could be achieved with this approach.
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•	 Cloud brightening might be achieved by increasing the albedo of 
certain marine clouds through the injection of cloud condensation 
nuclei, most likely sea salt, producing an effect like that seen when 
ship-tracks of brighter clouds form behind polluting ships (Latham, 
1990; Latham et al., 2008, 2012). Section 7.7.2.2 of WG I assessed 
that too little was known about marine cloud brightening to pro-
vide a definitive statement on its potential efficacy, but noted that 
it might be sufficient to counter the radiative forcing that would 
result from a doubling of CO2 levels. 
•	 Various methods have been proposed that could increase the 
albedo of the planetary surface, for example in urban, crop, and 
desert regions (President’s Science Advisory Committee. Environ-
mental Pollution Panel, 1965; Gaskill, 2004; Hamwey, 2007; Ridg-
well et al., 2009). These methods would likely only be possible on a 
much smaller scale than those listed above. Section 7.7.2.3 of WG I 
discusses these approaches.
This list is non-exhaustive and new proposals for SRM methods may be 
put forward in the future. Another method that is discussed alongside 
SRM methods aims to increase outgoing thermal radiation through the 
modification of cirrus clouds (Mitchell and Finnegan, 2009) (see WG I 
Section 7.7.2.4). 
As SRM geoengineering techniques only target the solar radiation 
budget of the Earth, the effects of CO2 and other GHGs on the Earth 
System would remain, for example, greater absorption and re-emis-
sion of thermal radiation by the atmosphere (WG I Section 7.7), an 
enhanced CO2 physiological effect on plants (WG I Section 6.5.4), and 
increased ocean acidification (Matthews et al., 2009). Although SRM 
geoengineering could potentially reduce the global mean surface air 
temperature, no SRM technique could fully return the climate to a 
pre-industrial or low-CO2-like state. One reason for this is that global 
mean temperature and global mean hydrological cycle intensity can-
not be simultaneously returned to a pre-industrial state (Govindasamy 
and Caldeira, 2000; Robock et al., 2008; Schmidt et al., 2012; Kravitz 
et al., 2013; MacMartin et al., 2013; Tilmes et al., 2013). Section 7.7.3 
of WG I details the current state of knowledge on the potential climate 
consequences of SRM geoengineering. In brief, simulation studies sug-
gest that some SRM geoengineering techniques applied to a high-CO2 
climate could create climate conditions more like those of a low-CO2 
climate (Moreno-Cruz et  al., 2011; MacMartin et  al., 2013), but the 
annual mean, seasonality, and interannual variability of climate would 
be modified compared to the pre-industrial climate (Govindasamy and 
Caldeira, 2000; Lunt et al., 2008; Robock et al., 2008; Ban-Weiss and 
Caldeira, 2010; Moreno-Cruz et al., 2011; Schmidt et al., 2012; Kravitz 
et al., 2013; MacMartin et al., 2013). SRM geoengineering that could 
reduce global mean temperatures would reduce thermosteric sea-level 
rise and would likely also reduce glacier and ice-sheet contributions to 
sea-level rise (Irvine et al., 2009, 2012; Moore et al., 2010).
Model simulations suggest that SRM would result in substantially 
altered global hydrological conditions, with uncertain consequences 
for specific regional responses such as precipitation and evaporation in 
monsoon regions (Bala et al., 2008; Schmidt et al., 2012; Kravitz et al., 
2013; Tilmes et al., 2013). In addition to the imperfect cancellation of 
GHG-induced changes in the climate by SRM, CO2 directly affects the 
opening of plant stomata, and thus the rate of transpiration of plants 
and in turn the recycling of water over continents, soil moisture, and 
surface hydrology (Bala et al., 2007; Betts et al., 2007; Boucher et al., 
2009; Spracklen et al., 2012). 
Due to these broadly altered conditions that would result from an 
implementation of geoengineering, and based on experience from 
studies of the detection and attribution of climate change, it may take 
many decades of observations to be certain whether SRM is respon-
sible for a particular regional trend in climate (Stone et al., 2009; Mac-
Mynowski et al., 2011). These detection and attribution problems also 
imply that field testing to identify some of the climate consequences of 
SRM geoengineering would require deployment at a sizeable fraction 
of full deployment for a period of many years or even decades (Robock 
et al., 2010; MacMynowski et al., 2011).
It is important to note that in addition to affecting the planet’s climate, 
many SRM methods could have serious non-climatic side-effects. Any 
stratospheric aerosol injection would affect stratospheric chemistry 
and has the potential to affect stratospheric ozone levels. Tilmes et al. 
(2009) found that sulphate aerosol geoengineering could delay the 
recovery of the ozone hole by decades (WG I Section 7.7.2.1). Strato-
spheric aerosol geoengineering would scatter light, modifying the 
optical properties of the atmosphere. This would increase the diffuse-
to-direct light ratio, which would make the sky appear hazier (Kravitz 
et  al., 2012), reduce the efficacy of concentrated solar power facili-
ties (Murphy, 2009), and potentially increase the productivity of some 
plant species, and preferentially those below the canopy layer, with 
unknown long-term ecosystem consequences (Mercado et al., 2009). 
The installations and infrastructure of SRM geoengineering techniques 
may also have some negative effects that may be particularly acute for 
techniques that are spatially extensive, such as desert albedo geoengi-
neering. SRM would have very little effect on ocean acidification and 
the other direct effects of elevated CO2 concentrations that are likely to 
pose significant risks (see WG I Section 6.5.4). 
6�9�2�2 The relation of solar radiation management to 
climate policy and transformation pathways
A key determinant of the potential role, if any, of SRM in climate policy 
is that some methods might act relatively quickly. For example, strato-
spheric aerosol injection could be deployable within months to years, 
if and when the technology is available, and the climate response to 
the resulting changes in radiative forcing could occur on a timescale 
of a decade or less (e. g. Keith, 2000; Matthews and Caldeira, 2007; 
Royal Society, 2009; Swart and Marinova, 2010; Goes et  al., 2011). 
Mitigating GHG emissions would affect global mean temperatures 
only on a multi-decadal to centennial time-scale because of the inertia 
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in the carbon cycle (van Vuuren and Stehfest, 2013). Hence, it has been 
argued that SRM technologies could potentially complement mitiga-
tion activities, for example, by countering global GHG radiative forcing 
while mitigation activities are being implemented, or by providing a 
back-up strategy for a hypothetical future situation where short-term 
reductions in radiative forcing may be desirable (Royal Society, 2009; 
Rickels et  al., 2011). However, the relatively fast and strong climate 
response expected from some SRM techniques would also impose 
risks. The termination of SRM geoengineering forcing either by policy 
choice or through some form of failure would result in a rapid rise 
of global mean temperature and associated changes in climate, the 
magnitude of which would depend on the degree of SRM forcing that 
was being exerted and the rate at which the SRM forcing was with-
drawn (Wigley, 2006; Matthews and Caldeira, 2007; Goes et al., 2011; 
Irvine et al., 2012; Jones et al., 2013). It has been suggested that this 
risk could be minimized if SRM geoengineering was used moderately 
and combined with strong CDR geoengineering and mitigation efforts 
(Ross and Matthews, 2009; Smith and Rasch, 2012). The potential of 
SRM to significantly impact the climate on short time-scales, at poten-
tially low cost, and the uncertainties and risks involved in this raise 
important socio-political questions in addition to natural scientific and 
technological considerations in the section above. 
The economic analysis of the potential role of SRM as a climate change 
policy is an area of active research and has, thus far, produced mixed 
and preliminary results (see Klepper and Rickels, 2012). Estimates of 
the direct costs of deploying various proposed SRM methods differ sig-
nificantly. A few studies have indicated that direct costs for some SRM 
methods might be considerably lower than the costs of conventional 
mitigation, but all estimates are subject to large uncertainties because 
of questions regarding efficacy and technical feasibility (Coppock, 
1992; Barrett, 2008; Blackstock et al., 2009; Robock et al., 2009; Pierce 
et al., 2010; Klepper and Rickels, 2012; McClellan et al., 2012). 
However, SRM techniques would carry uncertain risks, do not directly 
address some impacts of anthropogenic GHG emissions, and raise a 
range of ethical questions (see WG III Section 3.3.8) (Royal Society, 2009; 
Goes et  al., 2011; Moreno-Cruz and Keith, 2012; Tuana et  al., 2012). 
While costs for the implementation of a particular SRM method might 
potentially be low, a comprehensive assessment would need to consider 
all intended and unintended effects on ecosystems and societies and 
the corresponding uncertainties (Rickels et al., 2011; Goes et al., 2011; 
Klepper and Rickels, 2012). Because most proposed SRM methods would 
require constant replenishment and an increase in their implementation 
intensity if emissions of GHGs continue, the result of any assessment 
of climate policy costs is strongly dependent on assumptions about the 
applicable discount rate, the dynamics of deployment, the implementa-
tion of mitigation, and the likelihood of risks and side-effects of SRM 
(see Bickel and Agrawal, 2011; Goes et al., 2011). While it has been sug-
gested that SRM technologies may ‘buy time’ for emission reductions 
(Rickels et al., 2011), they cannot substitute for emission reductions in 
the long term because they do not address concentrations of GHGs and 
would only partially and imperfectly compensate for their impacts.
The acceptability of SRM as a climate policy in national and interna-
tional socio-political domains is uncertain. While international com-
mitment is required for effective mitigation, a concern about SRM is 
that direct costs might be low enough to allow countries to unilater-
ally alter the global climate (Bodansky, 1996; Schelling, 1996; Barrett, 
2008). Barrett (2008) and Urpelainen (2012) therefore argue that SRM 
technologies introduce structurally obverse problems to the ‘free-rider’ 
issue in climate change mitigation. Some studies suggest that deploy-
ment of SRM hinges on interstate cooperation, due to the complexity 
of the climate system and the unpredictability of outcomes if states do 
not coordinate their actions (Horton, 2011). In this case, the political 
feasibility of an SRM intervention would depend on the ability of state-
level actors to come to some form of agreement. 
The potential for interstate cooperation and conflict will likely depend 
on the institutional context in which SRM is being discussed, as well 
as on the relative importance given to climate change issues at the 
national and international levels. Whether a broad international agree-
ment is possible is a highly contested subject (see Section  13.4.4) 
(SRMGI, 2012). Several researchers suggest that a UN-based institu-
tional arrangement for decision making on SRM would be most effec-
tive (Barrett, 2008; Virgoe, 2009; Zürn and Schäfer, 2013). So far there 
are no legally binding international norms that explicitly address SRM, 
although certain general rules and principles of international law are 
applicable (see WG II, Chapter 13, p.37). States parties to the UN Con-
vention on Biological Diversity have adopted a non-binding decision on 
geoengineering that establishes criteria that could provide guidance for 
further development of international regulation and governance (CBD 
Decision IX / 16 C (ocean fertilization) and Decision X / 33(8)(w); see also 
LC / LP Resolutions LC-LP.1(2008) and LC-LP.2(2010), preamble). 
Commentators have identified the governance of SRM technologies 
as a significant political and ethical challenge, especially in ensuring 
legitimate decision making, monitoring, and control (Victor, 2008; 
Virgoe, 2009; Bodansky, 2012). Even if SRM would largely reduce the 
global temperature rise due to anthropogenic climate change, as cur-
rent modelling studies indicate, it would also imply a spatial and tem-
poral redistribution of risks. SRM thus introduces important questions 
of intra- and intergenerational justice, both distributive and procedural 
(see Wigley, 2006; Matthews and Caldeira, 2007; Goes et  al., 2011; 
Irvine et  al., 2012; Tuana et  al., 2012; Bellamy et  al., 2012; Preston, 
2013). Furthermore, since the technologies would not remove the need 
for emission reductions, in order to to effectively ameliorate climate 
change over a longer-term SRM regulation would need to be based 
on a viable relation between mitigation and SRM activities, and con-
sider the respective and combined risks of increased GHG concentra-
tions and SRM interventions. The concern that the prospect of a viable 
SRM technology may reduce efforts to mitigate and adapt has featured 
prominently in discussions to date (Royal Society, 2009; Gardiner, 
2011; Preston, 2013).
Whether SRM field research or even deployment would be socially and 
politically acceptable is also dependent on the wider discursive con-
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text in which the topic is being discussed. Bellamy et al. (2013) show 
that the success of mitigation policies is likely to have an influence on 
stakeholder acceptability of SRM. While current evidence is limited to 
few studies in a very narrow range of cultural contexts, in a first review 
of early studies on perceptions of geoengineering, Corner et al. (2012) 
find that participants of different studies tend to prefer CDR over SRM 
and mitigation over geoengineering. Considerations that influence 
opinions are, amongst others, the perceived ‘naturalness’ of a technol-
ogy, its reversibility, and the capacity for responsible and transparent 
governance (Corner et al., 2012). Furthermore, the way that the topic is 
framed in the media and by experts plays an important role in influenc-
ing opinions on SRM research or deployment (Luokkanen et al., 2013; 
Scholte et al., 2013). The direction that future discussions may take is 
impossible to predict, since deepened and highly differentiated informa-
tion is rapidly becoming available (Corner et al., 2012; Macnaghten and 
Szerszynski, 2013).
6�9�3 Summary
Despite the assumption of some form of negative CO2 emissions 
in many scenarios, including those leading to 2100 concentrations 
approaching 450 ppm CO2eq, whether proposed CDR or SRM geoen-
gineering techniques can actually play a useful role in transformation 
pathways is uncertain as the efficacy and risks of many techniques are 
poorly understood at present. CDR techniques aim to reduce CO2 (or 
potentially other GHG) concentrations. A broad definition of CDR would 
cover afforestation and BECCS, which are sometimes classified as miti-
gation techniques, but also proposals that are very distinct from mitiga-
tion in terms of technical maturity, scientific understanding, and risks 
such as ocean iron fertilization. The former are often included in current 
integrated models and scenarios and are, in terms of their impact on 
the climate, directly comparable with techniques that are considered 
to be conventional mitigation, notably fossil CCS and bio-energy use. 
Both BECCS and afforestation may play a key role in reaching low-GHG 
concentrations, but at a large scale have substantial land-use demands 
that may conflict with other mitigation strategies and societal needs 
such as food production. Whether other CDR techniques would be able 
to supplement mitigation at any significant scale in the future depends 
upon efficacy, cost, and risks of these techniques, which at present are 
highly uncertain. The properties of potential carbon storage reservoirs 
are also critically important, as limits to reservoir capacity and longevity 
will constrain the quantity and permanence of CO2 storage. Further-
more, some CDR techniques such as ocean iron fertilization may pose 
transboundary risks. The impacts of CDR would be relatively slow: cli-
mate effects would unfold over the course of decades.
In contrast to CDR, SRM would aim to cool the climate by shielding 
sunlight. These techniques would not reduce elevated GHG concentra-
tions, and thus not affect other consequences of high-GHG concentra-
tions, such as ocean acidification. Some SRM proposals could potentially 
cause a large cooling within years, much quicker than mitigation or CDR, 
and a few studies suggest that costs might be considerably lower than 
CDR for some SRM techniques. It has thus been suggested that SRM 
could be used to quickly reduce global temperatures or to limit tempera-
ture rise while mitigation activities are being implemented. However, 
to avoid warming, SRM would need to be maintained as long as GHG 
concentrations remain elevated. Modelling studies show that SRM may 
be able to reduce global average temperatures but would not perfectly 
reverse all climatic changes that occur due to elevated GHG concentra-
tions, especially at local to regional scales. For example, SRM is expected 
to weaken the global hydrological cycle with consequences for regional 
precipitation patterns and surface hydrology, and is expected to change 
the seasonality and variability of climate. Because the potential climate 
impacts of any SRM intervention are uncertain and evidence is very lim-
ited, it is too early to conclude how effective SRM would be in reducing 
climate risks. SRM approaches may also carry significant non-climatic 
side-effects. For example, sulphate aerosol injection would modify 
stratospheric chemistry, potentially reducing ozone levels, and would 
change the appearance of the sky. The risks of SRM interventions and 
large-scale experiments, alongside any potential benefits, raise a num-
ber of ethical and political questions that would require public engage-
ment and international cooperation to address adequately. 
6.10 Gaps in  knowledge 
and data
The questions that motivate this chapter all address the broad char-
acteristics of possible long-term transformation pathways toward sta-
bilization of GHG concentrations. The discussion has not focused on 
today’s global or country-specific technology strategies, policy strate-
gies, or other elements of a near-term strategy. It is therefore within 
this long-term strategic context that gaps in knowledge and data 
should be viewed. 
Throughout this chapter, a number of areas of further development 
have been highlighted. Several areas would be most valuable to fur-
ther the development of information and insights regarding long-term 
transformation pathways. These include the following: development of 
a broader set of socioeconomic and technological storylines to support 
the development of future scenarios; scenarios pursuing a wider set 
of climate goals including those related to temperature change; more 
mitigation scenarios that include impacts from, and adaptations to, a 
changing climate, including energy and land-use systems critical for 
mitigation; expanded treatment of the benefits and risks of CDR and 
SRM options; expanded treatment of co-benefits and risks of mitiga-
tion pathways; improvements in the treatment and understanding of 
mitigation options and responses in end-use sectors in transforma-
tion pathways; and more sophisticated treatments of land use and 
land use-based mitigation options in mitigation scenarios. In addition, 
a major weakness of the current integrated modelling suite is that 
regional definitions are often not comparable across models. An impor-
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tant area of advancement would be to develop some clearly defined 
regional definitions that can be met by most or all models.
6.11 Frequently Asked 
Questions
FAQ 6�1 Is it possible to bring climate change 
under control given where we are 
and what options are available to us? 
What are the implications of delay-
ing  mitigation or limits on technology 
options? 
Many commonly discussed concentration goals, including the goal 
of reaching 450 ppm CO2eq by the end of the 21st century, are both 
physically and technologically possible. However, meeting long-term 
climate goals will require large-scale transformations in human societ-
ies, from the way that we produce and consume energy to how we 
use the land surface, that are inconsistent with both long-term and 
short-term trends. For example, to achieve a 450 ppm CO2eq concen-
tration by 2100, supplies of low-carbon energy — energy from nuclear 
power, solar power, wind power, hydroelectric power, bioenergy, and 
fossil resources with carbon dioxide capture and storage — might 
need to increase five-fold or more over the next 40 years. The pos-
sibility of meeting any concentration goal therefore depends not just 
on the available technologies and current emissions and concentra-
tions, but also on the capacity of human societies to bear the asso-
ciated economic implications, accept the associated rapid and large-
scale deployment of technologies, develop the necessary institutions 
to manage the transformation, and reconcile the transformation with 
other policy priorities such as sustainable development. Improvements 
in the costs and performance of mitigation technologies will ease the 
burden of this transformation. If the world’s countries cannot take on 
sufficiently ambitious mitigation over the next 20 years, or obstacles 
impede the deployment of important mitigation technologies at large 
scale, goals such as 450 ppm CO2eq by 2100 may no longer be pos-
sible. 
FAQ 6�2 What are the most important 
 technologies for mitigation? Is there a 
silver bullet technology?
Limiting CO2eq concentrations will require a portfolio of options, 
because no single option is sufficient to reduce CO2eq concentrations 
and eventually eliminate net CO2 emissions. A portfolio approach can 
be tailored to local circumstances to take into account other priorities 
such as those associated with sustainable development. Technology 
options include a range of energy supply technologies such as nuclear 
power, solar energy, wind power, and hydroelectric power, as well as 
bioenergy and fossil resources with carbon dioxide capture and storage. 
In addition, a range of end-use technologies will be needed to reduce 
energy consumption, and therefore the need for low-carbon energy, 
and to allow the use of low-carbon fuels in transportation, buildings, 
and industry. Halting deforestation and encouraging an increase in for-
ested land will help to halt or reverse LUC CO2 emissions. Furthermore, 
there are opportunities to reduce non-CO2 emissions from land use and 
industrial sources. Many of these options must be deployed to some 
degree to stabilize CO2eq concentrations. At the same time, although a 
portfolio approach is necessary, if emissions reductions are too modest 
over the coming two decades, it may no longer be possible to reach a 
goal of 450 ppm CO2eq by the end of the century without large-scale 
deployment of carbon dioxide removal technologies. Thus, while no 
individual technology is sufficient, carbon dioxide removal technologies 
could become necessary in such a scenario.
FAQ 6�3 How much would it cost to bring climate 
change under control?
Aggregate economic mitigation cost metrics are an important criterion 
for evaluating transformation pathways and can indicate the level of 
difficulty associated with particular pathways. However, the broader 
socio-economic implications of mitigation go beyond measures of 
aggregate economic costs, as transformation pathways involve a range 
of tradeoffs that link to other policy priorities. Global mitigation cost 
estimates vary widely due to methodological differences along with 
differences in assumptions about future emissions drivers, technolo-
gies, and policy conditions. Most scenario studies collected for this 
assessment that are based on the idealized assumptions that all coun-
tries of the world begin mitigation immediately, there is a single global 
carbon price applied to well-functioning markets, and key technologies 
are available, find that meeting a 430 – 480 ppm CO2eq goal by cen-
tury’s end would entail a reduction in the amount global consumers 
spend of 1 – 4 % in 2030, 2 – 6 % in 2050, and 3 – 11 % in 2100 rela-
tive to what would happen without mitigation. To put these losses in 
context, studies assume that consumption spending might grow from 
four- to over ten-fold over the century without mitigation. Less ambi-
tious goals are associated with lower costs this century. Substantially 
higher and lower estimates have been obtained by studies that con-
sider interactions with pre-existing distortions, non-climate market 
failures, and complementary policies. Studies explicitly exploring the 
implications of less-idealized policy approaches and limited technol-
ogy performance or availability have consistently produced higher cost 
estimates. Delaying mitigation would reduce near-term costs; however 
subsequent costs would rise more rapidly to higher levels.
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